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Part I. Development and Structure
Chapter 1. Introduction
1. The IMF is the only global organization that administers and supervises mon-
etary relations between states. The objects of the IMF Articles of Agreement are the
exchange rates and balances of payments of its membership; the overall objective is
to create stability in the monetary system and, thereby, pave the way for national
and international prosperity. In more practical terms, the Fund was expected to cre-
ate the conditions and provide the resources that enable its members to take part in
the international trading system.
2. Since its establishment, the Fund has witnessed considerable changes in the
global economic conditions. The process of decolonization, increased membership
and the emergence of capital markets have created a new environment. Despite
pressures to shift the Fund’s orientation towards the promotion of economic growth
and the safeguard of financial stability, it continues to be a monetary institution.
Continuity in the Fund’s orientation must also be assumed as its purposes have not
been rephrased since its establishment. The amendments that were introduced
merely refer to the methods by which the Fund is mandated to pursue its objectives.
3. The activities of the IMF are complex, technical and versatile. The Fund may
respond to economic problems of a particular member, a group of members or the
global monetary system. Responses are reflected in a myriad of policies, decisions,
guidelines and interpretations. Within the framework of the International Encyclo-
paedia of Laws, there is only opportunity to emphasize key activities of the Fund.
This Part discusses the Fund’s institutional development and structure. Important
activities are dealt with in Parts 2 and 3: supervision of the international monetary
system and balance of payments support. Part 4 discusses the Fund in the global
context.
4. For further reading there is ample literature available. The most important
author on the Fund’s legal and institutional aspects is the late Sir Joseph Gold, who
was general counsel and director of the legal department. Gold has published doz-
ens of articles and books that explain the purposes and powers of the IMF. Another
important source is the historical overview published by the IMF. The material cov-
ers five periods: 1945–1965 (by J. Keith Horsefield), 1966–1971 and 1972–1978
(both by Margaret Garritsen de Vries) as well as 1979–1989 and 1990-1999 (by
1–4
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James M. Boughton). The volumes are published by the IMF and include a chro-
nological overview of policy development, analysis, the Fund’s corpus juris and
documents that preceded the amendments to the Articles of Agreement.
5. For keeping track with current developments the bi-weekly periodical IMF
Survey and the Annual Reports of the Executive Board are useful sources. Legal
documents are published in Selected Decisions of the International Monetary Fund.
The IMF Pamphlet Series are practical guides for an understanding of the Fund’s
activities. The IMF published two other useful series of volumes on banking and
finance: Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks (Vol. I–V) and Current
Developments in Monetary and Financial Law (Vol. 1–5). In addition, the Fund
maintains a comprehensive Internet site (www.imf.org) that publishes documents
and data on the economic position of the Fund and its membership. The website also
holds legal documents and papers concerning the Fund’s policies. The index and
many cross-references conveniently introduce the reader to the Fund’s current
activities. Sources and documents discussed in this monograph are available on the
Fund’s website.
Part I, Ch. 1, Introduction5–5
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Chapter 2. The Fund’s Function in the International Economic
System
6. Before studying the IMF in depth it is useful to have a clear understanding of
the triangular relationship between the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade
Organization (WTO). These institutions have the common objective, directly or
indirectly, to promote prosperity by fostering the growth of international trade and
investment. For more detailed information see Part IV, Chapters 6 and 7.
§1. IMF AND WTO: LIBERALIZATION OF CURRENT PAYMENTS AND TRADE
7. Trade involves two primary transactions: the transfer of goods and services
on the one hand, and payments on the other. Trade and payments are therefore two
sides of the same coin. Accordingly, for the regulation of trade and payments, the
WTO and IMF function as complementary institutions. The WTO administers mul-
tilateral trade agreements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) that is ‘directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers of
trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade rela-
tions’. In order to pave the way for trade liberalization, the IMF ‘facilitates the
expansion and balanced growth of international trade’, inter alia, by promoting the
removal of restrictions on international payments for current transactions (Article
I). Payments for current transactions include ‘all payments due in connection with
foreign trade’ (Article XXX). In short, the IMF administers rules that ensure that
international payments for trade can be made freely.
8. The above suggests that it is imperative for the smooth functioning of the
international trading system that states are both members of the WTO and the IMF.
The argument is that trade cannot be liberalized unless states fully accept the obli-
gations of both institutions. In one sense this is true. WTO membership compels
states to follow the rules of GATT and other multilateral trade agreements. Trade
liberalization under these agreements may not be hampered because of restrictions
in current payments. From this viewpoint there is substantive overlap of member-
ship: practically all WTO members are also IMF members. The reverse question
may also be asked. Can an IMF member fulfil its obligation without accepting the
obligations under the WTO? In this case no conflict seems to exist. It is feasible that
current payments are liberalized without accepting the obligations under the WTO.
Practice also shows that not all IMF members have opted for WTO membership.
9. While the IMF is primarily concerned with monetary issues, it has also urged
its members to promote trade liberalization. First, in 1974 the Fund drew up a draft
statement: this document, which was particularly significant for IMF members who
were not party to GATT, binds members voluntarily subscribing to it ‘not on its own
discretionary authority [to] introduce or intensify trade or other current account
measures [read: restrictions] for balance of payments purposes that are subject to
the jurisdiction of the GATT, or recommend them to its legislature, without a prior
finding by the Fund that there is a balance of payments justification for trade or
6–9
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other current account measures’. This regulation has expired and was not renewed.
Second, IMF conditions for balance of payment support usually include a standard
clause that abrogates the right to use Fund resources when the member imposes or
intensifies exchange restrictions. In this sense the objective of trade liberalization is
incorporated ipso facto into the practice of the IMF. Third, in 2004 the IMF estab-
lished the Trade Integration Mechanism (TIM) in support of Member States expe-
riencing temporary balance of payments difficulties as a result of multilateral trade
liberalization.
§2. IMF AND THE IBRD: MONETARY STABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
10. The IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) – the first agency of the World Bank – were created with complementary
purposes at the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944. The Articles of Agreement
of the IBRD stipulate outright that among the purposes of the organization there is
the promotion of the long-range balanced growth of international trade and the
maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments. To this end, the IBRD pro-
motes economic and social progress through project lending and support to private
foreign investments. A major characteristic, therefore, is the IBRD focus on devel-
opment, by addressing microeconomic items. In the IMF Articles of Agreement no
reference is made to the promotion of economic development. Whereas the IMF
focuses on balances of payments, exchange rate stability, currencies and other mac-
roeconomic aspects, the World Bank stimulates long-term investment in sectors of
the member’s economies. Thereby the Bank adopts a different approach and a
longer time frame than the IMF. The Bank–Fund relationship is also special because
membership in the Bank is only open to members of the Fund. This points to the
fact that countries must first subject themselves to IMF jurisdiction in order to be
able to enjoy the benefits of World Bank membership.
Part I, Ch. 2, The Fund’s Function10–10
16 – IMF Intergovernmental Organizations – Suppl. 47 (2013)
Chapter 3. Articles of Agreement
11. The Fund’s Articles are summarized below. The Articles are elaborated in
secondary legislation published in ‘Selected Decisions and Selected Documents of
the International Monetary Fund’. This publication also holds decisions of the
Executive Board, resolutions of the Board of Governors and agreements with other
international organizations, such as the United Nations, World Bank and WTO.
Documents on the internal functioning of the IMF are published in ‘By-Laws, Rules
and Regulations of the International Monetary Fund’.
Introductory Article Confirms the rule of law, determines financial structure
and principles for financial operations
Article I Purposes of the Fund
Article II Explains conditions for membership
Article III Explains quotas and subscription; quotas determine the
degree of participation in the Fund
Article IV Explains the international monetary system and
members’ obligations; enables the Fund to oversee the
international monetary system and exercise firm
surveillance over exchange rate policies
Article V Deals with balance of payments support by the Fund;
conditions and scope; enables the IMF to create special
accounts for supporting developing countries
Article VI Explains that the Fund is not designed to support ‘large
or sustained outflow of capital’.
Article VII Authorizes the Fund to take measures to replenish the
Fund’s holding of scarce currencies; declarations on
scarce currencies
Article VIII Determines members’ obligations on current payments
liberalization, discriminatory currency practices,
convertibility and furnishing of information
Article IX Establishes the Fund’s legal personality, immunity and
privileges
Article X Imposes a duty on the Fund to cooperate with other
institutions
Article XI Deals with relations with non-members
Article XII Determines the Fund’s institutional structure, organs and
their powers; allocation and exercise of votes
Article XIII Determines the location of headquarters and designates
central banks as depository for the Fund holdings of
currencies; members must guarantee assets
11–11
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Article XIV Allows for restrictions on current payments through a
‘transitional arrangement’; the time frame of the
arrangement is not limited
Articles XV to XXV Contains extensive provisions on SDRs explaining the
purpose of SDRs, general conditions for allocations,
valuation and many more facets
Article XXVI Explains voluntary and compulsory withdrawal of
members from the Fund and settlement of accounts
Article XXVII Allows for suspension of provisions in emergencies or
unforeseen circumstances
Article XXVIII Contains provisions on amendments
Article XXIX Explains the procedure for authoritative interpretations
Article XXX Interprets key provisions and terms
Article XXXI Final provisions on entry into force
Schedules A–M Contains further elaborations of provisions
Part I, Ch. 3, Articles of Agreement11–11
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Chapter 4. Genesis
12. The IMF is an intergovernmental organization established at the end of
World War II with the task to regulate international monetary relations between its
members. The drafters of the IMF treaty were preoccupied to avoid repetition of the
economic problems that brought considerable economic and social distress in the
inter-bellum. These problems manifested themselves during the Great Depression of
the early 1930s and related to trade protectionism, the collapse of the Gold Stan-
dard following competitive exchange rate devaluations, and stagnant economic
development. Many observers believed that the economic crises and the failure of
international cooperation had contributed to the breakdown in peace in 1939.
13. Three organizations were conceived for global cooperation on economic
problems. The Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 gave birth to the IMF and the
IBRD, respectively designed for the promotion of international monetary stability
and of economic growth through international investments. The Conference takes
its name from the town of Bretton Woods (New Hampshire, US) where the United
Nations Monetary and Financial Conference was held. Of the forty-four states that
had taken part to the negotiations, twenty-nine ratified the IMF Articles of Agree-
ment, which entered into force on 27 December 1945, followed a few days later by
the Articles of Agreement of the IBRD, the first agency of the World Bank. Both
institutions became specialized agencies of the United Nations in 1947. A third
organization would have promoted the reduction of obstacles to international trade
and mutually advantageous international commercial relations: the Charter of the
International Trade Organization (ITO), which was agreed upon in March 1948 at
the Havana Conference on Trade and Employment. However, many negotiating par-
ties demanded trade exemptions and the organization could not be realized in the
form initially conceived, leading to the provisional application of the GATT, until
the foundation of the WTO in 1994.
14. The creation of the Bretton Woods organizations was essentially an Ameri-
can–British undertaking. During the war years a series of meetings took place
between delegations, headed respectively by John Maynard Keynes (UK) and Harry
Dexter White (US). The basis for the discussion was Keynes’ idea of an ‘Interna-
tional Currency (or Clearing) Union’ and White’s proposal of an ‘International Sta-
bilization Fund.’ In April 1944, the discussions led to the ‘Joint Statement by
Experts on the Establishment of an International Monetary Fund’. The statement
formed the basis of negotiations at the Bretton Woods conference. It was the first
conference to establish a permanent institutional and legal framework that required
firm commitments of states to manage their currencies for the benefit of global mon-
etary stability. Despite considerable problems such as the conditions for the use of
Fund’s resources and the location of the headquarters, most of the issues were
solved or couched in ambiguous language to be clarified at a later stage through the
procedure for interpretation.
15. A key feature of the post-war monetary system was that the IMF, in order to
maintain monetary stability, would oversee a system of par values of currencies.
12–15
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This value had to be expressed in terms of gold as a common denominator or in
terms of the United States Dollar. A member was permitted to change the par value
of its currency only to correct a ‘fundamental disequilibrium’ in its balance of pay-
ments. To make such a modification, authorization of the IMF would be necessary.
If a member would make a change in its par value despite the objection of the Fund,
the member would not violate the Fund’s Articles, but would be ineligible to use
the resources of the Fund. In other words: the Fund would cease providing balance
of payment support to the country making the unauthorized change. The system of
fixed but adjustable exchange rates collapsed in the early 1970s.
Part I, Ch. 4, Genesis15–15
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Chapter 5. Amendments
16. The IMF Articles provide for an amendment procedure by which at least
three-fifths of the members, having 85% of the voting power, must have accepted a
proposed amendment. The Articles of Agreement have been amended several times
to adapt to changing global conditions and the desired degree of cooperation.
17. Amendments of the IMF Articles have taken place in 1969, 1978, 1992,
2009 and 2011. The 1969 amendment created the option for the Fund to introduce
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to be able to supplement the monetary reserves, and
in this way to help to meet a long-term global need to augment the total of world
reserves. Through the First Amendment, stricter rules on conditionality were
adopted, thus introducing a firmer scrutiny over members’ requests for balance of
payment support and mandating the Fund to apply ‘adequate safeguards’ for the
temporary use of its resources. In addition, the First Amendment improved the
authoritative procedure for interpretation by the introduction of a Committee for
Interpretation.
18. The Second Amendment of 1978 brought a fundamental change. The new
Article IV titled ‘Obligations regarding exchange arrangements’ reflected the
changing practice of IMF members with respect to their exchange rate policies. The
amendment formally brought an end to the system of par values by allowing mem-
bers to freely choose the exchange rate policy they deemed fit. Instead, a system of
supervision was introduced, supported by obligations that can be described as soft
law. The end of the par value system meant that the Fund ceased to administer ‘a
system of stable exchange rates’ but instead supervised ‘a stable system of exchange
rates’. This reflected a different role of the IMF: from custodian to supervisor. Other
changes concerned the decreasing role of gold and the promotion of the SDR as the
principle reserve asset in the monetary system. Moreover, according to the new
Article IV, section 1, one of the principal objectives of the Fund became ‘the con-
tinuing development of the orderly underlying conditions that are necessary for
financial and economic stability [emphasis added]’. This is the only reference made
to financial stability in the IMF Articles.
19. The Third (1992), Fourth (2009), Fifth and Sixth Amendments (2011)
respectively introduced:
– new rules for the suspension of voting rights for members failing to repay the
Fund (as a reaction to the problem of the growing arrears to the IMF);
– new rules providing for a special one-time allocation of SDRs to allow all par-
ticipants in the Special Drawing Rights Department to receive an equitable share
of cumulative SDR allocations;
– new rules expanding the investment authority of the Fund and authorizing the
Fund to manage the proceeds of gold sales;
16–19
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– a reform of the Executive Board regarding the appointment of Alternates and a
tripling of basic votes, which occurred together with a realignment of quota and
voting shares of member countries (the so-called Voice and Participation Amend-
ment).
A Seventh Amendment to establish an Executive Board consisting solely of elected
Executive Directors is expected to enter into force in late 2013.
Part I, Ch. 5, Amendments19–19
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Chapter 6. Membership
§1. COUNTRY BASED
20. Article II makes a distinction between original members and other mem-
bers. Original members are those countries that were represented at the United
Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, and became members before 31
December 1945. At this deadline, thirty countries had accepted membership.
21. Membership is open to other countries at such times and in accordance with
such terms as may be described by the Board of Governors. In considering the con-
ditions for membership the principle of non-discrimination applies. The terms shall
be based on principles consistent with those applied to other countries that were
already member. Membership has grown to 188 countries in 2012, with the acces-
sion of South Sudan. Andorra, Cuba, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nauru and North
Korea are non-members.
22. Membership may be ceased by voluntary or compulsory withdrawal. The
latter measure may be taken if a member fails to fulfil its obligations under the IMF
Articles. Before withdrawal will be enforced, a number of measures may be taken
including a declaration on ineligibility to use the Fund’s resources and suspension
of voting rights. If, nonetheless, the member persists in non-observance of its obli-
gations, procedures for forced withdrawal may start. In the process of withdrawal,
operations and transactions with the Fund shall cease and settlements of all accounts
between the Fund and the member shall be made.
23. The IMF is a country-based organization. The Articles do not define ‘coun-
try’ but practice suggests that only states can successfully apply for membership.
Other entities such as monetary unions are prima facie not eligible for membership.
The reasons for using ‘country’ instead of ‘state’ as a criterion for membership are
not entirely clear. One possible explanation is that the word ‘country’ is used to
allow a country to become applicant, even though it could not yet be considered a
state under international law. Formal statehood may also have been challenged
because borders had not been delineated with finality or the applicant government
controlled only part of the territory. For instance, Kosovo became a member of the
IMF in 2009, before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its advisory opin-
ion regarding accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo.
24. Nonetheless, currently only states are members to the IMF. It is likely that
this is not due to statehood per se, but rather the inherent right of states to issue their
own currency. Therefore, it is believed that the exercise of the sovereign right to
issue a currency and adopt a monetary policy is decisive for membership. That sov-
ereign right, though, might be surrendered to an international organization or to a
currency union for which membership in the IMF is not permitted.
20–24
IMF – 23Intergovernmental Organizations – Suppl. 47 (2013)
25. In particular, membership of the European Union (EU), responsible for cir-
culating a single currency for a group of countries, may give reason for discussion.
Members of the EMU have handed over the control of monetary policy and the con-
duct of foreign exchange operations to the ECB, while retaining responsibility over
economic policy decisions. The EU also enjoys the ability to conclude international
monetary and exchange rate agreements, to decide upon the external representation
of the Euro area, and – exceptionally – to restrict the flow of capital and payments.
Last but not least, the ECB is entrusted with the task of holding and managing the
common pool of reserves and of conducting all types of banking transactions with
third countries and international organizations, including lending and borrowing
operations. The transferral of these competences to a supranational level is deemed
to impair the ability of EMU members to fully discharge the duties, and exert the
rights, arising from IMF membership. Hitherto, participants in the EMU have
insisted that their membership in the IMF be continued. The key argument is that
the IMF is country-based and the EMU is not a country. It is unclear, however, how
EMU-participants can contribute to the IMF objectives after having dissociated
themselves from monetary sovereignty. It seems rational that the EMU as the larg-
est monetary union would be accepted as IMF member. On these grounds, many
authors suggest that, in the longer run, the EU ought to become a member of the
IMF, either by substituting its Member States or by becoming an additional mem-
ber. The question of membership of intergovernmental organizations within the IMF
may be solved by amending Article II or by an authoritative interpretation under
Article XXIX that the term ‘country’ also includes currency unions. Currently, coor-
dination among Euro area Member States in the IMF decision-making bodies is
achieved through informal understandings.
§2. UNIFORM AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT
26. The principle of uniformity requires that, with certain exceptions, the IMF
Articles establish the same rights and obligations for all members of the Fund. This
principle is meant to prevent discrimination in favour of, or against, particular mem-
bers, without regard to their economic strength or weakness. The fundamental
approach is that each member has a balance of payments, that the balance of pay-
ments concept is the same for all members and that the degree of economic devel-
opment does not justify a legal distinction. As a consequence each member country
– developing or industrialized – is entitled to draw on the Fund’s resources.
27. Developing countries in particular have insisted on the principle of unifor-
mity in order to ensure that they would be treated without discrimination. Occa-
sionally, they have complained about the discriminatory application of rules on
conditionality. It was believed in the 1970s that developed countries were treated
more favourably when they requested balance of payments support. Developing
members have also criticized the asymmetrical treatment between developed and
developing members reflected in the soft law of Article IV (surveillance for all
members including industrialized members) and the firm law of Article V (balance
of payments support, de facto for developing members only). The virtual absence
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of compulsion in the Article IV consultation stands in sharp contrast to the Fund’s
scrutiny when providing balance of payments support.
28. Developing countries have not been satisfied with uniform treatment in all
matters. Accordingly, they have attempted to make a linkage between SDR alloca-
tions and the need for development assistance. However, proposals to insert this
linkage into the Second Amendment of the Articles in 1978 were rejected because
it would compromise the principle of uniformity. No mention of these issues is
made in the Fourth Amendment on SDRs.
29. Whereas the principle of uniformity still applies, it has been moderated by
amendments and policies under the IMF Articles allowing for a more favourable
treatment of developing countries. Under Article V, section 2(b) and Article V, sec-
tion 12(f) trust funds and facilities have been created for these countries only. The
resources of these facilities must be separated from the General Resources Account
to which the principle of uniformity continues to apply.
§3. DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION
I. Quota
30. Since the IMF is a monetary institution offering financial support to mem-
bers in financial distress, members’ economic size cannot be ignored. The differ-
ences in contribution to and potential use of IMF resources are expressed in the
quota assigned to each Member State on the basis of a formula. The current quota
formula is a weighted average of GDP (weight of 50%), openness (30%), economic
variability (15%), and international reserves (5%). The quota is a quantity,
expressed in SDRs, which establishes, among other things, the ‘relative economic
position’ of the member countries. The amount of quota determines the extent of
participation in the IMF and plays a fourfold role. It determines:
– the subscription of each member (i.e., the amount of financial resources the mem-
ber is obliged to provide to the Fund);
– the number of voting rights of each member country;
– the maximum extent of balance of payments support that each member may
receive;
– the share of SDR allocations that each member receives.
The quota formula has remained almost unmodified since Bretton Woods, failing to
keep up with the developments of the world economy. As a result, many emerging
economies are de facto under-represented, since their quotas do not reflect their
actual weight in the global economy.
31. General quota reviews are regularly conducted by the IMF Board of Gov-
ernors, usually every five years. There are two main issues addressed in a general
quota review: the size of an overall increase (assessing the adequacy of IMF
Part I, Ch. 6, Membership 28–31
IMF – 25Intergovernmental Organizations – Suppl. 47 (2013)
resources to finance its activities) and the allocation of the increase among the mem-
bers (to better reflect changes in their relative weight in the world economy). Any
variation in quotas must be approved by an 85% majority of the total voting power,
and a member’s quota cannot be changed without its consent. The Fourteenth Gen-
eral Review of Quotas to be effective in 2013 will result in a 100% increase in total
quotas and a major realignment of quota shares. The total amount of quotas will be
about SDR 476.8 billion, whereby a shift of quotas is established from over-
represented to under-represented member countries. This shift significantly realigns
quota shares of emerging markets and developing members. China will become the
third largest member country in the IMF, and Brazil, India and Russia will be among
the ten largest shareholders in the Fund. For the quota increases under the Four-
teenth General Review of Quotas to become effective, the entry into force of the
proposed Seventh Amendment on the Executive Board reform is required.
II. Subscription
32. The subscription is equivalent to the quota; 75% is paid in the country’s own
currency, and the remainder in SDRs or in a widely accepted currency (usually the
US Dollar, the Euro, the Yen or the British Pound). The subscriptions are held in
the General Resources Account and serve as a source of the IMF balance of pay-
ments support and lending.
III. Voting Rights
33. Each IMF member possesses an equal number of basic votes and supple-
mentary votes proportional to the quota (one additional vote every SDR 100,000 of
quota). Initially the number of basic votes amounted to 250 per member, but to
avoid erosion in voting shares of least-developed countries, the Fifth Amendment
on Voice and Participation in the IMF (2011) tripled basic votes, establishing also
that they could not be less than 5.5% of all available votes. Basic votes will be
equally distributed among members so as to reflect the principle of equality of states
and give also the smallest members of the Fund voice in the Fund’s deliberations.
Votes in IMF after 14th quota review
United States 16.48% France 4.02%
Japan 6.14% United Kingdom 4.02%
China 6.07% Italy 3.02%
Germany 5.31% Rest of membership 54.94%
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IV. Extent of Balance of Payments Support
34. For any form of balance of payments support, the upper limit of assistance
is somehow related to the quota of the requesting member. For instance, under the
Stand-By and Extended Arrangements, a member may borrow annually amounts up
to 200% of its quota and not more than 600% cumulatively. These limits may be
exceeded under exceptional circumstances. The amount available depends on the
specific conditions of the member and the facility under which resources are made
available. Part III discusses rules and policies on balance of payments support.
V. Share in SDR Allocations
35. The SDR is an international reserve asset created by the IMF that can be held
by central banks of member countries or other designated holders to supplement
their official reserves. The IMF may allocate SDRs to Member States in proportion
to their IMF quotas. In 2009, when the Fourth Amendment became effective, a gen-
eral and a special SDR allocation together raised total cumulative SDR allocations
to about SDR 204 billion. Chapter 12 of Part I discusses SDRs in more details.
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Chapter 7. Object and Purpose
§1. OBJECT: CURRENCY, EXCHANGE RATES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
36. The purposes of the IMF relate to the stability of the system of exchange
rates and the balance of payments of members. The Articles clearly presume that
IMF members exercise their own monetary policies and the Fund will only com-
municate through the members’ monetary authorities having the capability to use
monetary instruments.
37. Throughout the Articles, Member States interact with the IMF by actions
related to their currencies and exchange rates. The key provisions in Articles IV and
V that concretize the Fund’s purpose support this argument. Under Article IV, each
member undertakes ‘to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure
orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates’.
It is the Fund’s task to oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure
its effective operation. Also, ‘the Fund shall exercise firm surveillance over the
exchange rate policies of members’. Accordingly, members are required to notify
the Fund on the ‘exchange arrangement’ that refers to a member’s exchange rate
policy. Furthermore, Article V entitles a member to ‘purchase the currencies of the
Fund in exchange for an equivalent amount of its own currency ( … ) after the mem-
ber declares that it has a need to make the purchase because of its balance of pay-
ments or its reserve position’. Clearly, ‘own currency’ and ‘balance of payments’
are items over which members are expected to have full control.
38. The reference to ‘exchange rate’, ‘own currency’ and ‘balance of payments’
clarifies the object of the Articles of Agreement, also identified as the ‘focus of con-
cern’. Hence, the Fund’s focus of concern vis-à-vis its membership and, correspond-
ingly, the focus of obligation on the part of members, ‘centres on the point and the
terms of intersection of their national economies with each other – that is, the bal-
ance of payments, the exchange rate and the exchange system’.
§2. PURPOSES EXPLAINED
39. The purposes of the Fund are stated in Article I. While amendments have
resulted in considerable changes in the Fund’s activities, they included only minor
adaptations in the text of Article I. The purposes are explained as follows:
40. ‘(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent
institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on
international monetary problems.’ This purpose underlines the monetary character
of the IMF and assigns a platform for both consultation and collaboration on mon-
etary problems. It is important to note that the IMF is mandated to deal principally
with international monetary problems, which may be considered as a segment of
manifold problems in international economic relations. Key provisions that effec-
tuate this purpose are to be found throughout the IMF Articles.
36–40
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41. ‘(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade,
and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of
employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of
all members as primary objectives of economic policy.’ This purpose refers to inter-
national trade, employment and real income. The expansion and balanced growth
of these items are supposed to be primary objectives of all members of the IMF, but
not necessarily of the IMF per se. A note of caution must be added to the interpre-
tation of this purpose. ‘To facilitate’ is not equivalent to ‘to promote.’ The Fund’s
task is to create an enabling environment – i.e. a stable monetary system – that
removes obstacles for economic growth rather than to promote growth, which is a
more straightforward obligation. Primarily, the IMF should be held accountable for
a stable monetary system that paves the way for economic development, rather than
the promotion of economic development. Moreover, ‘to contribute thereby’ under-
lines that high levels of employment and development of productive resources are
merely desired consequences of the stability of the monetary system.
42. ‘(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrange-
ments among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.’ Three
objectives are mentioned here. The promotion of exchange stability indicates that
the Fund has to play an active role in promoting stability in the exchange rates of
currencies. Further, ‘to maintain’ orderly exchange arrangements among members,
and ‘to avoid’ competitive exchange depreciations, assumes that the Fund may exer-
cise certain supervisory tasks vis-à-vis its membership. This purpose still has the
imprint of the system of stable exchange rates, but was maintained nonetheless after
official abrogation of par values in the Second Amendment in 1978. Article IV of
the Articles provides instruments through which the Fund communicates with and
exercise surveillance over its members.
43. ‘(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in
respect of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign
exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.’ The Fund ‘assists’
in the establishment of a payments system and the elimination of foreign exchange
restrictions. In practice little contribution has been made to the creation of a pay-
ments system. Cross-border payments are administered through domestic and
regional arrangements such as Federal Reserve Wire Network (FEDWIRE) and
Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system
(TARGET2). However, the Fund has made a considerable contribution to the elimi-
nation of exchange restrictions by urging members to avoid restrictions on their cur-
rent payments, which are payments related to trade, loans, investments and
remittances. The Fund administers the elimination of exchange restrictions under
Article VIII subject to transitional arrangements of Article XIV.
44. ‘(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the
Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing
them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments with-
out resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.’Activi-
ties under this purpose have grown to be a preoccupation of the Fund. Whereas
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balance of payment support was originally conceived as one of the methods to pro-
mote stability, it now has overshadowed other activities of the IMF. ‘To give con-
fidence’ should be understood in the light of the original Articles. As was explained
above, until the Second Amendment members were expected to maintain a par value
and the IMF would give members confidence that they could maintain their par
value, even in times of monetary distress, by balance of payments support. The
meaning of ‘measures destructive of national or international prosperity’ has not
been clarified in an authoritative interpretation of the Fund, despite firm criticism
on the Fund ‘conditionality.’Article V of the Articles authorizes conditional balance
of payments support and other operations and transactions of the IMF.
45. ‘(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the
degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members.’
This explains that pursuing the purposes will contribute to the maintenance of equi-
librium in the balances of payments of members. Thereby the Fund contributes to
overall stability. Disequilibrium can be understood both as surplus and deficit in the
balance of payments, but little attention has been paid to the need to address large
surpluses.
46. Finally, the closing sentence stipulates that ‘The Fund shall be guided in all
its policies and decisions by the purposes set forth in this Article.’ All activities
should be developed within the framework of Article I. As argued below, this pro-
vision appears to support a preference for a teleological interpretation.
Part I, Ch. 7, Object and Purpose45–46
30 – IMF Intergovernmental Organizations – Suppl. 47 (2013)
Chapter 8. Rules for Interpretation
§1. PRINCIPLES
47. Generally recognized rules of treaty interpretation, as codified in Article 31
of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, are not entirely applicable
because the IMF does not strictly follow the hierarchy of techniques that the law of
treaties prescribes. Instead the Fund’s rules for interpretation have been tailored by
applying multiple techniques for interpretation.
48. First, there appears to be a preference for the teleological approach because
the closing sentence of Article I stipulates that ‘the Fund shall be guided in all its
policies and decisions by the purposes set forth in this Article’. Further, it is held
that the travaux préparatoires play a more important role than Article 32 of the
Vienna Convention appears to support. Whereas the Vienna Convention allows for
recourse to the travaux only when the result is ambiguous, obscure or leads to a
manifestly absurd or unreasonable result, interpreters of the IMF Articles should
consider the travaux préparatoires anyway.
49. However, it can be inferred from the Fund’s practice that interpretation does
not fundamentally depart from the general rules of the Vienna Convention. Because
there may be a need for a more equitable balance of various methods, interpreta-
tions based on ordinary meaning, teleology, and travaux préparatoires should each
be given their proper role.
50. In case of the IMF Articles there are more avenues leading to interpreta-
tions. First, questions on interpretation may be dealt with by the Fund’s Executive
Board. By making an interpretation, the Board may not only clarify the meaning of
the Articles of Agreement but also, in fact, settle a dispute. A member may, for
instance, challenge a policy of the Fund and insist on another interpretation of the
provision underlying that policy. Second, interpretation may also be asked from the
ICJ through an advisory opinion. Third, the Fund’s practice also allows non-
authoritative interpretations.
§2. AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION UNDER ARTICLE XXIX
51. Article XXIX(a) provides that ‘any question of interpretation of the provi-
sions of this Agreement between any member and the Fund or between members of
the Fund shall be submitted to the Executive Board for its decision’. The procedure
further provides for an appeal to the Board of Governors, which shall be assisted by
a Committee on Interpretation. Paragraph (b) stipulates: ‘In any case where the
Executive Board has given a decision under (a) above, any member may require,
within three months from the date of the decision, that the question be referred to
the Board of Governors, whose decision shall be final. Any question referred to the
Board of Governors shall be considered by a Committee on Interpretation of the
Board of Governors.’ The procedure has two characteristics. First, the composition
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and equal division of voting rights of the Committee on Interpretation is notewor-
thy. The principle of one vote for each member is the only exception to the weighted
voting system in the IMF. Second, the language of Article XXIX (a) suggests exclu-
siveness of the right of interpretation: any question shall be submitted. The phrase
‘final’ under paragraph (b) indicates that once an interpretation is made, it is bind-
ing and definitive.
52. The procedure has been used ten times by explicitly referring in the decision
to the interpretation clause. On one occasion, the legal channel under (b) was used,
and the Board of Governors was involved in an interpretation question. The last
interpretation was given in 1959. It is puzzling why conflicts between the Fund and
particularly developing members, which surfaced in the 1960s and 1970s, have not
resulted in requests for interpretations under Article XXIX. It is possible that,
despite criticism, countries did not disagree with interpretations that the Fund
applied, or that they expected that the procedure would not lead to different inter-
pretations.
§3. ADVISORY OPINION FROM THE ICJ
53. The second formal avenue for interpretation appears to ignore exclusive-
ness. In the ‘Agreement between the United Nations and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF)’, the latter is authorized ‘to request advisory opinions of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice on any legal question arising within the scope of the Fund’s
activities ( … )’. It is obvious that the ICJ will also have to interpret the Fund’s
Articles when it is asked to deal with a legal question within the Fund’s scope. In
addition, the ICJ’s reach for interpretations has fewer limitations than the Fund’s
competence under Article XXIX. The Court may also discuss legal questions not
directly relating to its Articles, but that fall nevertheless within the Fund’s scope of
activities. Thus, if the IMF wishes to consider rules of international law in its deci-
sions on balance of payments support, it can ask the Court for advice. The Court
may also be requested to delineate the Fund’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis other institu-
tions in the UN system, through application of the ‘principle of speciality’. Hith-
erto, the IMF has refrained from asking for an advisory opinion of the Court.
54. An interpretation by the ICJ may expose diverging views on interpretations
of constitutional provisions. Thus, the Court may give another interpretation to a
provision that was considered earlier in an authoritative interpretation under Article
XXIX. Surprisingly, the Court has taken the position that it should make its own
judgment independently of mechanisms for interpretation available within a Statute
of another international organization.
§4. NON-AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
55. Article XXIX states that ‘any question of interpretation’ (italics added) of the
IMF Articles shall be subject to the interpretation procedure. Nevertheless, the great
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majority of interpretative decisions are taken outside Article XXIX. In a material
sense, these decisions are equivalent; differences are of a formal nature, and con-
cern the irreversibility of a ‘final’ decision by the Board of Governors under Article
XXIX. Moreover, decisions that do not fall under Article XXIX can include inter-
pretations of provisions other than provisions of the IMF Articles, such as By-Laws.
Non-authoritative interpretations cover a broad range in the Fund’s activities. Deci-
sions and policies of the organs or even statements made by the Managing Director
are interpretations because they are all supposed to act within the jurisdiction of the
IMF and the competences allocated to its organs.
56. Avoidance of Article XXIX interpretations means in particular that the
Board of Governors is largely relieved of its involvement in the interpretation pro-
cedure. Both the Fund and the members have been swayed by considerations of
flexibility, and both want to limit the number of irreversible decisions. Informal
interpretations do not in any way infringe members’ rights: a member may still
request an explanation, with explicit reference to the interpretation clause under
Article XXIX.
57. The Fund’s neglect of the authoritative procedure for interpretations and its
resort to informal procedures is controversial. The question may thus be raised
whether the power to give interpretations must be based on the explicit clause in the
IMF Articles. However, given that not a single member has contested the legality of
interpretations outside Article XXIX, it is unrealistic to insist that all interpretations
should fall within Article XXIX.
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Chapter 9. Institutional Structure
§1. BOARD OF GOVERNORS
58. The Board of Governors constitutes the plenary organ and meets annually.
Member States are represented by their finance ministers or central bank governors.
The Board is invested with all the powers within the IMF’s jurisdiction, except
those specifically assigned to another organ.
59. The Board of Governors is advised by the International Monetary and
Financial Committee (IMFC). The Committee is a transformation of the Interim
Committee of the Board of Governors on the International Monetary System
(Interim Committee) and reports and advises at ministerial level on ‘supervising the
management and adaptation of the international system including the continuing
operation of the adjustment process’. The Interim Committee was a continuation of
the ad hoc Committee on Reform of the International Monetary System and Related
Issues, and a possible forerunner of the Council, an organ with supranational char-
acteristics, which can be set up by an 85% majority decision of the Board. The
IMFC is composed in the same way as the Executive Board, and derives its author-
ity from the fact that finance ministers sit on it.
60. Finally, the Board of Governors has set up a second Committee which it
shares with the World Bank: the Joint Ministerial Committee of the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Bank and Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing
Countries (Development Committee). The composition of this committee also
reflects the composition of the Executive Board. The Committee advises and reports
‘on all aspects of the broad question of the transfer of real resources to developing
countries, and shall make suggestions for consideration by those concerned regard-
ing the implementation of its conclusions’.
§2. EXECUTIVE BOARD
61. Under Article XII, section 3(a) the Executive Board is responsible ‘for con-
ducting the business of the Fund’, and disposes of all the powers set out in the IMF
Articles and those delegated by the Board of Governors. Pursuant to Article XII the
Board consists of twenty Executive Directors, but the Board of Governors has used
its power to raise the number to twenty-four. Under the system originally envisaged
by the Articles, member countries that make the largest financial contributions each
have the right to appoint a Director. These members are: the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan. Members who have formed them-
selves into a voting group or constituency elect the other Directors every two years.
Some member countries take a special position (China, Russia and Saudi Arabia),
each of them forming a ‘single constituency’ and electing its own Director. Pursu-
ant to the Seventh Amendment (not yet in force) all the Executive Directors will be
elected. Elections will be conducted every two years in accordance with regulations
to be adopted by the Board of Governors. An elected Director exercises a sum total
58–61
34 – IMF Intergovernmental Organizations – Suppl. 47 (2013)
of voting rights equal to the votes he received. Directors may not split their votes in
the sense that part of his/her votes is in favour and another part is against a deci-
sion.
62. The status of an Executive Director is somewhat ambivalent. The Executive
Board should be seen as a ‘body consisting of officers of the Fund and not as the
“representatives” of the bodies that appointed or elected them’. Nevertheless, an
Executive Director is in practice held accountable by ‘his/her’ country, even though
the salary is paid by the Fund. A Director can be asked for his or her standpoint by
the government that has appointed or elected him; an unsatisfactory answer may
have consequences when it comes to re-election or re-appointment.
63. During meetings in the Board, an Executive Director may explain that he is
communicating the views of members, but he is not required to clarify whether or
not he is expressing their views. If he is silent, he will probably reflect the views
consistent with those of the members that appointed or elected him. The assump-
tion that he is communicating their views may give muscle to his opinion, but only
the position taken by the Executive Director when a decision is to be taken has legal
relevance.
64. An Executive Director who is appointed will, in most cases, have no option
but to defend the standpoint of his member country. An Executive Director who is
elected by several member countries has more scope in determining his own point
of view whenever he has to steer a middle course between possible differing opin-
ions among the members of the voting group. If a member country calls its elected
Director to account, he can hide behind the argument that he is voicing the point of
view of the majority in the voting group.
§3. MANAGING DIRECTOR
65. The third main organ, the Managing Director and the staff of the Fund ‘shall
owe their duty entirely to the Fund and to no other authority’. The Executive Board
appoints the Managing Director for five years. Madame Christine Lagarde was
appointed as the first female Managing Director in July 2011. She chairs Board
meetings and conducts, under the direction of the Executive Board, the ordinary
business of the Fund. Her role as chair of Board meetings is important since she is
required, if necessary, to summarize the ‘sense of the meeting’. Her summing-up
may both be made public and formally be qualified as a decision of the Board.
66. All contacts with member countries are maintained by the staff under
instruction from the Managing Director. Article IV consultations, as well as nego-
tiations with member countries requesting balance of payments support, take place
as a result of her instructions. Proposals for decisions concerning balance of pay-
ments support are put to the Executive Board by her.
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§4. OPTIONAL BODY: THE COUNCIL
67. The Board of Governors may decide, by an 85% majority of the total voting
power, to set up a Council that will take over the tasks of the IMFC. The Council
will consist of Councillors - who shall be a Governor, Minister in the government
of a member, or person of comparable rank -, and Associates. The Council shall
supervise the management and adaptation of the international monetary system,
including the continuing operation of the adjustment process and developments in
global liquidity, and in this connection shall review developments in the transfer of
real resources to developing countries. The rules of procedure of the Council are
elaborated in Schedule D of the Articles of Agreement.
§5. INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OFFICE (IEO)
68. In 2001, the Executive Board established the IEO with a view to promoting
transparency and accountability, and strengthening IMF’s learning culture. The IEO
operates at arm’s length from the Fund and is expected to critically review IMF’s
policies. The terms of reference are loosely formulated and allow the IEO to put in
its work programme any subject that is important for the IMF’s membership and
relevant to the mandate of the Fund. For the selection of subjects, the IEO may con-
sult groups inside and outside the Fund, including NGOs, academic circles, etc. The
work programme includes a variety of items ranging from evaluations of IMF
activities in particular countries to assessments concerning the Fund’s practice on
structural conditionality. Evaluations do not have any binding legal force and the
Executive Board may ignore recommendations. IEO recommendations and Board
responses are published on www.imf.org/ieo.
§6. DECISION-MAKING
69. The basic principle is that the IMF decisions – regardless of which organ
made them – are taken by a majority of weighted votes. The IMF Articles require
an exceptional majority for indicated decisions. However, formal votes within the
Board of Governors and the Executive Board are in practice avoided in order to cir-
cumvent political differences and to promote harmonious cooperation. Usually the
Managing Director establishes the ‘sense of the meeting’ rather than proceeding to
a formal vote. The Managing Director plays a key role in the decision-making of
the Executive Board by seeking a compromise between the different standpoints of
the Directors. The political reality is that on important questions, the opinions of
members with the highest quota cannot be disregarded.
70. The margin in determining opinions which the members of the Executive
Board possess, together with the discretionary freedom of the Managing Director,
mean that a compromise can usually be reached. If the positions appear irreconcil-
able, the Managing Director shall indicate the majority opinion of the Board, but
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shall also include the dissenting minority viewpoints in the summing-up. Accord-
ingly, the Managing Director will reflect discussions in the Executive Board and
qualify the number of Directors that has expressed views according to the schedule
below.
Qualifier Number of Executive Directors
A few Directors 2–4
Some Directors 5–6
A number of Directors 6–9
Many Directors 10–15
Most Directors 15 or more
Significant minority of the Board or, in
exceptional cases, required majority or
a majority of the Board
Indication of necessary voting strength,
particularly useful in cases of special
majorities
However, if a member insists on a formal voting, then decisions will be taken by a
majority of 70% or 85%, depending upon the subject. Decisions to be taken by spe-
cial majorities are technical and based on provisions scattered across the Fund’s
Articles of Agreement; decisions that affect the financial position of members are
more likely to require an 85% majority. The United States is the only single mem-
ber able to block decisions that must be made by an 85% majority.
§7. CORPUS JURIS
71. The Board of Governors and Executive Board derive their powers to issue
rules and regulations from the IMF Articles. To exercise their powers, the various
organs have at their disposal a number of instruments. The Board of Governors
issues By-Laws and Resolutions. The Executive Board approves Rules and Regu-
lations and other decisions. The category ‘other decisions’ includes: interpretations,
recommendations, guidelines, resolutions and decisions relating to balance of pay-
ments support. The rules and regulations mentioned are ordered hierarchically. A
decision may never conflict with the IMF Articles; a decision of the Executive
Board may not conflict with a decision of the Board of Governors. The hierarchical
ordering of sources is subject to the following:
– The Articles of Agreement regulate the Fund.
– The By-Laws adopted by the Board of Governors are a supplement to the Articles
and concern procedural questions.
– Resolutions of the Board of Governors are operational and include such matters
as admission of new members and quota reviews.
– Rules and Regulations of the Executive Board supplement the IMF Articles and
By-Laws, and are subject to review by the Board of Governors.
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– Finally, the Executive Board has powers across a wide spectrum of issues to take
what are usually termed decisions.
72. The IMF Articles explicitly confer powers on the organs and on ‘the Fund’.
Of particular importance is that the Board of Governors has delegated all but some
explicitly defined powers to the Executive Board. This means that where the IMF
Articles stipulate ‘the Fund’, in practice this refers to the Executive Board. This
assures the central role of the latter in many of the IMF’s activities. Decisions con-
cerning balance of payments support, Article IV consultations, the setting up of trust
funds, the level of charges, selling of gold by the Fund and many other decisions
are consequently made by the Executive Board. There are, however, some powers
that the Board of Governors may not transfer: they concern the adjustment of quota,
the composition of the Executive Board, allocation of SDRs and the suspension of
members.
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Chapter 10. Legal Status, Privileges and Immunities
73. The Fund enjoys ‘full juridical personality’ towards its membership. It has
freedom to contract, to acquire and dispose property and to institute legal proceed-
ings. In addition, it enjoys immunity from judicial process, enforcement actions and
taxation or customs duties. Its assets, archives and communication are protected
against interference. The Fund has developed special procedures that are intended
to ensure the physical safety of Fund staff and other officials and their families. The
IMF has been granted the status of specialized agency within the meaning of Article
57 of the Charter of the UN. Thereby, it also enjoys protection under the United
Nations Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies.
However, under Annex V of the Convention, the privileges and immunities created
under the Articles of Agreement shall not be diminished by the privileges and
immunities under the Convention.
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Chapter 11. Financial Structure
74. All members are under certain conditions entitled to balance of payments
support and thereby to help to cushion the impact of adjustment. According to the
principle of uniform treatment, access to the Fund’s regular facilities is equally open
to all members, irrespective of the state of their economic development. Until
recently, only developing countries and members in transition draw on the facili-
ties. In 2011, Greece was the first Euro area Member State to receive support from
the IMF under a stand-by arrangement. To be able to assist member countries the
Fund must have resources available and develop policies on its proper use.
§1. RESOURCES
75. IMF resources earmarked for regular or tranche policies consist primarily of
subscriptions that are equivalent to the quota of the member countries. The quota
payments are credited to the General Resources Account; 25% of the subscription
consists of SDRs or widely accepted foreign currency and the remainder is made up
from the local currency, usually in non-interest-bearing, non-negotiable promissory
notes, issued either by the member’s central bank or by its treasury. As national cur-
rencies from all members form a substantial part of the quota payment, not all
resources pooled in the General Resources Account are usable resources, i.e. usable
for balance of payments support for members in need. Non-usable resources are the
currencies of members with a weak balance of payments or reserve position (gen-
erally: currencies of developing members and members that are using the Fund’s
resources). Usable resources are the currencies of members in strong external posi-
tions. Roughly half of the quota payments constitute usable resources. For this rea-
son, the Fund needs to increase its resources through multilateral and bilateral
borrowing agreements and by selling gold holdings.
76. Apart from currencies and SDRs, the Fund holds substantial amounts of
gold. This has historical reasons. Until the breakdown of the system of fixed
exchange rates in the early 1970s, members could pay part of their subscription in
gold. The Fund also received gold as a repayment of loans or through other chan-
nels such as payments of charges. Since the Second Amendment in 1978, the role
of gold has diminished. From time to time, members may authorize the Fund to sell
part of its gold reserves to replenish holding of currencies or for the creation of trust
funds. Through these funds concessional facilities were financed. The Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Trust (PRGT) are partly financed by the sale of gold against market prices. In 2009,
the Executive Board approved the sale of one-eighth of the Fund’s total holdings of
gold to boost resources and, in particular, to provide additional financing for poor
countries.
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77. The IMF has the power to arrange loans from central banks or on the capital
markets to increase the resources of the General Resources Account with permis-
sion from the member country whose currency is involved. The IMF has not bor-
rowed on the capital market (it should be noticed that recently the Fifth Amendment
broadened the investment authority of the Fund), but has secured a number of loans
with central banks, of which the most important are the General Arrangements to
Borrow (GAB) and the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB). Member countries
have expressed the view that the subscription based on the quota should remain the
main source of income.
§2. ADDITIONAL BORROWING: MULTILATERAL (GAB AND NAB) AND
BILATERAL LOAN AGREEMENTS
78. Because resources in the General Resources Account may prove to be inad-
equate, the Fund is authorized to borrow to supplement those resources. As finan-
cial emergencies will occasionally surface, as it has indeed happened with the global
financial crisis, the Fund might have to rely on additional borrowing to boost its
lending capacity. The Fund has borrowed only from members (or their central
banks) and the Bank for International Settlements, but it may also borrow from
other sources such as private banks.
79. Currently, the GAB and the NAB are the multilateral instruments the Fund
relies on for borrowing from member countries. These instruments create credit
lines between the Fund and major industrialized countries. The GAB was estab-
lished in 1962 and it was activated the last time in 1998. Credit available under the
GAB amounts to SDR 17 billion. The NAB was established in 1998 after the Mexi-
can financial crisis. In 2011, during the global financial crisis, it was amended and
expanded: resources available under the NAB were increased from SDR 34 billion
to SDR 367.5 billion.
80. The GAB and NAB reflect a number of standing borrowing agreements
between central banks and the IMF. The Fund may use the loans ‘to forestall or cope
with an impairment of the international monetary system’. Such use could be autho-
rized when the Fund faces an inadequacy of resources to meet actual and expected
requests for financing that reflects an ‘exceptional situation associated with balance
of payments problems of members of a character of aggregate size that could
threaten the stability of the international monetary system’.
81. The IMF may also temporarily supplement its resources through bilateral
borrowing agreements. In 2012, the Fund had sixteen active bilateral loan agree-
ments worth about US Dollars (USD) 200 billion and two active bilateral note pur-
chase agreements for about USD 60 billion.
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§3. DRAWINGS ON THE GENERAL RESOURCES ACCOUNT: TRANCHE POLICY
82. A member country with balance of payments difficulties may ask the IMF to
draw on the General Resources Account. The member issues a letter of intent stat-
ing that it will implement a reform programme to correct its external payments
imbalance. The letter outlines in detail the reforms the country is going to imple-
ment and is usually written in close consultation with the Fund’s staff. Through the
letter of intent, the member formally requests the Fund to make its resources tem-
porary available. After the letter has been considered by the Executive Board, the
Fund’s financial assistance is provided under the terms of a stand-by arrangement.
Both the letter of intent and the stand-by arrangement are unilateral documents;
jointly these instruments do not constitute an international agreement. Normal draw-
ings on the General Resources Account are based on the tranche policy. These draw-
ings do not constitute credits in the technical sense, but are purchases of the required
currency with national currency. For the internationally widely accepted currency
purchased, a charge has to be paid which in practice is much the same as going mar-
ket interest rates.
83. The maximum extent of the purchase depends on the quota. The basic prin-
ciple is that the IMF holds 75% of the quota in the national currency; the remainder
must consist of SDRs or foreign currency. As soon as member country A makes a
purchase, the percentage of national currency within the General Resources Account
increases. It is also possible that the IMF sells currency of member A to member B
so that the percentage is again reduced, and member A’s tranche position improves.
84. In a year, a member can make conditional purchases of the requested cur-
rency until the Fund holds 200% of the member’s quota in its national currency, but
the Fund may waive such upper limits. The conditions for purchases always stipu-
late the obligation that after a certain time, the country must repurchase its own cur-
rency with a currency specified by the Fund. Purchases are phased in what are
termed ‘tranches’, and take place as follows:
Amount of purchase IMF holding of member’s
currency after purchase
Purchase in tranche
25% of quota 100% of quota Reserve tranche
50% of quota 125% of quota First credit tranche
75% of quota 150% of quota Second credit tranche
100% of quota 175% of quota Third credit tranche
125% of quota 200% of quota Fourth credit tranche
85. Conditions are attached to purchases in the higher tranches. Purchases in the
reserve tranche are unconditional: this means that IMF membership requires few
financial sacrifices. The monetary reserves which are transferred as subscription
(25% of the quota) in the form of foreign currency or SDRs can immediately be
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bought back and added to the reserves. On IMF’s conditionality see Chapter 6 of
Part III.
§4. SPECIAL FACILITIES
86. The different IMF facilities offer the opportunity to develop a policy in
respect of a specific category of balance of payments problems. The IMF has in fact
created various facilities to address the specific circumstances of its membership in
response to currency and financial crises. Facilities can be divided in two broad cat-
egories: concessional and non-concessional. Other facilities were created to deal
with financial consequences of natural disasters, problems caused by an unexpected
change of commodity prices or the financing of capacity-building after a conflict.
On the Fund’s facilities see infra paragraph 159.
§5. CONCESSIONAL FACILITIES
87. According to the principle of uniformity, no distinction is allowed between
member countries based on their stage of development for what concerns the
tranche policy. However, specific concessional facilities provide balance of pay-
ments support tailored to the needs of developing countries. Low-income countries
may borrow on more favourable terms, such as reduced charges and a grace period.
The target group is determined by the background of its specific balance of pay-
ments problems. In 2010, the IMF established new concessional facilities for low-
income countries: the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the Stand-by Credit Facility
(SCF) and the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF). All of them rely on resources available
from the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust.
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Chapter 12. SDRs and the Management of International Liquidity
§1. ALLOCATIONS
88. The 1969 Amendment of the IMF Articles created the possibility to supple-
ment monetary reserves of members with SDRs. The SDR is both a unit of account
and an international reserve asset created by the IMF. The value of the SDR is
defined by a basket of currencies. After the introduction of the Euro on 1 January
1999, the SDR basket is composed of the four following currencies: the US Dollar,
the Japanese Yen, the pound Sterling and the Euro. For practical purposes the Fund
appraised the Euro as a joint currency of France and Germany. Each currency is
weighted in the SDR basket, depending on its relative strength.
89. The SDR as an additional reserve asset was created to keep pace with grow-
ing international trade transactions. The economic rationale of SDR was that a
higher volume of reserves could be desirable to support a higher volume of trade
transactions rather than depend on increased money velocity. Additional reserves
could be created in two ways: countries could acquire reserves by assuming debt
(e.g., to other states) or through money creation without incurring debt. The SDR
represents the latter solution. SDRs may be considered as a form of ‘fiat money’,
allocated to members, that is backed by members’ obligations under the Articles of
Agreement.
90. Only members who participate in the Special Drawing Rights Department
may receive from the IMF allocations of SDRs and be involved in SDR transac-
tions. Such an allocation provides each member with a costless, unconditional inter-
national reserve asset on which interest is neither earned nor paid. However, if a
member’s SDR holdings rise above its allocation, it earns interest on the excess.
Conversely, if it holds fewer SDRs than allocated, it pays interest on the shortfall.
Currently, all IMF members participate in the department. The IMF can also
empower ‘official’ institutions to hold SDRs.
91. The decision to create SDRs is taken by the Board of Governors with a
majority of 85% whenever the long-term global need so requires. The same major-
ity is needed to cancel SDRs (which incidentally has never happened). Allocation
(and cancellation) is expressed as a percentage of the quota. No further conditions
are attached to allocations.
§2. EQUITY ALLOCATIONS
92. The role of the SDR as a supplement to monetary reserves has been mod-
erate. SDRs were distributed through general allocations only twice before the
1990s. At the 1994 annual meeting proposals were made for an increase in SDR
allocations. In addition, there were also suggestions to provide special SDR alloca-
tions for developing members and economies in transition. However, the IMF
Articles did not allow for selective allocations, not even for countries that became
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member at a later stage and did not benefit from previous allocations. The IMF
Articles provide that each participant receives its share of SDR allocation in pro-
portion to its quota. Moreover, ‘in all its decisions with respect to the allocation and
cancellation of special drawing rights the Fund shall seek to meet the long-term glo-
bal need’. The only reason for an allocation of SDRs, therefore, can be the smooth
operation of the international monetary system. Neither the need of an individual
member or group of members, nor the principle of equitable allocation between
existing and new members may be taken into account.
93. For new members of the Fund that have not enjoyed the benefit of previous
SDR allocations a special amendment of the Articles of Agreement was proposed.
The Fourth Amendment entered into force in 2009 and provided a ‘Special One-
Time Allocation of Drawing Rights’ which benefited particularly the thirty-eight
IMF members that had never received any SDR allocation. The amendment is
believed not to compromise the principle that allocations are only allowed when a
long-term global need so justifies.
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Chapter 13. Operations and Transactions in SDRs
§1. BETWEEN MEMBERS: DESIGNATION MECHANISM AND VOLUNTARY
TRANSACTIONS
94. All operations and transactions involving SDRs are conducted through the
Special Drawing Rights Department in which IMF members participate. Partici-
pants in the department are entitled to use SDRs to obtain an equivalent amount of
currency from a participant that is designated by the Fund. In this case, the IMF acts
as an intermediary: Article XIX, section 5 provides for a designation mechanism
under which participants whose balance of payments and reserve positions are con-
sidered sufficiently strong are obliged, when designated by the Fund, to provide
‘freely usable currencies’ in exchange for SDRs up to a specified amount. The
exchange can only be made for improving the balance of payments or the reserve
position of the requesting SDRs holder. The mechanism is executed through quar-
terly designation plans, approved by the Fund, which lists participants subject to
designation and set maximum limits to the amounts of SDRs, which they may
receive during the quarter.
95. The designation of individual participants may also be determined in a man-
ner that over time promotes equality in the ‘excess holding ratios’ of participants
(i.e., SDR holdings above or below allocations as a proportion of participants’ offi-
cial gold and foreign exchange reserves).
96. Since September 1987, there have been no transactions with designation
because exchanges of SDRs have been made on the basis of voluntary trading
agreements among members. Participants have established standing arrangements
to buy and sell SDRs against freely usable currencies.
§2. WITH THE FUND
97. The IMF itself may also participate in SDR transactions. Thus the Fund may
hold SDRs in the General Resources Account. SDRs may be acquired by subscrip-
tion payments, repurchase operations of members, payments of charges and other
transactions.
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Part II. Management of the International
Monetary System
Chapter 1. Introduction
98. The post-war management of the international monetary system has evolved
in two subsequent stages. In the early years the Fund was preoccupied with
exchange rate stability through the administration of a system of par values. In this
system each member was obliged to express the value of its currency in terms of
gold or the United States Dollar. The US would play a key role in maintaining the
integrity of the par value system by guaranteeing the Dollar value in terms of gold
at the rate of USD 35 per ounce. Accordingly the Dollar and, indirectly, all other
currencies were anchored to gold. The system was, however, not meant to be
entirely static. A member could change the par value of its currency only if a cor-
rection of a ‘fundamental disequilibrium’ (read: persistent deficit) in its balance of
payments was required.
99. Due to changes in the world economy and the US policies, the ‘system of
stable exchange rates’ collapsed in the early 1970s. It was followed by a more lib-
eral system of exchange rate management that was codified in the Second Amend-
ment to the Articles of Agreement. A major characteristic of the new system was
the freedom of members to choose the exchange rate policy they found appropriate
subject to one exception: the use of gold as denominator was explicitly forbidden
by the Articles. To secure stability in the system the Fund would enter into consul-
tation with each member and exercise ‘firm surveillance’ over exchange rate poli-
cies. Article IV stipulates members’ obligations regarding exchange rates and
enables the Fund to oversee the international monetary system. The mandate of the
Fund changed from being a guardian over the functioning of the par value system
to exercising surveillance and providing lending and technical assistance to Mem-
ber States.
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Chapter 2. Bilateral and Multilateral Surveillance
§1. ARTICLE IV CONSULTATIONS
100. Article IV, as modified by the Second Amendment, is entitled ‘Obligations
Regarding Exchange Arrangements’ and explains how the Fund exercises its over-
sight authority through bilateral and multilateral surveillance. Article IV, section 1
empowers the Fund to exercise bilateral surveillance; member countries are obliged
to cooperate with the IMF and other members in order to ensure orderly exchange
arrangements and to promote a ‘stable system of exchange rates’. Such cooperation
should take place in the light of a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods,
services, and capital amongst countries, and that sustains sound economic growth.
Moreover, cooperation will be desirable for the continuing development of the
orderly underlying conditions that are necessary for financial and economic stabil-
ity. In order to fulfil these functions, the Fund exercises ‘firm surveillance’ over the
exchange rate policy of the members and lays down specific principles to which
they must adhere. The Fund also is mandated to oversee the international monetary
system in order to ensure its effective operation (so-called multilateral surveil-
lance).
101. Section 1 of Article IV contains four requirements. The first two are related
to those domestic policies with an impact on the exchange rate. States are asked to:
‘(i) direct their economic and financial policies toward the objective of fostering
orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability’; and ‘(ii) to seek to pro-
mote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and financial conditions
and a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic disruptions’. These
requirements are expressed in a soft law language. The other two obligations are
related to the operation of the international monetary system and are mandatory in
nature: Member States have to ‘(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the inter-
national monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjust-
ment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members’; and (iv) to
follow exchange policies compatible with all of the above mentioned requirements.
Section 1 is couched in opaque language. Its overall softness is the result of the
political compromise after the breakdown of the system of stable exchange rates.
No systematic attempt has been made to explain the exact scope of this provision.
Instead the Fund has elaborated on the practice of surveillance under section 3(b).
102. Whereas section 1 generally requires the Fund and its members to collabo-
rate, a problem is that diverging views exist, within and outside the IMF, on the
appropriate policies required for the promotion of stability. Depending on the eco-
nomic conditions, the IMF may urge members to revalue, devalue or float their cur-
rency, but it may also make its resources available to maintain fixed exchange rates.
Economists may even argue that any exchange rate regime can work, provided it is
backed by sound economic fundamentals. The obligation to cooperate applies to
each and every member of the IMF regardless of whether the member has a surplus
or a deficit in its balance of payments. Cooperation also includes the willingness to
provide information to and receive advice from the Fund.
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103. Section 2(a) refers to ‘exchange rate arrangements’, i.e. to the decision of
the national monetary authorities on the exchange rate policy of the national cur-
rency. Section 2(b) explains that the domestic currency can, for example, be pegged
to another currency or basket of currencies (like the Special Drawing Rights). Sec-
tion 2(b) also anticipated the formation of the so-called European ‘snake in the tun-
nel’ and afterwards of the European Monetary System, by which most of the
European Economic Community (EEC) members linked their currencies to the
European Currency Unit (ECU) to prevent large fluctuations among one another. All
the other categories of exchange arrangements are available: free or managed float-
ing, the adoption of the currency of another country as legal tender, participation in
a monetary area or in a currency union. Section 2(b), however, clearly presumes that
each member retains its sovereign right to issue and manage its own currency.
104. Section 3 refers to multilateral surveillance which concerns developments
in the world economy and in international markets as well as economic linkages and
policy spillovers among countries. Section 3 stipulates that the Fund shall oversee
the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation.
105. During an Article IV consultation, an IMF mission is sent to the Member
State to meet with monetary authorities and collect economic and financial data. At
the end of the mission, a country report is prepared and submitted to the Executive
Board for discussion. The Fund completes the consultation procedure within three
months with a report containing a commentary on the policy in the form of non-
binding ‘conclusions’. The assessments may range from favourable, neutral, criti-
cal, to strongly critical. If the member country agrees, a Public Information Notice
(PIN), which provides background and a summary of the Board discussion, is pub-
lished, with or without the full Article IV consultation Report.
§2. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SURVEILLANCE
106. More wide-ranging is the analysis of developments of the world economy.
There is a six-monthly IMF publication, the World Economic Outlook, which dis-
cusses the economic and monetary developments in a global framework. Members
are expected to tailor their policies according to the findings of the Outlook.
Regional Economic Outlooks (REOs) provide an analysis of the economic trends in
the five major regions of the world. In this process, the Executive Board, which is
responsible for assessing ‘broad developments in exchange rates’, fulfils an impor-
tant role in analysing and forecasting.
107. The IMF also consults with non-members, such as intergovernmental orga-
nizations (IGOs) that exercise monetary jurisdiction. Since no reference is made in
the Articles to surveillance over monetary unions, with the introduction of the Euro
in 1998, the Executive Board decided to establish new modalities for conducting
surveillance over Euro area members within the framework of Article IV bilateral
consultations. A few years later, a framework for policy discussions with the other
existing currency unions was set up: the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union, the
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Central African Economic and Monetary Community, and the West African Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union. These IGOs cannot become members of the IMF
(membership is country-based), but their policies affect the international monetary
system. In 2002, the Executive Board clarified that discussions with EMU institu-
tions were to be held separately from those with individual Euro area countries and
take place twice a year.
§3. THE 1977 AND 2007 EXECUTIVE BOARD DECISIONS ON BILATERAL
SURVEILLANCE
108. The surveillance procedure is under constant review and various policies
have been developed for improvement, such as the 1977 Decision on Surveillance
over Exchange Rate Policies. Traditionally, in its consultations the Fund has prima-
rily focused on macroeconomic imbalances, combating inflation, trade liberaliza-
tion and other market reforms. But progress in understanding problems underlying
economic instability has brought the Fund to expand its jurisdiction under Article
IV. The causes for economic instability are now increasingly associated with poor
economic policies, political deficiencies and other shortcomings. Thus, the Fund has
adopted policies promoting transparency, sound institutional structures and ‘good
governance’, including the combating of corruption. Surveillance may also focus on
social issues and labour markets, income distribution and environmental aspects.
Accordingly, the Fund’s staff has published reports and studies on unproductive
public expenditure and excessive military spending. However, the Fund must be
cautious not to overstep its jurisdiction. Issues relating to the efficient allocation of
resources and priorities in government expenditure are normally not within the
Fund’s mandate and continue to remain within the exclusive jurisdiction of coun-
tries.
109. In 2007, the Executive Board decided to replace the 1977 Surveillance
Decision, introducing the concept of ‘external stability’. The 2007 Decision on
Bilateral Surveillance over Members’ Policies clarified that country surveillance
should be focused on assessing whether national policies promote domestic and
external stability. External stability was in fact considered critical to achieve sys-
temic stability and it was defined as ‘a balance of payments position that does not,
and is not likely to, give rise to disruptive exchange rate movements’, therefore
encompassing developments both in the current and in the capital account. Accord-
ingly, surveillance should focus on monetary, fiscal, financial and exchange rate
policies, assessing risks and weaknesses.
110. The surveillance procedure has in practice only limited effect (especially on
larger countries) for the simple reason that the obligations have no far-reaching con-
sequences: soft obligations do not make for strict surveillance. In the consultations,
only the weight of arguments and, to a certain extent, peer pressure play a role in
persuading a country to bring its economic policy more in line with the conclusions
of the IMF. Effective IMF surveillance thus depends crucially on the willingness of
members to take the Fund’s advice. To make surveillance more effective, members
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could be asked to respond within a specific time to conclusions reached in the
Article IV consultations process. In cases where a member’s policies appeared to
depart from the Fund’s advice, the member should be given increasingly stronger
warnings to bring its policies on course. However, under the current interpretation
of Article IV it is not possible for the Fund to give legally binding directives or to
impose sanctions.
§4. STRENGTHENING SURVEILLANCE: THE FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT
PROGRAMME AND THE 2012 INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE DECISION
111. After the global financial crisis, the Fund undertook a review of the effec-
tiveness of its surveillance. The exercise highlighted the fact that surveillance was
too fragmented and that there were weaknesses and loopholes. Improvements were
to be achieved especially for what concerns financial stability. Therefore, an impor-
tant development is the stronger focus of the Fund on the role of financial markets.
Following the Second Amendment, one of the principal objectives of the Fund has
become ‘the continuing development of the orderly underlying conditions that are
necessary for financial and economic stability’ (Article IV, section 1). The IMF jus-
tifies its jurisdiction over financial stability as it is a key component of members’
domestic and external stability. The Fund assesses developments in financial mar-
kets in the Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) and the Fiscal Monitor. More-
over, Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) are issued by
the IMF and/or the World Bank and cover a set of twelve internationally recognized
core standards and codes relevant to stability and private and financial sector devel-
opment. Under the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) established
after the Asian financial crisis in 1999, upon request of a country’s authority, the
Fund and the World Bank provided a comprehensive evaluation of its financial sec-
tor and gave policy advice on how to reduce vulnerabilities. FSAPs were an instru-
ment of technical assistance, covered by IMF Article V, section 2(b), thus being
‘voluntary’ in nature. In September 2010, the IMF Executive Board decided to inte-
grate FSAP stability assessments into IMF Article IV bilateral consultations for
twenty-five jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors. The assess-
ments will comprise three elements: the degree of inter-linkages between financial
sectors (and thereby the risk of contagion); the effectiveness of domestic supervi-
sion against international standards; and an assessment of the authorities’ capacity
to manage and resolve a financial crisis should the risks materialize. Importantly,
however, overseeing the stability of financial markets continues to be a primary
responsibility of national authorities. The absence of an international financial
authority that assesses financial markets operating across national borders may be
considered a lacuna in global governance.
112. In July 2012, following the completion of the Triennial Surveillance
Review, the IMF Executive Board adopted a new Decision on Bilateral and Mul-
tilateral Surveillance (also called the 2012 Integrated Surveillance Decision), which
extends the key modalities for bilateral surveillance – set forth in the 2007 Decision
– to multilateral surveillance. The new Decision clarifies the scope of multilateral
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surveillance (which includes all issues relevant for global economic and financial
stability), for the first time also establishing the modalities for conducting multilat-
eral consultations. As regards bilateral surveillance, the 2012 Decision recognizes
that systemic stability is most effectively achieved when a member promotes not
only its own balance of payments stability, but also its own domestic stability.
According to these premises, the Decision adds guidance on the conduct of mem-
bers’ domestic policies that are relevant to domestic stability, filling an important
gap of the 2007 Decision (see the new Principle E: ‘A member should seek to avoid
domestic economic and financial policies that give rise to domestic instability’). A
reference to the domestic stability of the union is added to the paragraph on surveil-
lance over members of currency unions (already laid out in the 2007 Decision). In
integrating bilateral and multilateral aspects in Article IV consultations, the new sur-
veillance framework enables the Fund to better assess spillovers and global and
country level risks to economic and financial stability. In fact, the new Decision
allows the Fund to discuss with individual members the full range of spillovers from
their economic and financial policies onto global stability during Article IV consul-
tations. For greater clarity, the term ‘external stability’ is replaced with ‘balance-of-
payments stability’.
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Chapter 3. New Practices in Exchange Rate Management
113. Recent years have witnessed a diversity of currency regimes that have
changed the patterns of international monetary collaboration. The IMF has not been
able to respond adequately to such developments due to institutional limitations or
political inertia. These regimes are alternatives to the traditional concept of mon-
etary sovereignty, i.e. a state that maintains its own currency and pursues its own
monetary policy under supervision of the IMF.
114. A major development has been the creation of the EMU in the EU. A rea-
son for introducing a European currency is the desire to create a single market in
which exchange rate fluctuations, that might impede the free flow of trade, are
eliminated. Under the EMU, states have surrendered their sovereign right to issue a
currency and to pursue monetary policies. Such transfer has replaced national cur-
rencies by a single European currency, the Euro. Key monetary policies relating to
the Euro are determined by the ECB (whose target is price stability) and the Coun-
cil of Finance Ministers (exchange rate policies). It is significant that the EMU and
its central bank, as key players in international monetary relations, are placed under
IMF supervision through annual Article IV consultations with individual members
of the Eurozone as well as through discussions with EU-institutions responsible for
common policies in the EMU area. The ECB has observer status at selected Execu-
tive Board meetings.
115. A second development has been the emergence of currency boards that are
designed to maintain a tight relationship between foreign exchange and domestic
currency. A currency board is committed to issue domestic currency solely in
exchange for a specified currency at a fixed rate. A direct consequence is a limita-
tion to create money by extending credit to the government and the banking sys-
tem. The right to exchange domestic currency for a foreign currency under a
currency board system may be suspended or abolished once the domestic economy
is sufficiently strong. A major reason for introducing currency boards is a firm com-
mitment to control inflation and to restore international confidence in the domestic
currency.
116. A third development is the de facto or de jure dollarization/euroization of
countries, meaning that the domestic currency is entirely replaced by the US Dollar
or another key currency. By de jure dollarization/euroization a country recognizes
legal tender status to the Dollar/Euro (or other dominant foreign currency) and
entirely depends on the policies pursued by foreign monetary authorities. Whereas
the advantages are clear – moderate inflation and a fully convertible currency – the
disadvantages may be considerable. A dollarized economy loses its ability to con-
trol liquidity and interest rates and thus its capacity to respond to economic cycles.
Moreover, it is not expected that the US monetary authorities will take economic
developments in dollarized economies into consideration when monetary objectives
are formulated.
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Chapter 4. Currency Convertibility
§1. INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS FOR CURRENT TRANSFERS AND MARKET
CONVERTIBILITY
117. Currency convertibility refers to the freedom to convert domestic currency
into foreign currencies at a given exchange rate, and to its subsequent use for for-
eign transactions. A distinction can be made between current account convertibility,
which means unrestricted payments and transfers for current transactions, and capi-
tal account convertibility, which means unrestricted inwards and outwards capital
transactions. Payments for current transactions are payments which are not for the
purpose of transferring capital, and include, inter alia, all payments due in connec-
tion with foreign trade, other current business, including services, and normal short-
term banking and credit facilities. Article XXX(d) explains the scope of a ‘current
transaction’.
118. Under Article I the IMF is authorized to facilitate the expansion and bal-
anced growth of international trade and to assist in the elimination of foreign
exchange restrictions that hamper the growth of world trade. For this purpose mem-
bers are expected to accept the obligations under Article VIII, sections 2, 3 and 4.
By doing so, members agree not to impose restrictions on the making of payments
and transfers for current international transactions and not to engage in discrimina-
tory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices without the approval of
the IMF. Particularly important for private contracts is the clause under section 2(b)
which stipulates the unenforceability of ‘exchange contracts involving the currency
of any member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that
member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement’. The meaning of
this provision is that members are obliged not to enforce by judicial or administra-
tive authorities exchange contracts that violate exchange restrictions authorized by
the Fund. The interpretation of ‘exchange contract’ is not without controversy. A
broad interpretation would include all contracts involving international payments or
transfers and domestic contracts payable in foreign exchange: sales, loans, deposits,
etc. The Fund may give advice about the consistency of exchange controls regula-
tions with the Articles of Agreement.
§2. CONVERTIBILITY OF FOREIGN-HELD BALANCES OR ‘OFFICIAL
CONVERTIBILITY’
119. Under Article VIII, section 4 members are obliged to convert certain bal-
ances of their currency held by monetary authorities of other members; ‘official con-
vertibility’ refers to transactions between central banks or similar monetary
authorities. The obligation to convert only applies to balances that have been
recently acquired as a result of current transactions or because their conversion is
needed for making payments for current transactions. Under the conditions of sec-
tion 4(b) the obligation to convert shall not apply.
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120. Developments in monetary practice have made a dead letter of Article VIII,
section 4. The reason for its desuetude is the close connection of this provision with
the system of fixed (but adjustable) exchange rates that collapsed in the early 1970s.
Nevertheless, section 4 has been maintained in the Articles of Agreement and if a
member were requested to convert balances of its currency, the member would
prima facie be in violation of its obligations if it refused conversion. In practice,
holdings of foreign currencies that are considered in excess of needs are sold on the
currency market. The Report on the Second Amendment suggests that no obligation
will be applied for a member to convert under section 4 so long as exchange mar-
kets normally serve this function.
§3. CAPITAL TRANSFERS
121. Article I does not mention capital account liberalization among the pur-
poses of the Fund. At the Bretton Woods conference White and Keynes did not con-
sider capital account convertibility either necessary or desirable. Their position is
reflected in Article VI, which recognizes the right of Member States to impose capi-
tal controls. In practice the Fund has not insisted that capital controls be introduced.
On the contrary, the Fund embraced capital account liberalization, exerting pressure
through technical assistance and surveillance over its members. Pursuant to Article
VI, the Fund’s resources may not be used to meet large or sustained outflows of
capital. However, the currency crises in the 1990s showed that the IMF is willing to
provide balance of payments support when a member is suffering from a sudden and
disruptive loss of market confidence reflected in pressures on the capital account
and its reserves.
122. The liberalization of capital movements is not within the Fund’s mandate
and the introduction of such regulation would require an amendment of the IMF
Articles. During the 1960s many industrialized countries had already adopted poli-
cies ensuring free capital movements. In 1997 and 1998 proposals were made to
amend the Articles to include provisions on liberalization of capital movements, but
they were eventually set aside. Many observers consider the unimpeded flow of pri-
vate capital as an essential element of an efficient international monetary system.
However, currency crises in the 1990s and the global financial crisis have made
many members reluctant to further pursue liberalization. There appears to be con-
sensus that liberalization of capital movements can only be effective when particu-
lar prerequisites are fulfilled. Therefore, liberalization must be approached
cautiously in concert with appropriate macroeconomic and exchange rate policies,
and a sound financial sector. In 2010, the Fund started to revise its longstanding
policy in favour of liberalization and acknowledged that capital controls may effec-
tively mitigate the harmful effects of large volatile capital inflows. In 2011, it also
recognized that controls on capital outflows can be useful in crisis or near crisis con-
ditions, but only as a supplement to more fundamental policy adjustment.
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Chapter 5. Reforming the International Monetary System
123. The volatility of the international capital markets and occasional currency
crises have induced calls for a new architecture of the international monetary sys-
tem. Various groups, including the G-7/8, the G-20, other international organiza-
tions and NGOs have made proposals for a new design. Some proposals suggest to
(re)create global institutions to cope with current international financial and mon-
etary problems. These institutions should have the features to act as a: (i) global
lender of last resort (a ‘global central bank’); (ii) global bankruptcy court (settling
debts and providing a fresh start when countries cannot meet their international
financial obligations); and (iii) a global financial regulator to exercise firm jurisdic-
tion over states and non-sovereign actors. The latter proposal attempts to remedy the
lacunae in supervision by ‘financial market surveillance’. Publication of documents
and, generally, the promotion of transparency are key features of the new architec-
ture. As explained below, considerable progress has been made in promoting more
transparency.
124. The new architecture is particularly expected to counter the increasing
destabilizing effects of international capital markets, a conglomerate of interna-
tional financial entities, including, amongst others, commercial banks, investment
banks, private equity firms, insurance companies and pension funds. These entities
usually buy and sell large quantities of securities, currencies or complex derivative
instruments. They may hedge against inflation and depreciation of currencies or
engage in securities transactions that reduce the risk on an existing investment posi-
tion. But they may also take short positions against currencies that are expected to
depreciate. The relative strength of international capital markets (vis-à-vis central
banks) has substantially increased. Due to their size, financial markets may cause
substantial damage to the global economy. The collapse of financial markets in 2008
was caused by defaults of collateralized debt obligations; these instruments were
widely traded among market participants while risks were poorly understood. In
addition, the market for insuring financial risk (credit default swaps) tore down key
financial institutions. Subsequently, these institutions were refinanced by central
banks or other financial authorities. As explained above, the Fund has no jurisdic-
tion to regulate or supervise financial markets behaviour. A new architecture should
be able to oversee and regulate financial markets in addition to overseeing mon-
etary and economic performance of countries. In 2009, the G-20 established the
Financial Stability Board (FSB) to coordinate at international level the work of
national financial authorities and international standard-setting bodies (SSBs) in
order to identify vulnerabilities affecting the global financial system and actions
needed to address them. In exercising this and its other functions, the FSB will col-
laborate with the Fund, especially on surveillance over the financial sector.
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Chapter 6. The Promotion of Transparency and Good Governance
125. Increased transparency both on the part of the IMF and the members is a
requirement for a more effective functioning of global and domestic financial mar-
kets. More systematic and diversified information on macroeconomic data and
financial markets performance contributes to more transparency. Transparency was
improved in particular by standardized publication of macroeconomic data. In April
1996, the Fund adopted the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) aimed at
parties that have, or seek, access to international capital markets. Adherence to the
SDDS is voluntary. The SDDS aims at the publication of up-to-date data on eco-
nomic performance and policy in the real, fiscal, financial and external sectors.
126. Starting from May 1997 the Fund publishes periodically Public Informa-
tion Notices (PINs) following Article IV consultations in IMF Economic Reviews.
PINs reflect the discussions with the member on its macroeconomic and monetary
policies and conclusions of the Fund’s Executive Board. PINs can only be issued
on a voluntary basis at the request of the members wishing to make public the
Fund’s views on their economic policies. In attracting foreign capital and invest-
ment, countries may benefit from a publicized favourable conclusion.
127. Furthermore, members may decide to release to the public letters of intent
and similar documents. These documents, issued by a government requesting bal-
ance of payments support, describe policy intentions. The Fund encourages mem-
bers to publish documents; with approval of the member these can be found on the
Fund’s website.
128. A salient development in the Fund’s practices has been the publication of
‘good practices’ codes on how to organize governance in the field of fiscal and mon-
etary policies. The codes were drafted in close consultation with the IMF members
and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Whereas these codes
do not hold mandatory rules for members, they contain standards that may be
upheld in consultation procedures. Moreover, these standards may be applied as pre-
conditions before the Fund approves balance of payments support.
129. Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) summarize
the extent to which countries observe internationally recognized standards and
codes. The IMF has identified twelve policies and corresponding standards as use-
ful for the operational work of the Bretton Woods institutions. These include:
accounting; auditing; anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terror-
ism; banking supervision; corporate governance; data dissemination; fiscal trans-
parency; insolvency and creditor rights; insurance supervision; monetary and
financial policy transparency; payments systems; and securities regulation. In a
number of areas the IMF has adopted standards developed by other institutions such
as the Basel Committee, the International Organization of Securities Commission
and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors or the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Reports summarizing coun-
tries’ observance in meeting the standards are published on the IMF’s website.
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130. For the purpose of promoting transparency in April 1998 the IMF adopted
a ‘Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency’. The Code attempts to clarify
governments’ roles and responsibilities in the sphere of fiscal administration. The
Code was followed by a ‘Manual on Fiscal Transparency’ prepared by the Fund’s
Fiscal Affairs Department. The manual translates the principles into practical policy
guidelines and draws on experiences in member countries to illustrate what the IMF
considers good governance.
131. The Code on Transparency is based on four general principles of fiscal
transparency. The principle of clarity of roles and responsibilities reflects the impor-
tance of clear boundaries within government between fiscal, monetary, and public
enterprise activities, and between the public and private sectors. The Code does not
appear to prescribe any particular allocation of responsibility among government
agencies.
132. Public availability of information reflects the need for both comprehensive
fiscal information and for governments to commit themselves to publish fiscal infor-
mation at clearly specified times. The concept of comprehensiveness goes beyond
what is typically covered in government budget and accounts statements. The Code
emphasizes the need to report on any quasi-fiscal activities that have been assigned
or otherwise undertaken by non-government agencies.
133. The third general principle, Open budget preparation, execution, and
reporting, encompasses traditional standards relating to the coverage, accessibility,
and integrity of fiscal information. Emphasis is placed on the development and har-
monization of international statistical and accounting standards for government
reporting.
134. Finally, independent assurances of integrity emphasizes the traditional
means of providing such assurances through external audit and statistical indepen-
dence, but then goes beyond this and calls for openness by governments to allow
independent scrutiny.
135. Additionally, the Fund issued a ‘Code of Good Practices on Transparency
in Monetary and Financial Policies’ that seeks to clarify the relationship between
the central banks and governments. For purposes of the Code, transparency refers
to an environment in which the objectives of policy are provided to the public on an
understandable, accessible and timely basis. Transparency should also clarify the
legal, institutional, and economic aspects of decision-making, the rationale of policy
decisions and accountability. Thus, practices listed in the Code focus on: (1) clarity
of roles, responsibilities and objectives of central banks and financial agencies; (2)
the processes for formulating and reporting of monetary policy decisions by the cen-
tral bank and of financial policies by financial agencies; (3) public availability of
information on monetary and financial policies; and (4) accountability and assur-
ances of integrity by the central bank and financial agencies.
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Part III. Balance of Payments Support
Chapter 1. Introduction
136. A purpose of the IMF is ‘to give confidence to members by making the gen-
eral resources of the Fund temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards,
thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of
payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international pros-
perity’. In the practice of the Fund, balance of payments support has become a
dominant activity, virtually overshadowing other tasks. Whereas each member is
entitled to balance of payments support, until recently only developing countries
and countries in transition have made use of the Fund’s resources. The last decade
has witnessed a major shift in economic performance: more developing countries
have been able to accumulate monetary reserves or gained access to financial mar-
kets and thereby became less dependent on IMF resources. In contrast, the financial
position of industrialized countries has worsened considerably; indebtedness, ampli-
fied by the fall-out of the financial crisis in 2008, has increased to alarming levels.
Since Italy and the UK received support from the Fund in the 1970s, in 2010 Greece
was the first advanced economy and Euro area country to receive financial assis-
tance from the IMF and the EU, being followed by Ireland and Portugal.
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Chapter 2. The Concept of Balance of Payments
137. Each Member State has to draw up a balance of payments. In order to pro-
mote uniformity in the book-keeping and to facilitate analysis of the figures, the
Fund gives directions to Member States about the way in which transactions are
recorded. These directions are published in the Balance of Payments Manual. The
figures relating to the balance of payments of Member States are published in the
Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.
138. The Fund defines the balance of payments as a statistical statement for a
given period showing: (a) transactions in goods, services, and income between an
economy and the rest of the world; (b) changes of ownership and other changes in
that economy’s monetary gold, special drawing rights (SDRs), and claims on and
liabilities to the rest of the world; and (c) unrequited transfers and counterpart
entries that are needed to balance, in the accounting sense, any entries for foregoing
transactions and changes which are not mutually offsetting. Every transaction that
is recorded is to be represented by two entries that have exactly equal values. One
entry is designated as a credit and conceived as having a positive arithmetic sign,
while the other entry is called a debit and given a negative sign. The sum of all
entries is therefore, in principle, zero.
139. The balance of payments is subdivided in the current account and the capi-
tal account. These accounts are further broken down into various categories of trans-
actions: the current account includes the balance of trade, goods and unrequited
transfers; the capital account relates to the capital transfers (international credits,
repayments, investments). A deficit on the current account may be settled by bor-
rowing abroad or by depleting official reserves, i.e. the foreign currency which is
held by central banks to serve as a buffer for financial transactions. Gold is also held
as a reserve, since it can be sold against any currency. A surplus on the current
account means an increase in the official reserves, while a deficit means a decrease
in the reserves. Any changes in the reserve position thus appear in the balance of
payments.
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Chapter 3. The Need for Support
140. A state has a deficit on the current account when it imports more goods and
services than it exports. The capital balance may also be negative because of flights
of capital or investments abroad. As long as these deficits are limited and of short
duration, the official reserves can provide a solution. It is possible that after a time
a surplus will arise so that the reserves can be brought back to the desired level.
However, when the deficit is serious or difficult to shift, most countries will come
into difficulty, as the reserves will become exhausted. In such cases two responses
are possible.
141. First, it is possible to seek elsewhere for a means of covering the deficit.
One option is for a country to offer bonds in a foreign currency, within or outside
its own territory. Countries can also try to secure loans from commercial banks,
operating on the market for currencies which are traded outside the country of issue.
Developing countries may also receive balance of payments support in the shape of
official development assistance.
142. Particularly for developing countries, calling on external financial sources
does however have its limits. The only source of credit, which does not entail future
obligations, are grants. This particular source is, however, scarce. As the balance of
payments position shows no signs of improvement, and as the creditworthiness of
the debtor country worsens, creditors will become ever more reluctant to furnish
additional financial resources.
143. Second, a country can carry out an adjustment programme aimed at restor-
ing the balance of payments. Such a policy means that the government opts for eco-
nomic reform through reducing government spending, adjusting exchange rates,
fighting inflation and other measures. Adjustment is in fact unavoidable when con-
fidence in the country concerned has fallen to such a level that new credits are no
longer offered. If the necessary adjustment fails to materialize, then market forces
will come into play: shortage of currency will lead to import restrictions. If market
forces are not controlled, these imports may include items which are essential for
the economic development of the country. For example, if industry cannot get hold
of foreign currency in order to buy machinery or spare parts, production comes to
a halt; there is income deprivation and the flow of currency ceases. Scarcity of for-
eign currency can easily lead to a downward spiral in the economy.
144. Often the IMF comes in when countries are up to their neck in difficulties.
The IMF has laid down that structural balance of payments deficits and currency
shortages must be countered by a programme of economic adjustment enabling the
government to influence and to manipulate public spending, growth in the money
supply, interest and exchange rates and other variables of economic and monetary
policy. The IMF has set itself the task of helping countries in setting up and car-
rying out adjustment programmes. At the same time, the Fund provides short-term
balance of payments support in order to cover immediate deficits. With few excep-
tions, an adjustment programme accompanies IMF financing of deficits.
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Chapter 4. The Political Economy
145. Adjustment becomes necessary because circumstances in the preceding
period have had an adverse effect on the balance of payments: excessive imports
due to over-consumption, disappointing export revenue due to falling commodity
prices, wrong exchange rate policy, misguided tax incentives, flight of capital or
unfocused investment policy. Some of these causes can be laid at the door of the
country concerned, while others, such as falling raw materials prices, can hardly be
blamed on the country. However, adjustment is inevitable, regardless of the cause
of the balance of payments deficit, and regardless of whether the country itself is to
blame for the deficit. Only when an unlimited appeal can be made on international
credit is postponement of adjustment possible.
146. Although the Fund cannot prevent adjustment, it can soften it. Member
countries call on the organization’s help in order to make the adjustment process
proceed as smoothly as possible, without seriously endangering the economy. The
Fund can also be requested to ensure that the adjustment happens in such a way that
the socio-economic position of vulnerable groups is protected as far as possible. It
may be expected that IMF-supported adjustment is more gradual and somewhat less
painful than market-enforced adjustment.
147. There are several reasons why the IMF insists on adjustment. The first is
rather mundane: as credit will only temporarily be made available, the IMF wants
to make sure that the member is able to pay back. In fact, one of the purposes of the
Fund is to make its general resources temporarily available to Member States ‘under
adequate safeguards’ (Article I). A member that does not reform and continues to
spend foreign currency beyond its means will certainly not be able to repay. Sec-
ond, the IMF must facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international
trade. Adjustment is expected to ensure that countries continue to participate in the
world trading system. There may also be a third reason: countries running out of
foreign reserves may become insolvent and create a risky environment for interna-
tional banks and investors.
148. When an adjustment programme is being negotiated, parties will apply core
principles of economic theory. Despite these principles, negotiators of the IMF and
the country in need may have fundamental differences of opinion. Parties will agree
that reforms must be aimed at restoring the balance but they may disagree on the
best recipe to find that balance. In the end, parties may come up with a deal which
is reflected in a document stating the reforms for the next year (a memorandum of
economic and financial policies attached to the country’s letter of intent). What
counts, of course, are effective changes in domestic economic policies. Changes
usually include drastic budget cuts and tax reform, price liberalization, trade and
foreign investment liberalization, privatization and private sector deregulation. Gen-
erally adjustment follows a predetermined pattern, meaning that the state steps back
while the private sector moves in.
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149. Governments have not always been eager to do business with the Fund.
They would much prefer to rely on unconditional support, which would not thus
restrict political priorities. Although the Fund calls on its members to take timely
measures, in practice members only turn to the Fund when other creditors have
turned their backs and the ship is threatening to sink, or has already sunk. Uninten-
tionally the Fund becomes a lender of last resort. This situation means that adjust-
ment under Fund guidance often entails a radical change in economic policy. Painful
choices have to be made. Interest groups who for years have been able to count on
special benefits see their financial position undermined by economy drives as a part
of conditionality. Government jobs are axed, and the military see their budgets melt
away. A government must stand firm to resist the pressure from so many interest
groups, and it is not unusual for the Fund, for political reasons, to take the blame
for these painful measures. The IMF has been prepared to let these reproaches go
unanswered, as a sort of silent contribution to the adjustment effort.
150. The Fund fulfils a pivotal function in the relation between the debtor coun-
try and its creditors. For creditors, the Fund is competent to judge the creditwor-
thiness of a country. Practically all creditors trust the IMF’s judgment, and are only
prepared to provide support if the debtor, in consultation with the Fund, carries out
an adjustment programme. As long as the Fund provides support, creditors will have
faith that the adjustment programme is on the right track, and will judge that the
risks entailed in providing credit are acceptable. The debtor country also realizes
that creditors will place their trust in an adjustment programme which meets with
the Fund’s approval. There may also be another reason why finance ministers and
central bank presidents in particular adhere to IMF adjustment programmes. These
authorities, responsible for financial and monetary policy, try to strengthen their
position vis-à-vis spending departments in seeking support from the IMF. Backed
up by the Fund, they hope to induce greater financial discipline among their fellow
ministers.
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Chapter 5. Purchasing Currencies from the Fund
151. Article V section 1 explains that only fiscal or monetary agencies may deal
with the Fund when operations and transactions are made. Section 2(a) stipulates
that transactions made for the purpose of balance of payments support have the
character of purchases. Hence SDRs or currencies of other members, which are held
in the General Resources Account, may be purchased in exchange for an equivalent
amount of the purchasing member’s currency. Thereby only the composition of cur-
rencies held by the Fund will change. Under section 2(b) the Fund may provide
financial and technical services, including the administration of resources contrib-
uted by members. Such additional activities must be consistent with the purposes of
the Fund. It is accepted that financial services may be available for specific catego-
ries of Member States only. An example was the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (now the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust), a facility that is financed
by a trust fund and created for the benefit of developing countries only.
152. Regular transactions are made through the General Resources Account.
Article V, section 3 lays down rules for conditional balance of payments support.
Under (a) the Fund must adopt policies on the use of its resources. The policies must
ensure that the balance of payments problems are solved consistently with the IMF
Articles and establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use of the Fund’s
resources. Temporary use is ensured by repurchase obligations: a member must buy
back from the Fund its own currency after it has used the foreign currency ‘tem-
porarily’.
153. Under section 2(b) conditions for the right to use resources are elaborated.
The member ‘shall be entitled to purchase currencies of other members from the
Fund in exchange for an equivalent amount of its own currency’. It is important to
note that members are ‘entitled’ to receive support, meaning that membership
already creates an initial right. The IMF merely determines the conditions under
which the purchase may be made.
154. After the member has made a request, the Fund shall examine it and deter-
mine the consistency with the IMF Articles and policies. Under section 3(d), (e) and
(f) arrangements will be made of the selection of currencies to be sold and the
exchangeability of currencies that are used in transactions. Resources made avail-
able by the Fund must be SDRs or ‘freely usable currencies’, i.e. currencies that are
widely used to make payments for international transactions and are widely traded
in the principal exchange markets. In practice only the currencies of members with
a sufficiently strong balance of payments and reserve position are considered usable
and constitute the ‘operational budget’ of the Fund.
155. A purchase may be made under the condition that the use of the resources
of the Fund would be in accordance with the provisions of the Articles and the poli-
cies adopted under them. Accordingly, the member must declare that it has a need
to make the purchase because of its balance of payments or its reserve position or
developments in its reserves. Therefore, only balance of payments problems or
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declining reserves may induce financial support from the Fund. A further condition
is that the proposed purchase would be limited up to 200% of the member’s quota,
but this limit may be waived under section 4. The maximum amount that a country
can borrow from the IMF, known as its access limit, varies depending on the type
of loan, but is typically a multiple of the country’s IMF quota.
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Chapter 6. IMF Conditionality
156. Conditionality reflects the policies a member is required to follow in order
to be able to use the Fund’s resources. Adjustment and conditionality makes the
IMF co-author of economic policies and co-responsible for the consequences of
adjustment. Just like a government makes choices in policies that reflect political,
moral and legal values, the IMF must also consider values. In light of IMF’s prac-
tice to insist on firm adjustment efforts, incisive questions on the scope of condi-
tionality may be asked. Could the IMF ask a country to increase the production of
the coca plant because the export of cocaine will generate a substantial inflow of
foreign currency? There are also less absurd questions to be asked. Can the IMF ask
for the closing down of state subsidized hospitals and schools? Can it demand a
policy by which parents must pay a user’s fee for their children in primary school?
What are the ethics of the IMF? Does it cherish moral values? From a legal point
of view it could be asked whether the IMF considers itself to be bound by human
rights.
157. Searching for values and human rights in the IMF Articles does not pro-
duce clear answers. According to its Articles the IMF must avoid measures that are
‘destructive of national or international prosperity’ but this has little practical mean-
ing without a proper interpretation. Significant is an opinion of the IMF’s legal
counsel on the relationship between the Fund and the UN Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (1966). The opinion suggests that the IMF is factually
contributing to the promotion of socio-economic standards, by creating a more pros-
perous economy in the long term. The opinion also states that the IMF is not legally
bound by the Covenant because it is not a party. Some authors, proceeding on the
assumption that human rights are part of a larger framework of international law,
argue instead that both the IMF and the World Bank are bound to respect human
rights obligations in their activities.
158. Sovereignty and political independence are also relevant legal notions. In
negotiations with country officials it may be tempting for the IMF to ignore such
concepts. In the past, countries have reproached the IMF with intrusions of sover-
eignty. Developing countries also accused the IMF of unequal treatment. This has
prompted the Fund to adopt Guidelines on Conditionality in 1979 that were revised
in 2002 and later on supplemented by operational guidance notes for assisting the
staff in discussions with members. In March 2009, the IMF further modernized its
conditionality framework in the context of a comprehensive reform to strengthen its
capacity to prevent and resolve crises. In 2010 it revised the Operational Guidance
to IMF Staff on the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines.
159. Conditionality applies when the Fund provides financial assistance to
Member States. Over the years, the IMF lending activities have been organized
under different ‘facilities’ to better take into account the specific circumstances of
its members (whether they are low-income countries or countries with strong fun-
damentals). A new framework was developed in the wake of the global financial cri-
sis to include a more systematic use of ex ante conditionality. The IMF facilities
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now include: (a) the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the Stand-by Credit Facility
(SCF) and the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) under which the IMF gives concessional
support to low-income countries; (b) the Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), under
which countries are given financial support to address short-term balance of pay-
ments problems; (c) the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), which is designed to help states
meeting a pre-established set of qualification criteria – strong fundamentals, poli-
cies, and track records of policy implementation – to adopt crisis prevention and cri-
sis resolution measures; (d) the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), designed
to assist countries with sound fundamentals which, however, do not meet the FCL
qualification standards (the PLL combines ex ante and ex post conditionality); (e)
the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), established to address members with medium-
and longer-term balance of payments problems; (f) and the Rapid Financing Instru-
ment (RFI), for emergency assistance to members facing urgent balance of pay-
ments needs.
§1. PRINCIPLES OF CONDITIONALITY
160. The 2002 Guidelines deal with ‘principles’ and ‘modalities’ of condition-
ality. The first guideline emphasizes that Fund resources are provided for resolving
balance of payments problems. Poverty or other conditions cannot give reason for
assistance. Conditionality depends not only on the IMF Articles, but also on imple-
menting decisions that interpret ‘adequate safeguards’, a phrase used in Article I(v)
and Article V, section 3(a). Such decisions are taken by a majority vote in the Execu-
tive Board. The Guidelines also explain that conditional balance of payments sup-
port is one of the ways in which the IMF helps members to strengthen their
economic and financial policies. Article IV consultations, discussed above, may also
signal developments that merit concern. The IMF suggests to members not to post-
pone difficult decisions.
161. In Guideline 3 the Fund acknowledges that programmes cannot be imposed
on countries. In the past too often the IMF prescribed the required policies to gov-
ernments. Governments were asked to sign documents on policy reform that were
prearranged by IMF missions. The Guidelines explain that ‘the member has pri-
mary responsibility for the selection, design and implementation of its economic
and financial policies’. This is an important warning sign to all IMF missions to lis-
ten carefully to government officials. There must also be an appropriate institutional
framework for the implementation of the reforms. The 2010 Operational Guidance
to IMF Staff further clarifies that the Fund’s staff should ‘seek early on the views of
country authorities and make every effort to accommodate their preferences while
ensuring that the Fund-supported program goals are achieved’.
162. Guideline 4 explains that ‘in helping members to devise economic and
financial programs, the Fund will pay due regard to the domestic social and politi-
cal objectives, the economic priorities, and the circumstances of members, includ-
ing the causes of their balance of payments problems and their administrative
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capacity to implement reforms’. The language of this principle suggests some lee-
way for preserving domestic policies when an adjustment programme is put in
place. In reality the latitude is limited. First, ‘due regard’ does not mean ‘respect’
and does not compel the IMF to give overriding force to domestic policies. If the
economic consequences of domestic choices conflict with IMF policies, the latter
will prevail. A second caveat is that the Fund’s policies interfering with sovereign
decision-making have been expanded in the 1990s. Significant is the IMF Stan-
dards and Codes Initiative, under which since the end of the 1990s the Fund
endorsed twelve internationally recognized standards and adopted a set of guide-
lines and codes to strengthen the international financial system. Among these there
were the 1997 Guidance Note on the Role of the IMF in Governance Issues, the
1999 Code of Good Practice on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies
and the Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency (developed in 1998 and
revised in 2007). With the proliferation and application of codes and standards, the
IMF is increasingly interfering with decision-making in areas that traditionally
belonged to the exclusive domain of governments. Guideline 4 also mentions the
‘past performance’ as a relevant circumstance. This refers to behaviour of members
in previous periods. By offering false economic data some countries have mislead
the IMF – the latter believing that programmes were on track. The Fund appears to
keep an elephant’s memory for such incidents.
163. Guideline 5 expresses the principle of ‘consistent application of policies’
to maintain ‘uniform treatment’ of members. Non-discriminatory treatment is an
important principle, but it is difficult to prove that uniform treatment has not taken
place, because the economic circumstances of countries will never be the same. Sec-
ond, capacity and commitment of the requesting country are important criteria for
providing credit. This principle also explains the key role of the IMF’s manage-
ment. The Managing Director has to rely on the judgment of IMF missions that
negotiate the programme. It will be difficult for the Executive Board to denounce
the recommendation of the Managing Director. Staff in the IMF has a high respon-
sibility for vigilant judgments.
164. Guideline 6 urges the Fund to provide balance of payments support ‘with-
out recourse to measures destructive of national or international prosperity’. The
wording is opaque and gives the IMF much room to deviate from this principle.
‘Should be directed primary towards ( … )’ is softly phrased and it is unclear what
is meant by ‘destructive of national and international prosperity’. These are
un-interpreted words and phrases. What is prosperity and whose prosperity should
be preserved? Does prosperity refer to GDP or socio-economic standards? Obvi-
ously, it will be difficult to keep all parties involved prosperous, when an adjust-
ment programme is in place. Second, a programme must aim to achieve medium-
term external viability while fostering sustainable economic growth. Significant is
‘fostering’, which suggests that the IMF assists in promoting ‘sustainable economic
growth’. It is correct to assume that the IMF is not directly promoting sustainable
economic growth, but principally paves the way towards growth.
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165. Guideline 7 explains that programme-related conditions governing the pro-
vision of Fund resources will be applied parsimoniously. Parsimoniously means
restrictively. This is to avoid the proliferation of conditions that in the past plagued
many countries under IMF scrutiny. The conditions must be of critical importance
for achieving programme goals or necessary for the implementation of the IMF
Articles of Agreement or policies adopted. According to the 2010 Operational Guid-
ance to IMF Staff, ‘a judgment that a condition is of critical importance means that
if it was not implemented, it is expected that the goals would not be achieved or
that program monitoring would not be possible’. Again, attention should be given
to the ‘policies’ clause. As explained above the IMF has not been ‘parsimonious’ in
developing new policies. In practice more policies means more conditions. Further-
more, the IMF will impose conditions that ‘normally’ consist of macroeconomic
variables and structural measures within the Fund’s mandate (core areas of respon-
sibility). Inclusion of non-macroeconomic variables must be explicitly motivated.
Macroeconomic variables have not been defined but likely they refer to aggregate
data. Accordingly, the IMF may ask for a reduction in overall government spend-
ing, but it should not systematically impose conditions on a detailed scheme for
such reductions. Structural measures have also been a source of major controversy,
because related conditions were conceived to go beyond the Fund’s responsibility.
In 2009, the Fund decided that structural performance criteria would have no longer
been part of the conditionality framework.
166. Guideline 8 addresses cross conditionality and the relation with the World
Bank. Debtor countries fear the domino effect of conditionalities imposed by vari-
ous creditors. If a debtor would fail to meet the condition of one creditor other credi-
tors may subsequently decide to cut off the credit lines. The Fund commits itself not
to apply this so-called cross conditionality. There is also an acknowledgement that
cooperation with other institutions, notably the World Bank, is imperative. Both
organizations tend to overlap in their activities. There were even simultaneous pro-
grammes of IMF and World Bank that were in conflict. The more the IMF became
concerned with structural reforms – e.g. the liberalization of trade or reform of eco-
nomic sectors – the more cooperation was required in these areas. In agreements the
IMF and World Bank have accepted the concept of ‘lead agency’. Depending on the
reforms required, one institution would take primary responsibility and the other is
expected to follow.
§2. ASSESSMENT
167. The IMF Articles and its implementing decisions govern conditionality. As
the IMF Articles are phrased in ambiguous language, conditionality depends largely
on implementing policies. Conditionality is expected to focus on macroeconomic
targets. It must also be unambiguous, necessary for achieving objectives, and
applied in a credible fashion. A member cannot be expected to implement a pro-
gramme in which it does not believe or for which it has no appropriate capabilities.
Other elements of the Guidelines are ‘national ownership’ of reform programmes,
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‘parsimony’ in the application of programme-related conditions, tailoring of pro-
grammes to the member’s circumstances, coordination with other multilateral insti-
tutions, and clarity in the specification of conditions.
168. By stressing that the programme is ‘country-owned’, the IMF attempts to
prevent that it will be named a scapegoat, as it has often happened. Many govern-
ments conveniently blamed the IMF for painful measures – ‘we do not want this,
but the IMF forces us to do so’. Governments may not always like the idea that they
must take full responsibility for adjustment policies.
169. There are also missed opportunities. The Guidelines fail to address the
problem of socio-economic consequences following adjustment. It should clarify
that adjustment must take into account the plight of the poor by interpreting the
‘national prosperity’ clause in Article I(v). Accordingly, the Guidelines could have
clarified that international human rights standards be upheld during adjustment. For
that purpose, the Guidelines could indicate that the Fund must cooperate with appro-
priate UN bodies, such as the treaty-based Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights.
170. Another inherent flaw is the absence of even a basic dispute settlement pro-
vision. States may disagree with the Fund and they may be wrong or right. The point
is that the Fund’s view will always prevail even when this view is illegitimate or
unlawful. In the final analysis, the IMF interprets the Guidelines without any cor-
rective procedure. The Fund might take the World Bank as an example. The Bank
has established an independent Inspection Panel for the purpose of providing people
directly with an independent forum through which they can request the Bank to act
in accordance with its own policies and procedures. Accordingly, the IMF should
create a procedure for member countries that believe that the Fund is failing to
observe its Articles of Agreement or implementing decisions. A member country
should have the opportunity to ask the IMF not to insist on conditionality that
implies a violation of the member’s international obligations. An example of such
controversial policy is the IMF’s insistence on the introduction of a ‘user fee’ for
basic services in health and education. A user fee for primary education would not
only ignore the Guidelines – conditions should be primarily ‘macroeconomic’ – but
also violate international human rights instruments that require compulsory and free
elementary education.
§3. PROCEDURE AND MODALITIES
171. A member country, which desires balance of payments support, expresses
its request to the IMF. Following the request the Fund sends a mission. In coopera-
tion with the mission the member’s monetary authorities work out a series of adjust-
ment measures that are then set out in a letter of intent, a document issued by the
requesting member. The letter of intent is a declaration of aims and policy by a
member country; it asks the IMF to approve a stand-by arrangement in favour of
the member country. The letter of intent or the stand-by arrangement does not entail
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any contract or obligation according to Guideline 9. Nor is there any question of a
unilateral legal act, since the ‘intention of being bound’ is absent. The letter of intent
only contains policy objectives, which the requesting Member State may change
without consulting the Fund.
172. The member may agree to take ‘prior actions’ and to implement some mea-
sures before the IMF’s Executive Board approves financing (or completes a review).
Measures based on preconditions are also termed ‘front load adjustment’. Precon-
ditions should be quantitatively as limited as possible, and may only be required
when necessary for carrying out the programme in accordance with the IMF’s regu-
lations.
173. An important consequence of the absence of a contractual relation between
the IMF and the member is that, from the combined reading of the letter of intent
and the stand-by arrangement, no binding agreement arises which would make man-
datory the execution of the adjustment programme. The programme only stipulates
the conditions under which currency purchases are possible; if the conditions are not
fulfilled, the purchase will not go ahead. The lack of contractual character also has
consequences in other areas: treaty law is not applicable, and it is not necessary to
follow national procedures that might be necessary for the approval of international
agreements. Nor are stand-by arrangements registered by virtue of Article 102 of the
UN Charter.
174. The IMF puts forward a number of different arguments for the lack of a
contractual bond. The most important legal reason lies in the formulation of Article
V, section 3(b): ‘A member shall be entitled to purchase currencies ( … ) from the
Fund ( … ) subject to the following conditions’ (italics added). It follows from this
condition that the stand-by arrangement is declaratory, in the sense that it recog-
nizes the member’s entitlement to use the Fund’s resources; it does not create the
entitlement. The stand-by agreement does no more than specify the conditions under
which this right may be exercised.
175. Furthermore, the IMF wishes to avoid the impression that adjustment pro-
grammes are dictated by setting forth contractual obligations. To set out the results
of a negotiation in the form of an agreement would be to paint a false picture of the
relationship between the Fund and its members. A contractual bond would be incon-
sistent with the ‘national ownership’ principle. The IMF supports the programme
without wishing to appeal to contractual rights and obligations.
176. The stand-by arrangement as a Fund decision offers a number of advan-
tages both for the member and the IMF:
(a) Speed. The procedure for setting up a letter of intent and a stand-by arrange-
ment can be quickly dealt with; the procedure is simple, and because the mem-
ber is under no obligation, there is less need to formulate the text of the letter
of intent in minute legal detail; speed is of the essence when balance of pay-
ments problems are threatening.
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(b) Confidentiality. The procedure can be handled in complete confidentiality, since
there is no question of an agreement that must be put before a parliament, or
which must be published; confidentiality is particularly important when cur-
rency devaluation forms a part of the adjustment programme. If the adjustment
programme were a matter of public knowledge, the risk would ensue of a flight
of capital or speculation against the currency undergoing devaluation. An objec-
tion to confidentiality is that radical adjustment measures are adopted without
the democratic scrutiny of a parliament or other stakeholders.
(c) Primacy of economic sovereignty. The member may, at any given moment, call
a halt to the adjustment programme without being guilty of breach of contract,
and without sanctions from the IMF. If the member decides to do so, there is no
question of non-compliance with the letter of intent or the stand-by arrange-
ment. The resources already purchased are not possessed unlawfully, and do not
have to be yielded up prematurely by repurchase, unless it was a case of a ‘non-
complying purchase’. It would only be a question of unlawful behaviour if the
use of the resources conflicted with the purposes of the Fund.
177. However, invoking economic sovereignty does have practical conse-
quences, since continuation of the programme remains a condition for continuing
the balance of payments support, not only by the Fund, but also by other creditors.
If balance of payments support is indispensable, a country has in practice no option
but to see the adjustment programme through. Should a member nevertheless decide
to bring a premature end to the adjustment programme, the relation of trust will be
seriously compromised. If a new request for support is made, the IMF will insist on
clarification about the reasons for halting the programme, and will require more
security before proceeding to a new stand-by arrangement.
§4. MONITORING AND MEASURING PERFORMANCE
178. The release of resources is formalized in the stand-by arrangement. Pur-
chases are usually made in phases. Before new purchases are made the Fund checks
if the programme is on track. A programme is usually monitored by so-called per-
formance criteria. Guideline 11(b) defines a performance criterion as ‘a variable or
measure whose observance or implementation is established as a formal condition
for the making of purchases or disbursement under a Fund arrangement’. Perfor-
mance criteria derive from the policy understandings and constitute the core of con-
ditionality. Failure to fulfil the criteria will result in a cutting off or suspension of
balance of payments support, unless the Fund decides to grant a waiver under
Guideline 12. Performance criteria may only be included in stand-by arrangements
and subsequent programme reviews. Criteria in ‘secret side letters’ are not permit-
ted. Quantitative performance criteria are usually established to assess the mem-
ber’s compliance with the programme. They are specific and measurable conditions
related to macroeconomic variables, such as monetary and credit aggregates, inter-
national reserves, fiscal balances, and external borrowing. If a quantitative perfor-
mance criterion is not met, the Executive Board may approve a formal waiver
during a programme review, but only if it is satisfied that ‘the program will never-
theless be successfully implemented—i.e., that it will achieve its goals—either
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because of the minor or temporary nature of the non-observance or because of cor-
rective actions taken by the authorities’ (2010 Operational Guidance to IMF Staff).
179. Performance criteria do not describe the objectives of the programme, but
serve rather as a touchstone for evaluating its progress. The criteria should nor-
mally relate to macroeconomic variables, or to those variables by which special
clauses of the Articles or the derived policy are effectuated. Thus, according to
Guideline 7(b) performance criteria must ‘normally’ be related to the Fund’s core
areas of responsibility, i.e. ‘macroeconomic stabilization; monetary, fiscal, and
exchange rate policies, including the underlying institutional arrangements and
closely related structural measures; and financial system issues related to the func-
tioning of both domestic and international financial markets’.
180. Performance criteria may only refer to other variables (notably ‘microeco-
nomic’) in exceptional circumstances, when, due to their effect at the macroeco-
nomic level, they are essential for the efficacy of the programme. The rationale of
this restraint is that the IMF’s objectives can normally be adequately achieved
through influence on macroeconomic variables. It may be stated that manipulation
of one or more microeconomic variables is only possible in exceptional circum-
stances, where these variables have a substantial influence on macroeconomic
policy.
181. Furthermore, a number of principles must be respected when performance
criteria are being established. These criteria must be as few as possible in number,
as well as explicit, objective and objectively verifiable. Differences of interpretation
about whether the criteria have been adequately met should, ideally, not occur, so
that a member country knows at any given moment whether it has met the criteria
and thus may purchase currency.
182. This restriction to largely macroeconomic criteria means that the IMF relies
primarily on aggregate figures when judging programmes; for example, figures
relating to the maximum deficit in the public expenditure budget. The actual way in
which public expenditure is reduced cannot be set out in the form of a criterion.
Strict application of the Guidelines means that criteria may not refer to matters of
redistribution, nor can they state that deficits must be reduced through cuts in expen-
diture on defence, education or food subsidies.
§5. CONDITIONS AGAINST CORRUPTION
183. In 1997, the IMF adopted the Guidance Note on Governance Issues that
appears to give a further guidance in the application of conditionality. The Guid-
ance Note stipulates that the IMF staff may address issues of poor governance inas-
much these would have ‘significant current or potential impact on macroeconomic
performance in the short and medium term, and on the ability of the government
credibility to pursue policies aimed at external viability’. The accumulation of
instances that may trigger the Fund’s involvement gives reason to believe that any
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major governance issue can be considered in the Fund’s conditionality. Many key
decisions on tax or expenditure would have a significant macroeconomic impact.
That would bring many items of governments’ policies within the ambit of the
Fund’s jurisdiction.
184. Yet the 1997 Guidance Note attempts to delineate the Fund’s jurisdiction:
‘IMF judgment should not be influenced by the nature of a political regime of a
country, nor should it interfere in domestic or foreign politics of any member.’ The
Guidelines identify a number of governance problems.
185. First, corruption as an excrescence of poor governance should be
addressed. The Guidance Note identifies by way of example indicators of poor gov-
ernance that may alert IMF missions: a poorly remunerated civil service and incon-
sistencies or improbabilities in the various data and accounts in member countries.
In this respect it is suggested to introduce civil service reforms such as a restruc-
turing or selective increase in pay scales or privatization.
186. As no precise definition of corruption is being provided, the IMF staff is
expected to draw upon comparisons with broadly agreed best international practices
of more or less corruption-free economic management. For that purpose the 1997
Guidance Note appears to anticipate on coordination with other multilateral insti-
tutions. Here, the work done by the OECD and the UN is relevant. The OECD 1997
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Busi-
ness Transactions criminalizes ‘active bribery’ of foreign public officials. This con-
vention addresses primarily the offence committed by the person who promises or
gives a bribe. Besides, the General Assembly of the UN adopted the Convention
against Corruption that focuses also on the passive side of corruption. The Conven-
tion stipulates parties to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be nec-
essary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) the
promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue
advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that
the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; and
(b) the solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an
undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in
order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official
duties.
187. Apart from widespread forms of corruption, the Fund may even address
‘individual instances of corruption in cases where there is a reason to believe they
would have significant macroeconomic implications, even if these effects are not
precisely measurable’. Here, the Fund seems to address corruption, which may grow
rampant in higher government circles. While the IMF should primarily rely on
information provided by the authorities, higher government officials themselves are
not immune from IMF scrutiny. If other information is available from third parties
including ‘rumors which have some genuine credence’, the Fund may insist on an
independent audit. Not without reason the Guidance Note stresses that the staff of
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the Fund should be prepared to face tensions in the working relationship with gov-
ernment officials that are suspected of being involved in corruption.
188. Second, the Guidance Note requires alertness of the IMF staff to promote
good governance in general, i.e. without particular references to corruption prac-
tices. In this respect various examples are mentioned: a reduced scope for general-
ized rent-seeking, enhanced transparency in decision-making and budgetary
processes, reductions in tax exemptions and subsidies, improved accounting and
control systems, improvements in statistical dissemination practices, a more bal-
anced composition of public expenditure and civil service reform.
189. The ambition of the IMF to assess many key administrative functions of
governance before approving balance of payments support requires expertise in
many areas. The Guidance Note stipulates that conditionality may even refer to poli-
cies that are outside the expertise of the IMF. Accordingly, the Fund may apply prin-
ciples and rules which go beyond the corpus juris – i.e. its Articles of Agreement
and the subordinate instruments – when deciding on financial support. Therefore,
the IMF staff is expected ‘to keep abreast of changes in the policies of partner orga-
nizations and specific efforts in member countries on governance issues. This should
include the activities of partner organizations, particularly the World Bank, in
addressing governance issues in areas which are outside IMF’s competence but
nonetheless important for the achievement of the economic policies advocated by
the IMF’.
190. Rules on governance, applicable in the World Bank, WTO, UN and any
other ‘partner organizations’ are therefore ready for use by the IMF. Such rules may
include procurement procedures, public enterprise reform and those promoting good
governance in general. The Fund could rely on various regulations, e.g. WTO’s
Agreement on Government Procurement, World Bank’s Operational Directives and
UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) policy statements on democratic
governance.
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Part IV. The IMF in Global Context
Chapter 1. Introduction
191. The IMF cannot be studied in isolation from its legal and political context.
Concepts such as sovereignty, jus cogens and the principle of specialty are to be
considered when the Fund operates in the international economic arena. The Fund
also cannot ignore human rights or UN Security Council resolutions when there is
a threat against international peace and security. It must accept rules on hierarchy
and acknowledge that superior rules of international law may conflict with the
Articles of Agreement. Some political realities must also be accepted. The Fund’s
membership consists, on the one hand, of a small group of economically powerful
creditor countries and, on the other hand, of a large group of economically vulner-
able debtor countries. Because voting rights in the IMF are based on economic
strength, IMF policies are in fact determined by a small group of wealthy countries,
but mainly apply to developing countries.
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Chapter 2. The Duty to Cooperate
192. Under Article X, the IMF ‘shall cooperate’, within the terms of the IMF
Articles, ‘with any general international organization and with public international
organizations having specialized responsibilities in related fields’. An obligation to
cooperate also derives from Article 56 of the United Nations Charter, which com-
mits UN members to realizing economic and other kinds of cooperation. The IMF
may be regarded as a platform for the kind of cooperation that Article 56 urges.
193. Cooperation is intended to lead to interaction between the IMF and other
international organizations. This interaction should influence the IMF, and have
direct or indirect repercussions on the decision-making process. Conversely, the
IMF’s own objectives should also have an influence on other institutions. If there
were no influence, then the obligation to cooperate would have no consequences.
This cannot have been the aim of the authors of the IMF Articles.
194. How ‘related fields’ should be understood depends to a large extent on how
the IMF interprets its own purposes. If the IMF interprets them either more broadly or
differently, new ‘related fields’ are opened up and cooperation should ensue. Certainly
in fields where the IMF operates but lacks the necessary knowledge and experience,
cooperation should be actively sought. To the extent the IMF considers measures to
promote lasting economic growth as an essential facet of adjustment programmes,
there is a need to seek modes for cooperation with other organizations.
195. Cooperation is also feasible in other areas. The more the IMF becomes con-
cerned with related aspects of adjustment – trade liberalization, fighting corruption,
protection of human rights standards, environmental questions – the more coopera-
tion will have to focus on those areas. It is reasonable that the IMF should rely on
the expertise of organizations holding a specific mandate in the related areas.
196. Cooperation may take place informally by representatives of the Fund
attending meetings of other organizations and staff members participating in work-
groups and seminars. The Managing Director speaks annually to the UN’s Eco-
nomic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and the IMF is represented at other meetings
and cooperation bodies set up by the UN. The Managing Director also participates
in informal consultative bodies and in the G-7/8 and the G-20. Representatives of
other organizations in their turn attend the IMF annual meetings as well as meet-
ings of the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC).
197. Cooperation took on a permanent character when the IMF opened Euro-
pean offices for contacts with the OECD, EU, Bank for International Settlements
(BIS), WTO, UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and many UN
specialized agencies. The Fund also cooperates with regional development banks
particularly in connection with the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initia-
tive. Cooperation is formalized through an agreement only with a few organizations
(e.g., the UN, World Bank and WTO). An example of effective cooperation is the
publication of joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank statistics on external debt.
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Chapter 3. Related Economic and Monetary Group Consultations
198. Since the 1970s there has been a high degree of informal consultation
among countries in the context of groups, clubs and intergovernmental fora. The
groups have no institutional structure and change their composition by mutual
agreement. The government acting as host to the group usually provides adminis-
trative and secretarial support. More groups and clubs somehow contribute to inter-
national coordination on various economic problems. On its website the IMF
provides a convenient overview of the composition and functions of such groups.
Some are briefly discussed below.
199. The G-7 consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
Kingdom and the United States, with some additional observers. Well-known meet-
ings resulted in the Plaza Accord (1985) and the Louvre Accord (1987), which
addressed the problems of fluctuating exchange rates of major currencies. Since
1998 Russia joined the group as full participant, thus marking the birth of the G-8.
The G-7/8 issues communiqués and convenes immediately prior to the semi-annual
IMF meetings. Thereby, the G-7/8 often confronts the IMF bodies with faits accom-
plis. In case the G-7/8 group of finance ministers encroaches on territory where the
IMF is also active, it poses a direct threat to consultations within the Fund.
200. The G-7/8 has lost much of its prominence since the emergence of the
G-20, a group that was established in 1999, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.
It brings together major advanced and emerging economies that claim responsibil-
ity for stabilizing the financial markets (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China,
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
South Africa, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United
States); representatives of the EU, the ECB, the IMF, the World Bank, and the FSB
are also invited to attend. The G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
meet annually and discuss measures to promote global financial stability. Since
2008, the G-20 also meets in a Heads of State or Government format. During the
global financial crisis, it started to play a greater role in promoting economic coop-
eration and reforming the international monetary and financial system.
201. The G-10, which comprises the states of the G-7 plus The Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Sweden and – at a later stage – Switzerland, was created in 1962 by partici-
pants in the GAB. Its primary purpose is to provide additional resources to the Fund.
The G-10 provides some smaller industrialized countries the opportunity to join the
debate on global monetary policies. The GAB consists of a series of agreements
between governments and central banks of the G-10 countries (and Saudi Arabia)
and the IMF.
202. The G-24 consists of countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America and
was created in 1972 as a chapter of the G-77 Lima meeting for the purpose of rep-
resenting developing countries in international monetary consultations. The G-24
has been instrumental in the policy-making in the IMF by issuing studies and
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reports. The IMF provides secretarial services. The group convenes and issues com-
muniqués immediately prior to the semi-annual IMF meetings.
203. In February 1999, the G-7 established the Financial Stability Forum,
entrusting it with the task of promoting global financial stability through the
exchange of information and international cooperation in financial supervision and
surveillance. In 2009, the G-20 established the FSB as the successor of the Finan-
cial Stability Forum. In order to address participatory gaps and legitimacy issues,
the FSB membership was broadened to include all the G-20 countries. The FSB
coordinates at the international level the work of national financial authorities and
international standard-setting bodies and develops and promotes the implementa-
tion of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies. It brings
together national authorities responsible for financial stability in key international
financial centres, international financial institutions, sector-specific international
groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central bank experts.
The IMF is also member of the FSB. However, the Executive Board decision
approving the Fund’s membership in the FSB makes it clear that participating in the
FSB would not equate to becoming a member in an international organization and
that, therefore, the Fund will not be legally bound by decisions adopted within the
FSB, but only politically accountable to the other FSB members.
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Chapter 4. Relations with the UN
204. The UN and the IMF share some common concerns such as the promotion
of sound economic policies. In terms of general international law, it is relevant that
the IMF may be confronted with states that are guilty of breaching international
peace and security, or with some other violation of international legal obligations.
205. Both the IMF Articles and the UN Charter entered into force in 1945. More
than two months after the Charter came into force (on 24 October 1945), the IMF
Articles were signed by the participants of the Bretton Woods conference at a joint
ceremony on 27 December 1945. Interpretation and application of the IMF Articles
should proceed in the light of the Charter. The subordination of the IMF Articles
arises from the position that the Charter takes towards obligations arising from other
international agreements. According to UN Article 103, the Charter (including bind-
ing Security Council decisions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter) takes pre-
cedence over every other international agreement (including agreements made after
the Charter) when there is a question of conflict.
206. Further, the UN–IMF Agreement of 15 November 1947, which confers on
the IMF the status of a specialized agency, is significant. This cooperation agree-
ment emphasizes the necessity for the IMF to function independently, given the
nature of international responsibilities and the content of the IMF Articles. Too close
an involvement with the UN would carry with it the risk of politicization, and jeop-
ardize the Fund’s primarily technical character. The agreement covers, among other
things, exchange of information, mutual consultation and the binding nature of
Security Council resolutions. The UN and the IMF may also make formal recom-
mendations to each other, but only after consultation.
§1. GENERAL COOPERATION
207. Cooperation with the UN has been troublesome and was often character-
ized by differences of policies and ideologies. IMF staff members tend to view the
UN as inefficient and politicized. In practice cooperation is limited to the exchange
of views and information on matters of mutual interest, exchange of statistical data
and reciprocal attendance in meetings. The cooperation mainly focuses on specific
activities in the context of sustainable development, macroeconomic policy dia-
logue, and to a lesser extent, poverty eradication and protection of the environment.
208. In 2008, the President of the UN General Assembly mandated a Commis-
sion of experts chaired by Joseph E. Stiglitz to reflect on the causes of the crisis,
assess impacts on all countries and suggest adequate responses to the global eco-
nomic and financial crisis. The Final Report of the Commission of Experts (the
so-called Stiglitz Report) was released on 21 September 2009. The Report contends
that only the UN have the necessary political legitimacy to discuss issues related to
the reform of the international economic and financial architecture, as they grant
adequate representation to both middle-income countries and least-developed
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countries. It proposes the creation of a Global Economic Coordination Council
which will oversee and direct the activities of the specialized institutions (among
which the IMF and the World Bank). Even if the proposal is not politically viable,
it pointed to the weaknesses related to voice and participation of developing coun-
tries in the international financial institutions.
§2. PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE IMF
209. The 1947 UN–IMF Cooperation Agreement includes an important clause
describing the relationship between the UN Security Council and the IMF. This
clause suggests a certain distance between the two organizations. Article 6 stipu-
lates that the Fund takes note of its members’ obligations to abide by the Council’s
resolutions, ‘and will, in the conduct of its activities, have due regard for the deci-
sions of the Security Council under Articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Char-
ter’. ‘Due regard’ does not equal ‘respect’. According to the letter of this clause, the
Fund may continue to provide balance of payments support to a member country
that has been targeted of an embargo by the Security Council by virtue of the Chap-
ter VII. ‘Due regard’ must be explained in such a way that the Fund could only dis-
regard a binding Security Council decision on the grounds of overwhelmingly
convincing arguments. The Fund holds that under no circumstances it can operate
in conflict with its own IMF Articles. From this provision it would appear that the
Fund is not ipso jure bound by binding Security Council resolutions.
210. It is fair to ask if the ECOSOC and the General Assembly acted ultra vires
by agreeing to the clause ‘have due regard for the decisions of the Security Coun-
cil’. It is indeed hard to imagine that the authors of the UN Charter, on the one hand,
had given the Security Council the right to declare sanctions against a member,
while at the same time permitting that member to receive financial assistance from
the IMF. The argument that the UN had made a concession in order to bring the IMF
into the fold of specialized agencies is possible to explain on political grounds, but
fails to stand up when the IMF is offered the opportunity to provide financial assis-
tance against the spirit of the Charter.
211. In practice, however, subjection to Security Council decisions will not pose
problems for the approval of stand-by arrangements. The permanent members of the
Council also have an important voice in the IMF, and it may be assumed that Execu-
tive Directors will pay heed to instructions or directions of the member countries in
their voting group. It is therefore highly unlikely that the Executive Board would
approve a stand-by arrangement after the member concerned has been on the receiv-
ing end of a binding decision of the Security Council.
212. Besides, under the IMF Executive Board Decision No. 144-(52/51), Fund’s
members are allowed to introduce exchange restrictions for national or international
security reasons, especially when required by a UN Security Council resolution to
impose financial sanctions against a state or targeting individuals and juridical
persons in the framework of the prevention and suppression of terrorism financing.
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A member should notify in advance the Fund of its intention to impose restrictions
for security reasons. Urgency and secrecy may, however, exempt the member from
prior notification. If the Fund does not reply within thirty days from notification, the
member may assume that the Fund has no objection. In its practice, the Executive
Board never objected to the imposition of said restrictions.
§3. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE IMF
213. The internationally recognized system of human rights is based on the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and the two International Covenants on Human
Rights of 1966. From these sources spring a number of other treaties pertaining to
human rights, such as those outlawing racial discrimination and torture.
214. The IMF does not provide a clear basis for linkage between financial sup-
port and human rights. However, this should not hinder the application of human
rights. Just on grounds of the cooperation agreement with the UN, it could be argued
that the IMF in any event may not ignore documents and opinions of the UN relat-
ing to human rights. The UN may after all make a recommendation to the Fund
which the latter must ‘consider’.
§4. CIVIL AND POLITICAL HUMAN RIGHTS
215. Responses to violations of civil and political rights should be divided into
two types. First, there may be refusal or abrogation of financial support because
human rights abuses hinder the performance of the adjustment programme. In this
case the violations are of such a nature that the political and economic conse-
quences make a successful performance of the programme unlikely. Second, there
may be refusal or abrogation as a sanction. In these cases the violations are not of
such a nature as to undermine the member’s capacity to successfully implement the
adjustment programme; if the Fund proceeds to refusal or abrogation, it is in effect
imposing a sanction.
216. Violations, which endanger successful adjustment, should have conse-
quences. Gross human rights violations should influence the decision-making of the
IMF if such violations undermine the possibilities of carrying out the adjustment
programme. However, sanctions cannot be applied as a matter of formal recourse:
in the Fund’s practice human rights considerations should be dressed up in eco-
nomic language.
217. The situation is different where violations of human rights have no influ-
ence, or a negligible influence, on the successful implementation of an adjustment
programme. If in this sort of case the Fund responds to violations – by refusing bal-
ance of payments support – then this is in the nature of a de facto sanction, by which
pressure is brought to bear on a government to improve its human rights record.
This kind of sanction should be applied with the greatest caution, since it would
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only affect members who were dependent on the Fund, in other words the poorest
members. The corollary is that members who are not dependent on the Fund in the
same way have nothing to fear in the way of sanctions. This differential treatment
of members should be applied with the utmost circumspection. Furthermore, it is
highly debatable whether withholding balance of payments support will lead to an
improvement in the human rights situation. On the contrary, withholding assistance
will plunge the economy deeper into the mire, which is hardly likely to encourage
greater respect for human rights.
§5. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS
218. Economic, social and cultural human rights refer to obligations to promote
full employment, just and favourable working conditions, social security, adequate
living standards (including food, clothing and housing), health and education. The
promotion of such rights means in effect the targeting of financial resources.
Improved education, adequate health care or better employment prospects all
require an allocation of public spending to these sectors. The IMF can make a direct
and positive contribution by incorporating socio-economic human rights in its
adjustment programmes. This might take the form of sparing socio-economic pro-
visions when laying down conditions for reducing budget deficits in adjustment pro-
grammes.
219. The socio-economic position of vulnerable groups during the period of the
adjustment programme has received increasing consideration. The Fund decided to
pay greater attention to this aspect, based on the belief that socio-economic decline
brings in its wake political unrest, which in turn compromises the chances of suc-
cessful adjustment. In documents describing structural adjustment programmes
there is usually a paragraph addressing social needs. The commitment to protect
socio-economic standards during adjustment is one that can pre-eminently be real-
ized through cooperation with the UN and its specialized agencies.
220. Therefore, the IMF maintains a dialogue with the UN and some of its spe-
cialized agencies to identify areas where public expenditure must be maintained or
even increased if necessary. Simultaneously, the Fund addresses non-productive
spending (including military spending) so that investments in human capital, such
as basic health care and primary education, are not displaced. The IMF also claims
to protect social sector spending of member countries, in particular on health and
education. The Fund has reiterated that it is willing to recognize the crucial link
between the level and efficiency of health and education spending and economic
growth.
221. In a paper on the relationship between the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights and the IMF Articles the legal counsel of the IMF
adopts a strict view by arguing that the IMF is primarily a monetary agency and
should not be made responsible for upholding human rights. He reiterates that the
IMF is not a party to the Covenant and members want the IMF to remain within its
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own legal domain. If members believe that the IMF should integrate human rights
in their decision-making, they should amend the IMF Articles. However, there are
two points that appear to make the Fund more responsive towards human rights.
First, the IMF de facto promotes economic, social and cultural rights through its cur-
rent policies such as the HIPC initiative and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
(PRSP) process (see below). Second, the Fund is bound to promote economic, social
and cultural rights that are part of customary international law. However, the coun-
sel believes that ‘the norms contained in the Covenant have not attained the status
under general international law that would make them applicable to the Fund inde-
pendently of the Covenant’.
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Chapter 5. Country Level Cooperation: Poverty Reduction Facilities
222. Problems in developing countries are often interlinked and cannot be dealt
with through isolated measures. Such problems refer to poverty, macroeconomic
imbalances but also poor governance and corruption. In order to find a more inte-
grated approach the Fund has developed in 1999 the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility, which expired in 2010.
223. To be able to continue assistance to developing countries, in 2010 the IMF
has established the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT). The IMF oper-
ates as trustee and provides loans on concessional terms (zero interest rates) to low-
income countries. The trust is funded by donations from members or reserves
available within the Fund. Loans for low-income countries are now available under
various facilities (Extended Credit Facility, Stand-by Credit Facility, Rapid Credit
Facility). Each facility establishes specific criteria for eligibility. The Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) remain an important basis for a comprehensive
country-based strategy for poverty reduction, but other documentation is required
as well. PRSPs are adopted by the member country through a participatory process
involving ‘domestic stakeholders’, external donors and development partners,
among which the IMF and the World Bank. They describe the country’s strategy for
poverty reduction and promote national ownership through a broad-based partici-
pation of civil society (in this differing from letter of intents).
224. PRSPs serve not only as a basis for IMF and World Bank programmes, but
may also be significant for other intergovernmental organizations as the ensuing
programmes are aimed at the promotion of economic development. Specialized
agencies in particular may become involved in the setting up of programmes
because of their expertise and their capacity to provide additional credits. The Fund
argues for widening the circulation of programmes, provided that the approval of
the member is obtained. The Executive Board does perceive the necessity for coop-
eration with specialized agencies. Concerning the social consequences of adjust-
ment, there is reference to the presence of expertise in the form of United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNDP and the International Labour Organization
(ILO). These and other organizations are far better placed than the IMF to make a
judgment about a country’s socio-economic situation; they can also evaluate, better
than the Fund, the effects of adjustment on the various socio-economic sectors.
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Chapter 6. Cooperation with the World Bank
225. As far as the relationship between the IMF and the World Bank is con-
cerned, several aspects come into play. First, membership of the Bank is only open
to members of the Fund. Accordingly, states must first subject themselves to the
IMF’s Articles of Agreement in order to be able to enjoy the benefits of World Bank
membership. It should be noticed, however, that this clause was devised within a
framework of a system of stable exchange rates; the authors had intended that only
countries that were willing to accept this system would be considered for member-
ship of the Bank. Since the beginning of the 1970s, this system has been non-
existent. Although the Fund’s grip on exchange rate stability has loosened
considerably, membership of the IMF nevertheless remains a condition for mem-
bership of the Bank.
226. Second, Article V, section 8 of the IBRD Articles of Agreement contains a
cooperation clause which implicitly points to the IMF as a cooperating partner.
According to (a) the Bank shall cooperate with any general international organiza-
tion and with public international organizations having specialized responsibilities
in related fields. Under (b), in making decisions on applications for loans or guar-
antees relating to matters directly within the competence of any other IO and par-
ticipated in primarily by members of the Bank, the Bank shall give consideration to
the views and recommendations of such organization. The first sentence under (a)
uses similar wording to the IMF’s cooperation obligation. Conversely, clause (b) has
no equivalent in the IMF Articles.
227. It is evident that ‘any international organization’ mentioned in (b) refers
particularly to the IMF. The Bank has to be kept informed about the IMF’s opinions
and recommendations, and has to take them into consideration whenever the Bank
encroaches on the jurisdiction of its sister organization. The founders of the two
organizations obviously recognized that the Bank could operate on the IMF’s ter-
ritory. Conversely, there was no anticipation that the IMF might interfere in matters
which primarily concern the Bank, at least to judge from the IMF Articles.
228. Third, the Bretton Woods institutions have concluded agreements to clarify
the reach of their jurisdictions. Not surprisingly, conflicts can easily arise when the
two organizations are involved simultaneously in a single country. Despite the
endeavours to coordinate activities, the risk remains that irreconcilable advice may
be given, or conflicting conditions laid down. For this reason the Bretton Woods
organizations adopted a memorandum for mutual cooperation.
§1. DIVISION OF COMPETENCES
229. In 1966, the IMF Managing Director and the President of the World Bank
jointly issued the ‘Fund–Bank Collaboration Memorandum’ outlining the proce-
dures for collaboration between the two sister organizations. In 1989, after review-
ing the memorandum on a number of occasions, the ‘IMF–World Bank Concordat’
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was adopted to strengthen cooperation and avoid inconsistencies in the advice given
to member countries.
230. The key element of these documents is the identification of the main
responsibilities of the IMF and the Bank. The Bank has ‘primary responsibility for
the composition and appropriateness of development programs and project evalu-
ation, including development priorities’. The Bank should focus in practice on the
efficient allocation of resources in both public and private sectors; priorities in gov-
ernment expenditures, reforms of administrative systems, production, trade and
financial sectors; and the restructuring of state enterprises and sector policies. The
Fund has ‘primary responsibility for exchange rates and restrictive systems, for
adjustment of temporary balance of payments disequilibria, and for evaluating and
assisting members to work out stabilization programs as a sound basis for economic
advance’. This responsibility includes aggregate aspects of macroeconomic policies
and their related instruments including public sector spending and revenues, aggre-
gate wage and price policies, money and credit, interest rates and the exchange
rates.
231. Roughly speaking, the division of responsibilities is reflected in the dis-
tinction between aggregate and non-aggregate variables. Nevertheless, the memo-
randum and the concordat confirm that the overlap in activities of the two
institutions grew rapidly with the introduction of structural adjustment programmes
monitored by the World Bank and in the context of the international debt crisis of
the 1980s. These and future overlap may mean that one of the organizations has to
give way to the opinions of the other, whose responsibility is in question. Primary
responsibility does not however equal exclusive responsibility. Certainly, when the
IMF acts alone (i.e., when the Bank is not involved) with a certain member, no ‘dif-
fering policy advice’ can arise, and the Fund may incorporate advice or conditions
on the Bank’s territory, with the proviso, of course, that the Fund remains within its
mandate. In contrast, the Bank must always take into account the Fund’s opinions.
By virtue of the annual Article IV consultations the Fund gives advice to all mem-
bers. When drawing up programmes for specific sectors in the economy, the Bank
must take into account IMF advice, insofar as this concerns the primary responsi-
bility of the Fund.
232. In 2007, collaboration was streamlined through the Joint Management
Action Plan (JMAP), which provides a framework to improve coordination and
communication between the staff of the two institutions on country issues. Today
there are many initiatives on which the Fund and the World Bank collaborate. Under
the HIPC and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), the IMF and the Bank
assist the poorest countries in reducing their external debt and achieve debt sustain-
ability. Also the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) – aimed at apprais-
ing the stability of the financial sector in a given country – is a joint responsibility
of the IMF and the Bank. The importance of FSAP assessments has been high-
lighted by the global financial crisis.
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§2. CROSS CONDITIONALITY
233. What is termed cross conditionality arises when one of the two organiza-
tions provides or extends a loan dependent on the fulfilment of conditions which the
other has laid down. Cross conditionality also comes into play when one of the orga-
nizations exercises a veto on a loan that the other organization has agreed, or if a
formal agreement exists that a loan shall not be granted or extended without the
express permission of the other organization. The Bank may thus decide not to pro-
vide further credits when a member has been declared ineligible by the Fund
because of payment arrears. Other formal or informal, unspoken or explicit agree-
ments may de facto give rise to cross conditionality.
234. Cross conditionality is the dread of debtor nations, due to the domino
effect: if the Fund first stops credit because of failure to fulfil performance criteria,
and the Bank in response suspends credit, the international financial markets may
lose faith in the member country concerned. Other creditors – regional development
banks, commercial banks and bilateral donors – will respond likewise. The out-
come – a total block on international credit – may thus ensue from a failure to meet
a simple performance criterion such as getting inflation down below a certain level.
235. The official view of the IMF is that cross conditionality should be avoided,
and that closer collaboration between the two institutions should not be allowed to
lead to cross conditionality. In practice, however, it seems that cross conditionality
cannot be avoided by merely harmonizing Fund and Bank programmes: the Bank
provides support based on macroeconomic policy agreed with the Fund; the Fund
provides credit after ascertaining that investment priorities and other factors agreed
with the Bank concerning the efficient allocation of government resources are sat-
isfactory. It is precisely because the structural conditionalities of the Fund and the
Bank are so intertwined that one programme may depend for its success on the suc-
cessful performance of another programme. Because, officially, cross conditionality
is not permitted, the Bank incorporates relevant conditions stipulated by the Fund
in its own loan agreements; the Fund will ensure fulfilment of the Bank’s condi-
tions within the framework of the reviews. Officially, then, it is not a question of
cross conditionality, but rather of joint conditionality, i.e. the transfer of conditions
from one organization to the other. In reality, however, this amounts to cross con-
ditionality.
236. The danger inherent in cross conditionality lies in the informal consulta-
tion between Bank and Fund, to which member countries are not party. On the one
hand, there can be no question of a knee-jerk reaction, but on the other hand there
is no doubt that great importance is attached to the opinions of the sister organiza-
tion. Cross conditionality is also officially denied in the cooperation memorandum
and in the concordat, but in reality it remains a sword of Damocles over the mem-
ber’s head.
Part IV, Ch. 6, Cooperation with the World Bank 233–236
IMF – 89Intergovernmental Organizations – Suppl. 47 (2013)
Chapter 7. Relationship with the World Trade Organization
237. The IMF is closely related with the WTO. The interweaving of trade and
payments in connection with current transactions explains this relationship. After
the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the IMF and the WTO concluded a Coop-
eration Agreement in December 1996. The agreement provides for observer status
of the WTO Secretariat in selected IMF meetings and IMF staff in WTO bodies.
There are also provisions on document exchange.
The IMF participates in the WTO Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance
which is mandated to enhance the capacity of the multilateral trading system to con-
tribute to a durable solution to the problem of external indebtedness of developing
and least-developed countries, and to strengthen the coherence of international trade
and financial policies, with a view to safeguarding the multilateral trading system
from the effects of financial and monetary instability.The Group addresses inter alia
trade financing, which refers to trade credit lines available to developing countries.
The group has discussed the problems that arise because of low credit ratings, debt
overhang and limited access to international financial markets.
§1. EXCHANGE POLICIES AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION
238. GATT Article XV was designed to make the IMF and the GATT provisions
complementary. Two paragraphs are particularly relevant. Article XV, paragraph 2
of the GATT provides that in all cases in which WTO Members are called upon to
consider or deal with problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of pay-
ments or foreign exchange arrangements, they ‘shall consult fully with the IMF’. In
such consultations, they ‘shall accept all findings of statistical and other facts pre-
sented by the Fund relating to foreign exchange, monetary reserves and balances of
payments, and shall accept the determination of the Fund as to whether action by a
contracting party in exchange matters is in accordance with the IMF Articles’.
GATT Article XV, paragraph 9(a) establishes that ‘nothing in this Agreement
shall preclude: (a) the use by a Contracting Party of exchange controls or exchange
restrictions in accordance with the IMF Articles of Agreement’.
239. The first provision focuses on the common ground on which both institu-
tions operate: balance of payments, exchange rates and monetary reserves. Essen-
tially Article XV, paragraph 2 stipulates that when it comes to considering monetary
issues, the WTO must give heed to the opinion of the IMF. The wording on the
object of IMF–WTO cooperation is somewhat confusing. Paragraph 2 of Article XV
GATT refers to ‘exchange matters’, whereas the 1996 cooperation agreement refers
to ‘exchange measures’. The IMF Articles of Agreement use the phrase ‘exchange
policies’. The second provision makes clear that any exchange measure that is per-
mitted under the IMF Articles would be considered legitimate also under the GATT.
Reference is implicitly made to exchange restrictions adopted for balance of pay-
ments reasons, for security reasons or under the transitional period: these measures
would not amount to a breach of the GATT Agreement when introduced or main-
tained in accordance with the IMF Articles.
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240. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) contains a similar
provision. Pursuant to GATS Article XI, paragraph 2 ‘nothing shall affect the rights
and obligations of the IMF members under the Articles of Agreement of the Fund,
including the use of exchange actions which are in conformity with the Articles of
Agreement, provided that a Member shall not impose restrictions on any capital
transactions inconsistently with its specific commitments regarding such transac-
tions, except under [GATS] Article XII or at the request of the Fund’.
§2. TRADE RESTRICTIONS FOR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS REASONS AND
MONETARY MEASURES
241. The IMF comes into focus also when members of the WTO are allowed to
introduce BOP restrictions (balance of payments restrictions). The WTO recognizes
that, under certain circumstances, imports can impose a severe strain on the balance
of payments. When a balance of payments deficit cannot be financed, a country may
decide to switch to restrictive import measures in order to contain the deficit.
242. According to GATT Article XII, paragraph 2, any contracting party, in
order to safeguard its external financial position and its balance of payments, may
restrict the quantity or value of merchandize permitted to be imported, subject to
the fact that import restrictions instituted, maintained or intensified by a contracting
party ‘shall not exceed those necessary: (i) to forestall the imminent threat of, or to
stop, a serious decline in its monetary reserves; or (ii) in the case of a contracting
party with very low monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in
its reserves’.
This provision does not encompass the introduction of exchange restrictions for
balance of payments reasons, such possibility being already regulated by the IMF
Articles. Judgments about the necessity of trade restrictions fall within the mandate
of WTO, which operates less strict conditions for developing countries. A WTO
member that is applying a new restriction or raising the general level of its existing
restrictions by a substantial intensification of the measures must consult the Com-
mittee on Balance of Payments Restrictions. The Committee shall open an inves-
tigation and report to the General Council on the legitimacy of the restriction.
243. The IMF plays a central role in this procedure. The WTO asks the Fund for
information about the adjustment strategy and the country’s monetary position. In
particular, the IMF makes a judgment about the underlying causes of the balance of
payments problems so that the WTO can judge if the restrictions are legitimate. The
WTO is obliged to respect the Fund’s views.
244. Generally, the IMF is opposed to the introduction or strengthening of quan-
titative trade restrictions. Fund adjustment programmes usually include a standard
performance criterion which abrogates the right to tranche disbursements when the
member country imposes or intensifies import restrictions for balance of payments
reasons. In this sense the WTO obligations are incorporated ipso facto into condi-
tionality.
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245. The GATS sets forth a BOP clause that allows members not only to impose
temporary trade restrictions on service sectors for which they have undertaken spe-
cific commitments, but also to introduce exchange restrictions and capital controls
on services-related payments. Pursuant to GATS Article XII, paragraph 1, in the
event of serious balance of payments and external financial difficulties or threat
thereof, a Member may adopt or maintain restrictions on trade in services on which
it has undertaken specific commitments, including on payments or transfers for
transactions related to such commitments.
Article XII, paragraph 5(e) of the GATS establishes the procedure for consulta-
tions with the Committee on Balance of Payments Restrictions, which has to accept
the IMF’s assessment of the member’s situation in terms of foreign exchange, mon-
etary reserves and balance of payments.
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Chapter 8. The Promotion of Sustainable Development and Debt
Management
246. Sustainable development has been defined as ‘development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the abilities of future generations to
meet their own needs’. This definition is frequently applied to environmental poli-
cies in the sense that future generations must not be burdened with the costs
incurred by environmental degradation caused by careless policies of present gen-
erations. However, sustainable development has more dimensions. The UNDP has
discerned three forms of policies for the promotion of sustainable development: (a)
the prevention of financing current consumption by incurring economic debts that
others must repay in the future; (b) the need to invest in the health and education of
today’s population so as not to create a social debt for future generations; and (c)
the use of natural resources without creating ecological debts by overexploiting the
carrying and productive capacity of the earth.
247. The IMF cannot directly contribute to environmental protection, as it has
no mandate in this area. However, the IMF may contribute to sustainable develop-
ment by the prevention and management of unsustainable debt levels in order to
protect the developmental needs of current and future generations and to promote
thereby intergenerational equity. Just as environmental mismanagement shifts the
burden to future generations, so may the engagement in excessive debt burdens limit
development opportunities.
248. The Fund is actively involved in solving official and commercial external
debt problems of member countries. Thereby it attempts to help members to have
continued access to credit markets and attain external viability.
§1. DEBT MANAGEMENT
249. The Fund’s traditional role in debt restructuring is (jointly with the World
Bank) to adopt adjustment programmes under the concessional facilities and thereby
to pave the way for debt-rescheduling agreements. In support of these programmes,
Paris Club creditors and commercial creditors would be willing to reschedule debt.
In the early 1990s creditors agreed on conditions that allowed for more concession-
ality in rescheduling operations for heavily indebted countries. Under the Paris Club
Naples Terms of 1994 creditors would be willing to consider ‘stock-of-debt opera-
tions’ for countries that had established a good track record of performance for at
least three years under an IMF-supported and on debt-service payment to Paris Club
creditors.
250. However, these terms of the Paris Club were applied for a limited number
of countries only or were not adequate for heavily indebted countries that continued
to have unsustainable debt levels. Therefore, in 1996, the IMF and the World Bank
launched the HIPC initiative that aims at reducing the debt burden of all eligible
HIPCs to sustainable levels, provided that they implement strong adjustment
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programmes. The initiative aimed at establishing a coordinated action by multilat-
eral organizations, bilateral and private creditors.
251. The HIPC was established through an IMF Executive Board instrument
creating a trust for financing debt-rescheduling operations. The joint IMF–World
Bank HIPC initiative, that was substantially broadened at the G-7 meeting of
finance ministers in Cologne in June 1999, aims at helping developing countries to
reduce debt to sustainable levels that enable them to meet their foreign obligations
without jeopardizing economic development. Resources under the initiative may be
made available as grants or as loans.
252. According to the HIPC terms, a debt level is considered sustainable when
it would be less than 150% of annual income from exports. In principle each heavily
indebted poor country is eligible for debt relief. Relief will be granted under strict
conditions only: a country must be eligible for concessional assistance from the
World Bank’s International Development Agency (IDA), face an unsustainable debt
level, must have implemented adjustment programmes of the IMF and World Bank
for a number of years, and have adopted a PRSP. Initially, adjustment programmes
had to be implemented for six years in order to ‘educate’ the developing country
towards tight budgetary policies. However, this period could be shortened signifi-
cantly if a country meets ambitious policy targets early on. Once a country quali-
fies, reaching the so-called decision point, it has a claim for interim debt relief on
its debt-service falling due. The debtor country will obtain full debt relief once it
achieves the so-called completion point, that is after establishing a track record of
reform through the IMF–World Bank supported programmes, adopting key reforms
and implementing its PRSP for at least one year.
253. In 2005, the G-8 proposed that the IMF and other financial institutions (the
World Bank and the African Development Fund) cancel 100% of their claims for
countries that have reached the completion point under the HIPC initiative. For this
purpose the MDRI was created. The MDRI objective was to offer substantial debt
relief and thereby enable developing countries to reach the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals. As the Fund cannot offer debt relief out of its general resources, special
arrangements were adopted. Debt relief for a specific group of countries would
cause legal problems since the Fund is required to apply the principle of uniformity
of treatment. Therefore, it was decided that all countries with per capita income of
USD 380 a year or less (HIPCs and non-HIPCs) and an outstanding debt due to the
IMF at the end of 2004 will receive MDRI debt relief financed by the IMF’s own
resources. HIPCs with per capita income above that threshold will receive MDRI
relief from bilateral contributions administered by the IMF.
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Chapter 9. Relations with the European Union
§1. DIVISION OF COMPETENCES
254. In 1998, countries that have joined the Euro area have shifted key powers
on monetary policies to the level of EU-institutions. This has caused a dichotomy in
the Fund’s position towards EU members. A few problems arise in the Fund’s deal-
ings with members of the Euro area.
255. As Euro area countries continue their IMF membership, the Fund must for-
mally engage in Article IV consultations with these countries. However, to the
extent that the EU exercises exclusive monetary powers and increasingly oversees
macroeconomic policies of its members (through the Stability and Growth Pact and
the macroeconomic imbalance procedure) these consultations have become futile.
Therefore, meaningful consultation on Euro area policies can only take place
through EU-institutions, notably the ECB, Commission and Council. However, the
Fund’s position towards the EU-institutions is frail as the EU is a non-member and
therefore it is not directly bound by the IMF Articles of Agreement or derived leg-
islation. To some extent the Fund has responded to the emergence of currency
unions such as the EMU by adopting modalities for surveillance over Euro area
policies in the context of Article IV consultations with member countries.
256. A general problem is the overlap of oversight powers by both the IMF and
the EU. Whereas the Fund exercises bilateral and multilateral surveillance over
members’ monetary and macroeconomic policies and the international monetary
system, the EU has adopted a set of regulations that aim to strengthen the surveil-
lance of budgetary position and the surveillance and coordination of economic poli-
cies (e.g., Regulation 1175/2011 of 16 November 2011). Accordingly, both
institutions independently and simultaneously aim to oversee and supervise Euro
area members’ economic policies. As there is no formal agreement on coordination
or proper delineation of responsibilities, conflicts may easily arise. The Fund’s
determination to continue Article IV consultation with Euro area members will
likely interfere with the legal construct that was set up by the EMU.
257. A notable position towards currency unions in general is reflected in the
2012 Integrated Surveillance Decision stipulating that ‘members of currency unions
remain subject to all of their obligations under Article IV, section 1 and, accord-
ingly, each member is accountable for those policies that are conducted by union-
level institutions on its behalf’ (emphasis added). This clause means that Euro area
members are held accountable for monetary policies such as decisions on interest
rates and liquidity management, even if these policies are determined outside their
jurisdiction. However, the decision also holds a caveat: ‘Because, in a currency
union, exchange rate policies are implemented at the level of the union, the prin-
ciples for the guidance of members’ exchange rate policies and the associated indi-
cators set out in paragraphs 21 and 22 of this Decision only apply at the level of the
currency union.’ These paragraphs concern exchange rates management policies.
The clause ‘only apply at the level of the currency union’ implies that Euro area
254–257
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Member States cannot be held individually accountable for the exchange rate policy
of the Euro. Obviously, a currency union as a non-member cannot be held directly
accountable by the Fund for any policy. Accordingly, exercising ‘firm surveillance
over exchange rate policies’ of the Euro, as Article IV section 3(b) stipulates, would
be difficult if not impossible.
258. In addition, the provisions for balance of payments support for countries of
monetary unions are inadequately designed. In case of Euro area members seeking
financial assistance, the IMF may only provide financial assistance according to its
purposes and Article V, i.e. temporary and conditional balance of payments support
after the member has stated that it will need IMF resources ‘because of its balance
of payments or its reserve position or developments in its reserves’. The support will
be realised through a purchase: the member purchases desired currencies from the
Fund in exchange of its ‘own currency’. In case of a Euro area member in financial
distress, a purchase can obviously not be made with its ‘own currency’ because
Euros or any other convertible currency are needed. Although stand-by arrange-
ments have been adopted for Euro area members, it is unclear with what means pur-
chases from the Fund are made. Recourse to promissory notes in the alternative
raises many doubts about consistency with the Articles.
§2. CO-FINANCING
259. As of February 2013 Greece, Ireland and Portugal implemented IMF pro-
grammes and received resources jointly by the IMF and the EU. The fact that these
countries are subject to stand-by arrangements suggests that the balance of pay-
ments of individual Euro area members continues to be important, at least as far as
the IMF is concerned. However, the problem of these countries is not a balance of
payments deficit, but the indebtedness of the central and local governments and the
inability to gain access to the capital market for financing the deficit. The Fund’s
staff has argued that budget financing could trigger the Fund to step in with balance
of payments support (Review of Fund Facilities – Analytical Basis for Fund Lend-
ing and Reform Options, 6 February 2009). In the Fund’s Executive Board, budget
deficit financing (and not balance of payments deficits) has met some opposition
(EB Meeting 04/36, 14 April 2004). As IMF purchases have in effect been used as
a source of budget financing and resources are made available directly to the gov-
ernment rather than to the central bank, there is a risk that repurchases become sub-
ject to a budget appropriation process that is subject to democratic control.
260. Cooperation between the IMF and the Euro area is surrounded by legal
uncertainty and practical problems, but might provisionally be solved by a formal
agreement between the IMF and the EU. At first, assistance to non-Euro countries
(Hungary, Latvia and Romania) was extended in close cooperation with the Bretton
Woods institution, even though the IMF involvement was not foreseen according to
the applicable EU balance of payments facility (Council Regulation (EC) No. 332/
2002). On the occasion, the EU adopted internal guidelines delineating the operat-
ing procedures for the EU–Fund coordination. Later on, when the crisis hit Euro
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area Member States, EU–IMF co-financing was explicitly foreseen in the new EU
mechanisms: the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), the Euro-
pean Financial Stability Facility framework agreement (EFSF) and the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The IMF however failed to adapt
its legal framework to the increased role of the EU and of Regional Financing
Arrangements (RFAs) in crisis lending. At the 2011 Cannes meeting, the G-20
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors have adopted the Principles for
Cooperation between the IMF and Regional Financing Arrangements.
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Appendix 1. Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund
(as of February 2013)
Adopted at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods,
New Hampshire, July 22, 1944. Entered into force December 27, 1945. Amended
effective July 28, 1969, by the modifications approved by the Board of Governors
in Resolution No. 23–5, adopted May 31, 1968; amended effective April 1, 1978,
by the modifications approved by the Board of Governors in Resolution No. 31–4,
adopted April 30, 1976; amended effective November 11, 1992, by the modifica-
tions approved by the Board of Governors in Resolution No. 45–3, adopted June
28, 1990; amended effective August 10, 2009, by the modifications approved by the
Board of Governors in Resolution No. 52–4, adopted September 23, 1997; amended
effective February 18, 2011, by the modifications approved by the Board of Gov-
ernors in Resolution No. 63–3, adopted May 5, 2008; and amended effective March
3, 2011, by the modifications approved by the Board of Governors in Resolution
No. 63–2, adopted April 28, 2008.
Introductory Article
(i) The International Monetary Fund is established and shall operate in accor-
dance with the provisions of this Agreement as originally adopted and subse-
quently amended.
(ii) To enable the Fund to conduct its operations and transactions, the Fund shall
maintain a General Department and a Special Drawing Rights Department.
Membership in the Fund shall give the right to participation in the Special
Drawing Rights Department.
(iii) Operations and transactions authorized by this Agreement shall be conducted
through the General Department, consisting in accordance with the provisions
of this Agreement of the General Resources Account, the Special Disburse-
ment Account, and the Investment Account; except that operations and trans-
actions involving special drawing rights shall be conducted through the Special
Drawing Rights Department.
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Article I: Purposes
The purposes of the International Monetary Fund are:
(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institu-
tion which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on inter-
national monetary problems.
(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to
contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employ-
ment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of
all members as primary objectives of economic policy.
(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements
among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation.
(iv) To assist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect
of current transactions between members and in the elimination of foreign
exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade.
(v) To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund
temporarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments with-
out resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity.
(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the degree of
disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members.
The Fund shall be guided in all its policies and decisions by the purposes set forth
in this Article.
Article II: Membership
SECTION 1. ORIGINAL MEMBERS
The original members of the Fund shall be those of the countries represented at the
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference whose governments accept
membership before December 31, 1945.
SECTION 2. OTHER MEMBERS
Membership shall be open to other countries at such times and in accordance with
such terms as may be prescribed by the Board of Governors. These terms, including
the terms for subscriptions, shall be based on principles consistent with those
applied to other countries that are already members.
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Article III: Quotas and Subscriptions
SECTION 1. QUOTAS AND PAYMENT OF SUBSCRIPTIONS
Each member shall be assigned a quota expressed in special drawing rights. The
quotas of the members represented at the United Nations Monetary and Financial
Conference which accept membership before December 31, 1945 shall be those set
forth in Schedule A. The quotas of other members shall be determined by the Board
of Governors. The subscription of each member shall be equal to its quota and shall
be paid in full to the Fund at the appropriate depository.
SECTION 2. ADJUSTMENT OF QUOTAS
(a) The Board of Governors shall at intervals of not more than five years conduct
a general review, and if it deems it appropriate propose an adjustment, of the
quotas of the members. It may also, if it thinks fit, consider at any other time
the adjustment of any particular quota at the request of the member concerned.
(b) The Fund may at any time propose an increase in the quotas of those members
of the Fund that were members on August 31, 1975 in proportion to their quo-
tas on that date in a cumulative amount not in excess of amounts transferred
under Article V, Section 12(f)(i) and (j) from the Special Disbursement Account
to the General Resources Account.
(c) An eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting power shall be required for
any change in quotas.
(d) The quota of a member shall not be changed until the member has consented
and until payment has been made unless payment is deemed to have been made
in accordance with Section 3(b) of this Article.
SECTION 3. PAYMENTS WHEN QUOTAS ARE CHANGED
(a) Each member which consents to an increase in its quota under Section 2(a) of
this Article shall, within a period determined by the Fund, pay to the Fund
twenty-five per cent of the increase in special drawing rights, but the Board of
Governors may prescribe that this payment may be made, on the same basis for
all members, in whole or in part in the currencies of other members specified,
with their concurrence, by the Fund, or in the member’s own currency. A non-
participant shall pay in the currencies of other members specified by the Fund,
with their concurrence, a proportion of the increase corresponding to the pro-
portion to be paid in special drawing rights by participants. The balance of the
increase shall be paid by the member in its own currency. The Fund’s holdings
of a member’s currency shall not be increased above the level at which they
would be subject to charges under Article V, Section 8(b)(ii), as a result of pay-
ments by other members under this provision.
(b) Each member which consents to an increase in its quota under Section 2(b) of
this Article shall be deemed to have paid to the Fund an amount of subscription
equal to such increase.
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(c) If a member consents to a reduction in its quota, the Fund shall, within sixty
days, pay to the member an amount equal to the reduction. The payment shall
be made in the member’s currency and in such amount of special drawing rights
or the currencies of other members specified, with their concurrence, by the
Fund as is necessary to prevent the reduction of the Fund’s holdings of the cur-
rency below the new quota, provided that in exceptional circumstances the Fund
may reduce its holdings of the currency below the new quota by payment to the
member in its own currency.
(d) A seventy per cent majority of the total voting power shall be required for any
decision under (a) above, except for the determination of a period and the speci-
fication of currencies under that provision.
SECTION 4. SUBSTITUTION OF SECURITIES FOR CURRENCY
The Fund shall accept from any member, in place of any part of the member’s cur-
rency in the General Resources Account which in the judgment of the Fund is not
needed for its operations and transactions, notes or similar obligations issued by the
member or the depository designated by the member under Article XIII, Section 2,
which shall be non-negotiable, non-interest bearing and payable at their face value
on demand by crediting the account of the Fund in the designated depository. This
Section shall apply not only to currency subscribed by members but also to any cur-
rency otherwise due to, or acquired by, the Fund and to be placed in the General
Resources Account.
Article IV: Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements
SECTION 1. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERS
Recognizing that the essential purpose of the international monetary system is to
provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and capital
among countries, and that sustains sound economic growth, and that a principal
objective is the continuing development of the orderly underlying conditions that
are necessary for financial and economic stability, each member undertakes to col-
laborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements
and to promote a stable system of exchange rates. In particular, each member shall:
(i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective of
fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due
regard to its circumstances;
(ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and finan-
cial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic dis-
ruptions;
(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in
order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair
competitive advantage over other members; and
(iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings under this Section
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SECTION 2. GENERAL EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS
(a) Each member shall notify the Fund, within thirty days after the date of the sec-
ond amendment of this Agreement, of the exchange arrangements it intends to
apply in fulfillment of its obligations under Section 1 of this Article, and shall
notify the Fund promptly of any changes in its exchange arrangements.
(b) Under an international monetary system of the kind prevailing on January 1,
1976, exchange arrangements may include (i) the maintenance by a member of
a value for its currency in terms of the special drawing right or another denomi-
nator, other than gold, selected by the member, or (ii) cooperative arrangements
by which members maintain the value of their currencies in relation to the value
of the currency or currencies of other members, or (iii) other exchange arrange-
ments of a member’s choice.
(c) To accord with the development of the international monetary system, the Fund,
by an eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting power, may make provi-
sion for general exchange arrangements without limiting the right of members
to have exchange arrangements of their choice consistent with the purposes of
the Fund and the obligations under Section 1 of this Article.
SECTION 3. SURVEILLANCE OVER EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS
(a) The Fund shall oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its
effective operation, and shall oversee the compliance of each member with its
obligations under Section 1 of this Article.
(b) In order to fulfill its functions under (a) above, the Fund shall exercise firm sur-
veillance over the exchange rate policies of members, and shall adopt specific
principles for the guidance of all members with respect to those policies. Each
member shall provide the Fund with the information necessary for such surveil-
lance, and, when requested by the Fund, shall consult with it on the member’s
exchange rate policies. The principles adopted by the Fund shall be consistent
with cooperative arrangements by which members maintain the value of their
currencies in relation to the value of the currency or currencies of other mem-
bers, as well as with other exchange arrangements of a member’s choice con-
sistent with the purposes of the Fund and Section 1 of this Article. These
principles shall respect the domestic social and political policies of members,
and in applying these principles the Fund shall pay due regard to the circum-
stances of members.
SECTION 4. PAR VALUES
The Fund may determine, by an eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting
power, that international economic conditions permit the introduction of a wide-
spread system of exchange arrangements based on stable but adjustable par values.
The Fund shall make the determination on the basis of the underlying stability of
the world economy, and for this purpose shall take into account price movements
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and rates of expansion in the economies of members. The determination shall be
made in light of the evolution of the international monetary system, with particular
reference to sources of liquidity, and, in order to ensure the effective operation of a
system of par values, to arrangements under which both members in surplus and
members in deficit in their balances of payments take prompt, effective, and sym-
metrical action to achieve adjustment, as well as to arrangements for intervention
and the treatment of imbalances. Upon making such determination, the Fund shall
notify members that the provisions of Schedule C apply.
SECTION 5. SEPARATE CURRENCIES WITHIN A MEMBER’S TERRITORIES
(a) Action by a member with respect to its currency under this Article shall be
deemed to apply to the separate currencies of all territories in respect of which
the member has accepted this Agreement under Article XXXI, Section 2 (g)
unless the member declares that its action relates either to the metropolitan cur-
rency alone, or only to one or more specified separate currencies, or to the met-
ropolitan currency and one or more specified separate currencies.
(b) Action by the Fund under this Article shall be deemed to relate to all currencies
of a member referred to in (a) above unless the Fund declares otherwise.
Article V: Operations and Transactions of the Fund
SECTION 1. AGENCIES DEALING WITH THE FUND
Each member shall deal with the Fund only through its Treasury, central bank, sta-
bilization fund, or other similar fiscal agency, and the Fund shall deal only with or
through the same agencies.
SECTION 2. LIMITATION ON THE FUND’S OPERATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, transactions on the account of
the Fund shall be limited to transactions for the purpose of supplying a mem-
ber, on the initiative of such member, with special drawing rights or the curren-
cies of other members from the general resources of the Fund, which shall be
held in the General Resources Account, in exchange for the currency of the
member desiring to make the purchase.
(b) If requested, the Fund may decide to perform financial and technical services,
including the administration of resources contributed by members, that are con-
sistent with the purposes of the Fund. Operations involved in the performance
of such financial services shall not be on the account of the Fund. Services under
this subsection shall not impose any obligation on a member without its consent.
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SECTION 3. CONDITIONS GOVERNING USE OF THE FUND’S GENERAL RESOURCES
(a) The Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general resources, including poli-
cies on stand-by or similar arrangements, and may adopt special policies for
special balance of payments problems, that will assist members to solve their
balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for the temporary use of
the general resources of the Fund.
(b) A member shall be entitled to purchase the currencies of other members from
the Fund in exchange for an equivalent amount of its own currency subject to
the following conditions:
(i) the member’s use of the general resources of the Fund would be in accor-
dance with the provisions of this Agreement and the policies adopted under
them;
(ii) the member represents that it has a need to make the purchase because of
its balance of payments or its reserve position or developments in its
reserves;
(iii) the proposed purchase would be a reserve tranche purchase, or would not
cause the Fund’s holdings of the purchasing member’s currency to exceed
two hundred per cent of its quota;
(iv) the Fund has not previously declared under Section 5 of this Article, Article
VI, Section 1, or Article XXVI, Section 2 (a) that the member desiring to
purchase is ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund.
(c) The Fund shall examine a request for a purchase to determine whether the pro-
posed purchase would be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement and
the policies adopted under them, provided that requests for reserve tranche pur-
chases shall not be subject to challenge.
(d) The Fund shall adopt policies and procedures on the selection of currencies to
be sold that take into account, in consultation with members, the balance of pay-
ments and reserve position of members and developments in the exchange mar-
kets, as well as the desirability of promoting over time balanced positions in the
Fund, provided that if a member represents that it is proposing to purchase the
currency of another member because the purchasing member wishes to obtain
an equivalent amount of its own currency offered by the other member, it shall
be entitled to purchase the currency of the other member unless the Fund has
given notice under Article VII, Section 3 that its holdings of the currency have
become scarce.
(e)
(i) Each member shall ensure that balances of its currency purchased from the
Fund are balances of a freely usable currency or can be exchanged at the
time of purchase for a freely usable currency of its choice at an exchange
rate between the two currencies equivalent to the exchange rate between
them on the basis of Article XIX, Section 7(a).
(ii) Each member whose currency is purchased from the Fund or is obtained in
exchange for currency purchased from the Fund shall collaborate with the
Fund and other members to enable such balances of its currency to be
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exchanged, at the time of purchase, for the freely usable currencies of other
members.
(iii) An exchange under (i) above of a currency that is not freely usable shall
be made by the member whose currency is purchased unless that member
and the purchasing member agree on another procedure.
(iv) A member purchasing from the Fund the freely usable currency of another
member and wishing to exchange it at the time of purchase for another
freely usable currency shall make the exchange with the other member if
requested by that member. The exchange shall be made for a freely usable
currency selected by the other member at the rate of exchange referred to
in (i) above.
(f) Under policies and procedures which it shall adopt, the Fund may agree to pro-
vide a participant making a purchase in accordance with this Section with spe-
cial drawing rights instead of the currencies of other members.
SECTION 4. WAIVER OF CONDITIONS
The Fund may in its discretion, and on terms which safeguard its interests, waive
any of the conditions prescribed in Section 3(b)(iii) and (iv) of this Article, espe-
cially in the case of members with a record of avoiding large or continuous use of
the Fund’s general resources. In making a waiver it shall take into consideration
periodic or exceptional requirements of the member requesting the waiver. The
Fund shall also take into consideration a member’s willingness to pledge as collat-
eral security acceptable assets having a value sufficient in the opinion of the Fund
to protect its interests and may require as a condition of waiver the pledge of such
collateral security.
SECTION 5. INELIGIBILITY TO USE THE FUND’S GENERAL RESOURCES
Whenever the Fund is of the opinion that any member is using the general resources
of the Fund in a manner contrary to the purposes of the Fund, it shall present to the
member a report setting forth the views of the Fund and prescribing a suitable time
for reply. After presenting such a report to a member, the Fund may limit the use of
its general resources by the member. If no reply to the report is received from the
member within the prescribed time, or if the reply received is unsatisfactory, the
Fund may continue to limit the member’s use of the general resources of the Fund
or may, after giving reasonable notice to the member, declare it ineligible to use the
general resources of the Fund.
SECTION 6. OTHER PURCHASES AND SALES OF SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS
BY THE FUND
(a) The Fund may accept special drawing rights offered by a participant in
exchange for an equivalent amount of the currencies of other members.
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(b) The Fund may provide a participant, at its request, with special drawing rights
for an equivalent amount of the currencies of other members. The Fund’s hold-
ings of a member’s currency shall not be increased as a result of these trans-
actions above the level at which the holdings would be subject to charges under
Section 8(b)(ii) of this Article.
(c) The currencies provided or accepted by the Fund under this Section shall be
selected in accordance with policies that take into account the principles of Sec-
tion 3(d) or 7(i) of this Article. The Fund may enter into transactions under this
Section only if a member whose currency is provided or accepted by the Fund
concurs in that use of its currency.
SECTION 7. REPURCHASE BY A MEMBER OF ITS CURRENCY HELD BY THE FUND
(a) A member shall be entitled to repurchase at any time the Fund’s holdings of its
currency that are subject to charges under Section 8(b) of this Article.
(b) A member that has made a purchase under Section 3 of this Article will be
expected normally, as its balance of payments and reserve position improves, to
repurchase the Fund’s holdings of its currency that result from the purchase and
are subject to charges under Section 8(b) of this Article. A member shall repur-
chase these holdings if, in accordance with policies on repurchase that the Fund
shall adopt and after consultation with the member, the Fund represents to the
member that it should repurchase because of an improvement in its balance of
payments and reserve position.
(c) A member that has made a purchase under Section 3 of this Article shall repur-
chase the Fund’s holdings of its currency that result from the purchase and are
subject to charges under Section 8(b) of this Article not later than five years after
the date on which the purchase was made. The Fund may prescribe that repur-
chase shall be made by a member in installments during the period beginning
three years and ending five years after the date of a purchase. The Fund, by an
eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting power, may change the periods
for repurchase under this subsection, and any period so adopted shall apply to
all members.
(d) The Fund, by an eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting power, may
adopt periods other than those that apply in accordance with (c) above, which
shall be the same for all members, for the repurchase of holdings of currency
acquired by the Fund pursuant to a special policy on the use of its general
resources.
(e) A member shall repurchase, in accordance with policies that the Fund shall
adopt by a seventy per cent majority of the total voting power, the Fund’s hold-
ings of its currency that are not acquired as a result of purchases and are subject
to charges under Section 8(b)(ii) of this Article.
(f) A decision prescribing that under a policy on the use of the general resources of
the Fund the period for repurchase under (c) or (d) above shall be shorter than
the one in effect under the policy shall apply only to holdings acquired by the
Fund subsequent to the effective date of the decision.
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(g) The Fund, on the request of a member, may postpone the date of discharge of
a repurchase obligation, but not beyond the maximum period under (c) or (d)
above or under policies adopted by the Fund under (e) above, unless the Fund
determines, by a seventy per cent majority of the total voting power, that a
longer period for repurchase which is consistent with the temporary use of the
general resources of the Fund is justified because discharge on the due date
would result in exceptional hardship for the member.
(h) The Fund’s policies under Section 3(d) of this Article may be supplemented by
policies under which the Fund may decide after consultation with a member to
sell under Section 3(b) of this Article its holdings of the member’s currency that
have not been repurchased in accordance with this Section 7, without prejudice
to any action that the Fund may be authorized to take under any other provision
of this Agreement.
(i) All repurchases under this Section shall be made with special drawing rights or
with the currencies of other members specified by the Fund. The Fund shall
adopt policies and procedures with regard to the currencies to be used by mem-
bers in making repurchases that take into account the principles in Section 3(d)
of this Article. The Fund’s holdings of a member’s currency that is used in
repurchase shall not be increased by the repurchase above the level at which
they would be subject to charges under Section 8(b)(ii) of this Article.
(j)
(i) If a member’s currency specified by the Fund under (i) above is not a freely
usable currency, the member shall ensure that the repurchasing member
can obtain it at the time of the repurchase in exchange for a freely usable
currency selected by the member whose currency has been specified. An
exchange of currency under this provision shall take place at an exchange
rate between the two currencies equivalent to the exchange rate between
them on the basis of Article XIX, Section 7(a).
(ii) Each member whose currency is specified by the Fund for repurchase shall
collaborate with the Fund and other members to enable repurchasing mem-
bers, at the time of the repurchase, to obtain the specified currency in
exchange for the freely usable currencies of other members.
(iii) An exchange under (j)(i) above shall be made with the member whose cur-
rency is specified unless that member and the repurchasing member agree
on another procedure.
(iv) If a repurchasing member wishes to obtain, at the time of the repurchase,
the freely usable currency of another member specified by the Fund under
(i) above, it shall, if requested by the other member, obtain the currency
from the other member in exchange for a freely usable currency at the rate
of exchange referred to in (j)(i) above. The Fund may adopt regulations on
the freely usable currency to be provided in an exchange.
Appendix 1. IMF Articles of Agreement
112 – IMF Intergovernmental Organizations – Suppl. 47 (2013)
SECTION 8. CHARGES
(a)
(i) The Fund shall levy a service charge on the purchase by a member of spe-
cial drawing rights or the currency of another member held in the General
Resources Account in exchange for its own currency, provided that the
Fund may levy a lower service charge on reserve tranche purchases than
on other purchases. The service charge on reserve tranche purchases shall
not exceed one-half of one per cent.
(ii) The Fund may levy a charge for stand-by or similar arrangements. The
Fund may decide that the charge for an arrangement shall be offset against
the service charge levied under (i) above on purchases under the arrange-
ment.
(b) The Fund shall levy charges on its average daily balances of a member’s cur-
rency held in the General Resources Account to the extent that they
(i) have been acquired under a policy that has been the subject of an exclu-
sion under Article XXX(c), or
(ii) exceed the amount of the member’s quota after excluding any balances
referred to in (i) above.
The rates of charge normally shall rise at intervals during the period in
which the balances are held.
(c) If a member fails to make a repurchase required under Section 7 of this Article,
the Fund, after consultation with the member on the reduction of the Fund’s
holdings of its currency, may impose such charges as the Fund deems appro-
priate on its holdings of the member’s currency that should have been repur-
chased.
(d) A seventy per cent majority of the total voting power shall be required for the
determination of the rates of charge under (a) and (b) above, which shall be uni-
form for all members, and under (c) above.
(e) A member shall pay all charges in special drawing rights, provided that in
exceptional circumstances the Fund may permit a member to pay charges in the
currencies of other members specified by the Fund, after consultation with them,
or in its own currency. The Fund’s holdings of a member’s currency shall not
be increased as a result of payments by other members under this provision
above the level at which they would be subject to charges under (b)(ii) above.
SECTION 9. REMUNERATION
(a) The Fund shall pay remuneration on the amount by which the per centage of
quota prescribed under (b) or (c) below exceeds the Fund’s average daily bal-
ances of a member’s currency held in the General Resources Account other than
balances acquired under a policy that has been the subject of an exclusion under
Article XXX(c). The rate of remuneration, which shall be determined by the
Fund by a seventy per cent majority of the total voting power, shall be the same
for all members and shall be not more than, nor less than four-fifths of, the rate
of interest under Article XX, Section 3. In establishing the rate of remuneration,
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the Fund shall take into account the rates of charge under Article V, Section
8(b).
(b) The per centage of quota applying for the purposes of (a) above shall be:
(i) for each member that became a member before the second amendment of
this Agreement, a per centage of quota corresponding to seventy-five per
cent of its quota on the date of the second amendment of this Agreement,
and for each member that became a member after the date of the second
amendment of this Agreement, a per centage of quota calculated by divid-
ing the total of the amounts corresponding to the per centages of quota that
apply to the other members on the date on which the member became a
member by the total of the quotas of the other members on the same date;
plus
(ii) the amounts it has paid to the Fund in currency or special drawing rights
under Article III, Section 3(a) since the date applicable under (b)(i) above;
and minus
(iii) the amounts it has received from the Fund in currency or special drawing
rights under Article III, Section 3(c) since the date applicable under (b)(i)
above.
(c) The Fund, by a seventy per cent majority of the total voting power, may raise
the latest per centage of quota applying for the purposes of (a) above to each
member to:
(i) a per centage, not in excess of one hundred per cent, that shall be determined
for each member on the basis of the same criteria for all members, or
(ii) one hundred per cent for all members.
(d) Remuneration shall be paid in special drawing rights, provided that either the
Fund or the member may decide that the payment to the member shall be made
in its own currency.
SECTION 10. COMPUTATIONS
(a) The value of the Fund’s assets held in the accounts of the General Department
shall be expressed in terms of the special drawing right.
(b) All computations relating to currencies of members for the purpose of applying
the provisions of this Agreement, except Article IV and Schedule C, shall be at
the rates at which the Fund accounts for these currencies in accordance with
Section 11 of this Article.
(c) Computations for the determination of amounts of currency in relation to quota
for the purpose of applying the provisions of this Agreement shall not include
currency held in the Special Disbursement Account or in the Investment
Account.
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SECTION 11. MAINTENANCE OF VALUE
(a) The value of the currencies of members held in the General Resources Account
shall be maintained in terms of the special drawing right in accordance with
exchange rates under Article XIX, Section 7(a).
(b) An adjustment in the Fund’s holdings of a member’s currency pursuant to this
Section shall be made on the occasion of the use of that currency in an opera-
tion or transaction between the Fund and another member and at such other
times as the Fund may decide or the member may request. Payments to or by
the Fund in respect of an adjustment shall be made within a reasonable time, as
determined by the Fund, after the date of adjustment, and at any other time
requested by the member.
SECTION 12. OTHER OPERATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS
(a) The Fund shall be guided in all its policies and decisions under this Section by
the objectives set forth in Article VIII, Section 7 and by the objective of avoid-
ing the management of the price, or the establishment of a fixed price, in the
gold market.
(b) Decisions of the Fund to engage in operations or transactions under (c), (d), and
(e) below shall be made by an eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting
power.
(c) The Fund may sell gold for the currency of any member after consulting the
member for whose currency the gold is sold, provided that the Fund’s holdings
of a member’s currency held in the General Resources Account shall not be
increased by the sale above the level at which they would be subject to charges
under Section 8(b)(ii) of this Article without the concurrence of the member,
and provided that, at the request of the member, the Fund at the time of sale
shall exchange for the currency of another member such part of the currency
received as would prevent such an increase. The exchange of a currency for the
currency of another member shall be made after consultation with that member,
and shall not increase the Fund’s holdings of that member’s currency above the
level at which they would be subject to charges under Section 8(b)(ii) of this
Article. The Fund shall adopt policies and procedures with regard to exchanges
that take into account the principles applied under Section 7(i) of this Article.
Sales under this provision to a member shall be at a price agreed for each trans-
action on the basis of prices in the market.
(d) The Fund may accept payments from a member in gold instead of special draw-
ing rights or currency in any operations or transactions under this Agreement.
Payments to the Fund under this provision shall be at a price agreed for each
operation or transaction on the basis of prices in the market.
(e) The Fund may sell gold held by it on the date of the second amendment of this
Agreement to those members that were members on August 31, 1975 and that
agree to buy it, in proportion to their quotas on that date. If the Fund intends to
sell gold under (c) above for the purpose of (f)(ii) below, it may sell to each
developing member that agrees to buy it that portion of the gold which, if sold
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under (c) above, would have produced the excess that could have been distrib-
uted to it under (f)(iii) below. The gold that would be sold under this provision
to a member that has been declared ineligible to use the general resources of the
Fund under Section 5 of this Article shall be sold to it when the ineligibility
ceases, unless the Fund decides to make the sale sooner. The sale of gold to a
member under this subsection (e) shall be made in exchange for its currency and
at a price equivalent at the time of sale to one special drawing right per 0.888
671 gram of fine gold.
(f) Whenever under (c) above the Fund sells gold held by it on the date of the sec-
ond amendment of this Agreement, an amount of the proceeds equivalent at the
time of sale to one special drawing right per 0.888 671 gram of fine gold shall
be placed in the General Resources Account and, except as the Fund may decide
otherwise under (g) below, any excess shall be held in the Special Disburse-
ment Account. The assets held in the Special Disbursement Account shall be
held separately from the other accounts of the General Department, and may be
used at any time:
(i) to make transfers to the General Resources Account for immediate use in
operations and transactions authorized by provisions of this Agreement
other than this Section;
(ii) for operations and transactions that are not authorized by other provisions
of this Agreement but are consistent with the purposes of the Fund. Under
this subsection (f)(ii) balance of payments assistance may be made avail-
able on special terms to developing members in difficult circumstances,
and for this purpose the Fund shall take into account the level of per capita
income;
(iii) for distribution to those developing members that were members on August
31, 1975, in proportion to their quotas on that date, of such part of the
assets that the Fund decides to use for the purposes of (ii) above as cor-
responds to the proportion of the quotas of these members on the date of
distribution to the total of the quotas of all members on the same date, pro-
vided that the distribution under this provision to a member that has been
declared ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund under Section
5 of this Article shall be made when the ineligibility ceases, unless the
Fund decides to make the distribution sooner.
Decisions to use assets pursuant to (i) above shall be taken by a seventy
per cent majority of the total voting power, and decisions pursuant to (ii)
and (iii) above shall be taken by an eighty-five per cent majority of the total
voting power.
(g) The Fund may decide, by an eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting
power, to transfer a part of the excess referred to in (f) above to the Investment
Account for use pursuant to the provisions of Article XII, Section 6(f).
(h) Pending uses specified under (f) above, the Fund may use a member’s currency
held in the Special Disbursement Account for investment as it may determine,
in accordance with rules and regulations adopted by the Fund by a seventy per
cent majority of the total voting power. The income of investment and interest
received under (f)(ii) above shall be placed in the Special Disbursement
Account.
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(i) The General Resources Account shall be reimbursed from time to time in
respect of the expenses of administration of the Special Disbursement Account
paid from the General Resources Account by transfers from the Special Dis-
bursement Account on the basis of a reasonable estimate of such expenses.
(j) The Special Disbursement Account shall be terminated in the event of the liq-
uidation of the Fund and may be terminated prior to liquidation of the Fund by
a seventy per cent majority of the total voting power. Upon termination of the
account because of the liquidation of the Fund, any assets in this account shall
be distributed in accordance with the provisions of Schedule K. Upon termina-
tion prior to liquidation of the Fund, any assets in this account shall be trans-
ferred to the General Resources Account for immediate use in operations and
transactions. The Fund, by a seventy per cent majority of the total voting power,
shall adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the Special Disburse-
ment Account.
(k) Whenever under (c) above the Fund sells gold acquired by it after the date of
the second amendment of this Agreement, an amount of the proceeds equiva-
lent to the acquisition price of the gold shall be placed in the General Resources
Account, and any excess shall be placed in the Investment Account for use pur-
suant to the provisions of Article XII, Section 6(f). If any gold acquired by the
Fund after the date of the second amendment of this Agreement is sold after
April 7, 2008 but prior to the date of entry into force of this provision, then,
upon the entry into force of this provision, and notwithstanding the limit set
forth in Article XII, Section 6(f)(ii), the Fund shall transfer to the Investment
Account from the General Resources Account an amount equal to the proceeds
of such sale less (i) the acquisition price of the gold sold, and (ii) any amount
of such proceeds in excess of the acquisition price that may have already been
transferred to the Investment Account prior to the date of entry into force of this
provision.
Article VI: Capital Transfers
SECTION 1. USE OF THE FUND’S GENERAL RESOURCES FOR CAPITAL TRANSFERS
(a) A member may not use the Fund’s general resources to meet a large or sus-
tained outflow of capital except as provided in Section 2 of this Article, and the
Fund may request a member to exercise controls to prevent such use of the gen-
eral resources of the Fund. If, after receiving such a request, a member fails to
exercise appropriate controls, the Fund may declare the member ineligible to
use the general resources of the Fund.
(b) Nothing in this Section shall be deemed:
(i) to prevent the use of the general resources of the Fund for capital trans-
actions of reasonable amount required for the expansion of exports or in
the ordinary course of trade, banking, or other business; or
(ii) to affect capital movements which are met out of a member’s own
resources, but members undertake that such capital movements will be in
accordance with the purposes of the Fund.
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SECTION 2. SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR CAPITAL TRANSFERS
A member shall be entitled to make reserve tranche purchases to meet capital trans-
fers.
SECTION 3. CONTROLS OF CAPITAL TRANSFERS
Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capi-
tal movements, but no member may exercise these controls in a manner which will
restrict payments for current transactions or which will unduly delay transfers of
funds in settlement of commitments, except as provided in Article VII, Section 3(b)
and in Article XIV, Section 2.
Article VII: Replenishment and Scarce Currencies
SECTION 1. MEASURES TO REPLENISH THE FUND’S HOLDINGS OF CURRENCIES
The Fund may, if it deems such action appropriate to replenish its holdings of any
member’s currency in the General Resources Account needed in connection with its
transactions, take either or both of the following steps:
(i) propose to the member that, on terms and conditions agreed between the Fund
and the member, the latter lend its currency to the Fund or that, with the con-
currence of the member, the Fund borrow such currency from some other
source either within or outside the territories of the member, but no member
shall be under any obligation to make such loans to the Fund or to concur in
the borrowing of its currency by the Fund from any other source;
(ii) require the member, if it is a participant, to sell its currency to the Fund for
special drawing rights held in the General Resources Account, subject to
Article XIX, Section 4. In replenishing with special drawing rights, the Fund
shall pay due regard to the principles of designation under Article XIX, Sec-
tion 5.
SECTION 2. GENERAL SCARCITY OF CURRENCY
If the Fund finds that a general scarcity of a particular currency is developing, the
Fund may so inform members and may issue a report setting forth the causes of the
scarcity and containing recommendations designed to bring it to an end. A repre-
sentative of the member whose currency is involved shall participate in the prepa-
ration of the report.
SECTION 3. SCARCITY OF THE FUND’S HOLDINGS
(a) If it becomes evident to the Fund that the demand for a member’s currency seri-
ously threatens the Fund’s ability to supply that currency, the Fund, whether or
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not it has issued a report under Section 2 of this Article, shall formally declare
such currency scarce and shall thenceforth apportion its existing and accruing
supply of the scarce currency with due regard to the relative needs of members,
the general international economic situation, and any other pertinent consider-
ations. The Fund shall also issue a report concerning its action.
(b) A formal declaration under (a) above shall operate as an authorization to any
member, after consultation with the Fund, temporarily to impose limitations on
the freedom of exchange operations in the scarce currency. Subject to the pro-
visions of Article IV and Schedule C, the member shall have complete jurisdic-
tion in determining the nature of such limitations, but they shall be no more
restrictive than is necessary to limit the demand for the scarce currency to the
supply held by, or accruing to, the member in question, and they shall be relaxed
and removed as rapidly as conditions permit.
(c) The authorization under (b) above shall expire whenever the Fund formally
declares the currency in question to be no longer scarce.
SECTION 4. ADMINISTRATION OF RESTRICTIONS
Any member imposing restrictions in respect of the currency of any other member
pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of this Article shall give sympathetic con-
sideration to any representations by the other member regarding the administration
of such restrictions.
SECTION 5. EFFECT OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON RESTRICTIONS
Members agree not to invoke the obligations of any engagements entered into with
other members prior to this Agreement in such manner as will prevent the operation
of the provisions of this Article.
Article VIII: General Obligations of Members
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION
In addition to the obligations assumed under other articles of this Agreement, each
member undertakes the obligations set out in this Article.
SECTION 2. AVOIDANCE OF RESTRICTIONS ON CURRENT PAYMENTS
(a) Subject to the provisions of Article VII, Section 3(b) and Article XIV, Section
2, no member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on
the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions.
(b) Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are
contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or
imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territo-
ries of any member. In addition, members may, by mutual accord, cooperate in
measures for the purpose of making the exchange control regulations of either
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member more effective, provided that such measures and regulations are con-
sistent with this Agreement.
SECTION 3. AVOIDANCE OF DISCRIMINATORY CURRENCY PRACTICES
No member shall engage in, or permit any of its fiscal agencies referred to inArticle V,
Section 1 to engage in, any discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple cur-
rency practices, whether within or outside margins under Article IV or prescribed by
or under Schedule C, except as authorized under this Agreement or approved by the
Fund. If such arrangements and practices are engaged in at the date when this Agree-
ment enters into force, the member concerned shall consult with the Fund as to their
progressive removal unless they are maintained or imposed under Article XIV, Sec-
tion 2, in which case the provisions of Section 3 of that Article shall apply.
SECTION 4. CONVERTIBILITY OF FOREIGN-HELD BALANCES
(a) Each member shall buy balances of its currency held by another member if the
latter, in requesting the purchase, represents:
(i) that the balances to be bought have been recently acquired as a result of
current transactions; or
(ii) that their conversion is needed for making payments for current transac-
tions.
The buying member shall have the option to pay either in special drawing rights,
subject to Article XIX, Section 4, or in the currency of the member making the
request.
(b) The obligation in (a) above shall not apply when:
(i) the convertibility of the balances has been restricted consistently with Sec-
tion 2 of this Article or Article VI, Section 3;
(ii) the balances have accumulated as a result of transactions effected before
the removal by a member of restrictions maintained or imposed under
Article XIV, Section 2;
(iii) the balances have been acquired contrary to the exchange regulations of the
member which is asked to buy them;
(iv) the currency of the member requesting the purchase has been declared
scarce under Article VII, Section 3 (a); or
(v) the member requested to make the purchase is for any reason not entitled
to buy currencies of other members from the Fund for its own currency.
SECTION 5. FURNISHING OF INFORMATION
(a) The Fund may require members to furnish it with such information as it deems
necessary for its activities, including, as the minimum necessary for the effec-
tive discharge of the Fund’s duties, national data on the following matters:
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(i) official holdings at home and abroad of (1) gold, (2) foreign exchange;
(ii) holdings at home and abroad by banking and financial agencies, other
than official agencies, of (1) gold, (2) foreign exchange;
(iii) production of gold;
(iv) gold exports and imports according to countries of destination and origin;
(v) total exports and imports of merchandise, in terms of local currency val-
ues, according to countries of destination and origin;
(vi) international balance of payments, including (1) trade in goods and ser-
vices, (2) gold transactions, (3) known capital transactions, and (4) other
items;
(vii) international investment position, i.e., investments within the territories of
the member owned abroad and investments abroad owned by persons in
its territories so far as it is possible to furnish this information;
(viii) national income;
(ix) price indices, i.e., indices of commodity prices in wholesale and retail
markets and of export and import prices;
(x) buying and selling rates for foreign currencies;
(xi) exchange controls, i.e., a comprehensive statement of exchange controls
in effect at the time of assuming membership in the Fund and details of
subsequent changes as they occur; and
(xii) where official clearing arrangements exist, details of amounts awaiting
clearance in respect of commercial and financial transactions, and of the
length of time during which such arrears have been outstanding.
(b) In requesting information the Fund shall take into consideration the varying
ability of members to furnish the data requested. Members shall be under no
obligation to furnish information in such detail that the affairs of individuals or
corporations are disclosed. Members undertake, however, to furnish the desired
information in as detailed and accurate a manner as is practicable and, so far as
possible, to avoid mere estimates.
(c) The Fund may arrange to obtain further information by agreement with mem-
bers. It shall act as a centre for the collection and exchange of information on
monetary and financial problems, thus facilitating the preparation of studies
designed to assist members in developing policies which further the purposes
of the Fund.
SECTION 6. CONSULTATION BETWEEN MEMBERS REGARDING EXISTING
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Where under this Agreement a member is authorized in the special or temporary cir-
cumstances specified in the Agreement to maintain or establish restrictions on
exchange transactions, and there are other engagements between members entered
into prior to this Agreement which conflict with the application of such restrictions,
the parties to such engagements shall consult with one another with a view to mak-
ing such mutually acceptable adjustments as may be necessary. The provisions of
this Article shall be without prejudice to the operation of Article VII, Section 5.
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SECTION 7. OBLIGATION TO COLLABORATE REGARDING POLICIES ON RESERVE
ASSETS
Each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and with other members in
order to ensure that the policies of the member with respect to reserve assets shall
be consistent with the objectives of promoting better international surveillance of
international liquidity and making the special drawing right the principal reserve
asset in the international monetary system.
Article IX: Status, Immunities, and Privileges
SECTION 1. PURPOSES OF ARTICLE
To enable the Fund to fulfill the functions with which it is entrusted, the status,
immunities, and privileges set forth in this Article shall be accorded to the Fund in
the territories of each member.
SECTION 2. STATUS OF THE FUND
The Fund shall possess full juridical personality, and in particular, the capacity:
(i) to contract;
(ii) to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property; and
(iii) to institute legal proceedings.
SECTION 3. IMMUNITY FROM JUDICIAL PROCESS
The Fund, its property and its assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held,
shall enjoy immunity from every form of judicial process except to the extent that
it expressly waives its immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms
of any contract.
SECTION 4. IMMUNITY FROM OTHER ACTION
Property and assets of the Fund, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall
be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation, or any other form
of seizure by executive or legislative action.
SECTION 5. IMMUNITY OF ARCHIVES
The archives of the Fund shall be inviolable.
SECTION 6. FREEDOM OF ASSETS FROM RESTRICTIONS
To the extent necessary to carry out the activities provided for in this Agreement,
all property and assets of the Fund shall be free from restrictions, regulations, con-
trols, and moratoria of any nature.
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SECTION 7. PRIVILEGE FOR COMMUNICATIONS
The official communications of the Fund shall be accorded by members the same
treatment as the official communications of other members.
SECTION 8. IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
All Governors, Executive Directors, Alternates, members of committees, represen-
tatives appointed under Article XII, Section 3(j), advisors of any of the foregoing
persons, officers, and employees of the Fund:
(i) shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in
their official capacity except when the Fund waives this immunity;
(ii) not being local nationals, shall be granted the same immunities from immigra-
tion restrictions, alien registration requirements, and national service obliga-
tions and the same facilities as regards exchange restrictions as are accorded
by members to the representatives, officials, and employees of comparable
rank of other members; and
(iii) shall be granted the same treatment in respect of traveling facilities as is
accorded by members to representatives, officials, and employees of compa-
rable rank of other members.
SECTION 9. IMMUNITIES FROM TAXATION
(a) The Fund, its assets, property, income, and its operations and transactions autho-
rized by this Agreement shall be immune from all taxation and from all cus-
toms duties. The Fund shall also be immune from liability for the collection or
payment of any tax or duty.
(b) No tax shall be levied on or in respect of salaries and emoluments paid by the
Fund to Executive Directors, Alternates, officers, or employees of the Fund who
are not local citizens, local subjects, or other local nationals.
(c) No taxation of any kind shall be levied on any obligation or security issued by
the Fund, including any dividend or interest thereon, by whomsoever held:
(i) which discriminates against such obligation or security solely because of
its origin; or
(ii) if the sole jurisdictional basis for such taxation is the place or currency in
which it is issued, made payable or paid, or the location of any office or
place of business maintained by the Fund.
SECTION 10. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE
Each member shall take such action as is necessary in its own territories for the pur-
pose of making effective in terms of its own law the principles set forth in this
Article and shall inform the Fund of the detailed action which it has taken.
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Article X: Relations with Other International Organizations
The Fund shall cooperate within the terms of this Agreement with any general inter-
national organization and with public international organizations having specialized
responsibilities in related fields. Any arrangements for such cooperation which
would involve a modification of any provision of this Agreement may be effected
only after amendment to this Agreement under Article XXVIII.
Article XI: Relations with Non-Member Countries
SECTION 1. UNDERTAKINGS REGARDING RELATIONS WITH NON-MEMBER
COUNTRIES
Each member undertakes:
(i) not to engage in, nor to permit any of its fiscal agencies referred to in Article
V, Section 1 to engage in, any transactions with a non-member or with persons
in a non-member’s territories which would be contrary to the provisions of this
Agreement or the purposes of the Fund;
(ii) not to cooperate with a non-member or with persons in a non-member’s ter-
ritories in practices which would be contrary to the provisions of this Agree-
ment or the purposes of the Fund; and
(iii) to cooperate with the Fund with a view to the application in its territories of
appropriate measures to prevent transactions with non-members or with per-
sons in their territories which would be contrary to the provisions of this
Agreement or the purposes of the Fund.
SECTION 2. RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSACTIONS WITH NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the right of any member to impose restric-
tions on exchange transactions with non-members or with persons in their territo-
ries unless the Fund finds that such restrictions prejudice the interests of members
and are contrary to the purposes of the Fund.
Article XII: Organization and Management
SECTION 1. STRUCTURE OF THE FUND
The Fund shall have a Board of Governors, an Executive Board, a Managing Direc-
tor, and a staff, and a Council if the Board of Governors decides, by an eighty-five
per cent majority of the total voting power, that the provisions of Schedule D shall
be applied.
SECTION 2. BOARD OF GOVERNORS
(a) All powers under this Agreement not conferred directly on the Board of
Governors, the Executive Board, or the Managing Director shall be vested in
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the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors shall consist of one Governor
and one Alternate appointed by each member in such manner as it may deter-
mine. Each Governor and each Alternate shall serve until a new appointment is
made. No Alternate may vote except in the absence of his principal. The Board
of Governors shall select one of the Governors as Chairman.
(b) The Board of Governors may delegate to the Executive Board authority to exer-
cise any powers of the Board of Governors, except the powers conferred
directly by this Agreement on the Board of Governors.
(c) The Board of Governors shall hold such meetings as may be provided for by
the Board of Governors or called by the Executive Board. Meetings of the
Board of Governors shall be called whenever requested by fifteen members or
by members having one-quarter of the total voting power.
(d) A quorum for any meeting of the Board of Governors shall be a majority of the
Governors having not less than two-thirds of the total voting power.
(e) Each Governor shall be entitled to cast the number of votes allotted under Sec-
tion 5 of this Article to the member appointing him.
(f) The Board of Governors may by regulation establish a procedure whereby the
Executive Board, when it deems such action to be in the best interests of the
Fund, may obtain a vote of the Governors on a specific question without calling
a meeting of the Board of Governors.
(g) The Board of Governors, and the Executive Board to the extent authorized, may
adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to conduct
the business of the Fund.
(h) Governors and Alternates shall serve as such without compensation from the
Fund, but the Fund may pay them reasonable expenses incurred in attending
meetings.
(i) The Board of Governors shall determine the remuneration to be paid to the
Executive Directors and their Alternates and the salary and terms of the con-
tract of service of the Managing Director.
(j) The Board of Governors and the Executive Board may appoint such commit-
tees as they deem advisable. Membership of committees need not be limited to
Governors or Executive Directors or their Alternates.
SECTION 3. EXECUTIVE BOARD
(a) The Executive Board shall be responsible for conducting the business of the
Fund, and for this purpose shall exercise all the powers delegated to it by the
Board of Governors.
(b) The Executive Board shall consist of Executive Directors with the Managing
Director as chairman. Of the Executive Directors:
(i) five shall be appointed by the five members having the largest quotas; and
(ii) fifteen shall be elected by the other members.
For the purpose of each regular election of Executive Directors, the Board of Gov-
ernors, by an eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting power, may increase
or decrease the number of Executive Directors in (ii) above. The number of Execu-
tive Directors in (ii) above shall be reduced by one or two, as the case may be, if
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Executive Directors are appointed under (c) below, unless the Board of Governors
decides, by an eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting power, that this
reduction would hinder the effective discharge of the functions of the Executive
Board or of Executive Directors or would threaten to upset a desirable balance in
the Executive Board.
(c) If, at the second regular election of Executive Directors and thereafter, the mem-
bers entitled to appoint Executive Directors under (b)(i) above do not include
the two members, the holdings of whose currencies by the Fund in the General
Resources Account have been, on the average over the preceding two years,
reduced below their quotas by the largest absolute amounts in terms of the spe-
cial drawing right, either one or both of such members, as the case may be, may
appoint an Executive Director.
(d) Elections of elective Executive Directors shall be conducted at intervals of two
years in accordance with the provisions of Schedule E, supplemented by such
regulations as the Fund deems appropriate. For each regular election of Execu-
tive Directors, the Board of Governors may issue regulations making changes
in the proportion of votes required to elect Executive Directors under the pro-
visions of Schedule E.
(e) Each Executive Director shall appoint an Alternate with full power to act for
him when he is not present, provided that the Board of Governors may adopt
rules enabling an Executive Director elected by more than a specified number
of members to appoint two Alternates. Such rules, if adopted, may only be
modified in the context of the regular election of Executive Directors and shall
require an Executive Director appointing two Alternates to designate: (i) the
Alternate who shall act for the Executive Director when he is not present and
both Alternates are present and (ii) the Alternate who shall exercise the powers
of the Executive Director under (f) below. When the Executive Directors
appointing them are present, Alternates may participate in meetings but may not
vote.
(f) Executive Directors shall continue in office until their successors are appointed
or elected. If the office of an elected Executive Director becomes vacant more
than ninety days before the end of his term, another Executive Director shall be
elected for the remainder of the term by the members that elected the former
Executive Director. A majority of the votes cast shall be required for election.
While the office remains vacant, the Alternate of the former Executive Director
shall exercise his powers, except that of appointing an Alternate.
(g) The Executive Board shall function in continuous session at the principal office
of the Fund and shall meet as often as the business of the Fund may require.
(h) A quorum for any meeting of the Executive Board shall be a majority of the
Executive Directors having not less than one-half of the total voting power.
(i)
(i) Each appointed Executive Director shall be entitled to cast the number of
votes allotted under Section 5 of this Article to the member appointing
him.
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(ii) If the votes allotted to a member that appoints an Executive Director under
(c) above were cast by an Executive Director together with the votes allot-
ted to other members as a result of the last regular election of Executive
Directors, the member may agree with each of the other members that the
number of votes allotted to it shall be cast by the appointed Executive
Director. A member making such an agreement shall not participate in the
election of Executive Directors.
(iii) Each elected Executive Director shall be entitled to cast the number of
votes which counted towards his election.
(iv) When the provisions of Section 5(b) of this Article are applicable, the votes
which an Executive Director would otherwise be entitled to cast shall be
increased or decreased correspondingly. All the votes which an Executive
Director is entitled to cast shall be cast as a unit.
(v) When the suspension of the voting rights of a member is terminated under
Article XXVI, Section 2(b), and the member is not entitled to appoint an
Executive Director, the member may agree with all the members that have
elected an Executive Director that the number of votes allotted to that
member shall be cast by such Executive Director, provided that, if no regu-
lar election of Executive Directors has been conducted during the period
of the suspension, the Executive Director in whose election the member
had participated prior to the suspension, or his successor elected in accor-
dance with paragraph 3(c)(i) of Schedule L or with (f) above, shall be
entitled to cast the number of votes allotted to the member. The member
shall be deemed to have participated in the election of the Executive Direc-
tor entitled to cast the number of votes allotted to the member.
(j) The Board of Governors shall adopt regulations under which a member not
entitled to appoint an Executive Director under (b) above may send a represen-
tative to attend any meeting of the Executive Board when a request made by, or
a matter particularly affecting, that member is under consideration.
SECTION 4. MANAGING DIRECTOR AND STAFF
(a) The Executive Board shall select a Managing Director who shall not be a Gov-
ernor or an Executive Director. The Managing Director shall be chairman of the
Executive Board, but shall have no vote except a deciding vote in case of an
equal division. He may participate in meetings of the Board of Governors, but
shall not vote at such meetings. The Managing Director shall cease to hold
office when the Executive Board so decides.
(b) The Managing Director shall be chief of the operating staff of the Fund and shall
conduct, under the direction of the Executive Board, the ordinary business of
the Fund. Subject to the general control of the Executive Board, he shall be
responsible for the organization, appointment, and dismissal of the staff of the
Fund.
(c) The Managing Director and the staff of the Fund, in the discharge of their func-
tions, shall owe their duty entirely to the Fund and to no other authority. Each
member of the Fund shall respect the international character of this duty and
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shall refrain from all attempts to influence any of the staff in the discharge of
these functions.
(d) In appointing the staff the Managing Director shall, subject to the paramount
importance of securing the highest standards of efficiency and of technical com-
petence, pay due regard to the importance of recruiting personnel on as wide a
geographical basis as possible.
SECTION 5. VOTING
(a) The total votes of each member shall be equal to the sum of its basic votes and
its quota-based votes.
(i) The basic votes of each member shall be the number of votes that results
from the equal distribution among all the members of 5.502 per cent of the
aggregate sum of the total voting power of all the members, provided that
there shall be no fractional basic votes.
(ii) The quota-based votes of each member shall be the number of votes that
results from the allocation of one vote for each part of its quota equivalent
to one hundred thousand special drawing rights.
(b) Whenever voting is required under Article V, Section 4 or 5, each member shall
have the number of votes to which it is entitled under (a) above adjusted
(i) by the addition of one vote for the equivalent of each four hundred thou-
sand special drawing rights of net sales of its currency from the general
resources of the Fund up to the date when the vote is taken, or
(ii) by the subtraction of one vote for the equivalent of each four hundred thou-
sand special drawing rights of its net purchases under Article V, Section
3(b) and (f) up to the date when the vote is taken, provided that neither net
purchases nor net sales shall be deemed at any time to exceed an amount
equal to the quota of the member involved.
(c) Except as otherwise specifically provided, all decisions of the Fund shall be
made by a majority of the votes cast.
SECTION 6. RESERVES, DISTRIBUTION OF NET INCOME, AND INVESTMENT
(a) The Fund shall determine annually what part of its net income shall be placed
to general reserve or special reserve, and what part, if any, shall be distributed.
(b) The Fund may use the special reserve for any purpose for which it may use the
general reserve, except distribution.
(c) If any distribution is made of the net income of any year, it shall be made to all
members in proportion to their quotas.
(d) The Fund, by a seventy per cent majority of the total voting power, may decide
at any time to distribute any part of the general reserve. Any such distribution
shall be made to all members in proportion to their quotas.
(e) Payments under (c) and (d) above shall be made in special drawing rights, pro-
vided that either the Fund or the member may decide that the payment to the
member shall be made in its own currency.
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(f)
(i) The Fund may establish an Investment Account for the purposes of this
subsection (f). The assets of the Investment Account shall be held sepa-
rately from the other accounts of the General Department.
(ii) The Fund may decide to transfer to the Investment Account a part of the
proceeds of the sale of gold in accordance with Article V, Section 12(g)
and, by a seventy per cent majority of the total voting power, may decide
to transfer to the Investment Account, for immediate investment, curren-
cies held in the General Resources Account. The amount of these trans-
fers shall not exceed the total amount of the general reserve and the
special reserve at the time of the decision.
(iii) The Fund may use a member’s currency held in the Investment Account
for investment as it may determine, in accordance with rules and regula-
tions adopted by the Fund by a seventy per cent majority of the total vot-
ing power. The rules and regulations adopted pursuant to this provision
shall be consistent with (vii), (viii), and (ix) below.
(iv) The income of investment may be invested in accordance with the pro-
visions of this subsection (f). Income not invested shall be held in the
Investment Account or may be used for meeting the expenses of conduct-
ing the business of the Fund.
(v) The Fund may use a member’s currency held in the Investment Account
to obtain the currencies needed to meet the expenses of conducting the
business of the Fund.
(vi) The Investment Account shall be terminated in the event of liquidation of
the Fund and may be terminated, or the amount of the investment may be
reduced, prior to liquidation of the Fund by a seventy per cent majority of
the total voting power.
(vii) Upon termination of the Investment Account because of liquidation of the
Fund, any assets in this account shall be distributed in accordance with
the provisions of Schedule K, provided that a portion of these assets cor-
responding to the proportion of the assets transferred to this account under
Article V, Section 12(g) to the total of the assets transferred to this account
shall be deemed to be assets held in the Special Disbursement Account
and shall be distributed in accordance with Schedule K, paragraph
2(a)(ii).
(viii) Upon termination of the Investment Account prior to liquidation of the
Fund, a portion of the assets held in this account corresponding to the pro-
portion of the assets transferred to this account under Article V, Section
12(g) to the total of the assets transferred to the account shall be trans-
ferred to the Special Disbursement Account if it has not been terminated,
and the balance of the assets held in the Investment Account shall be
transferred to the General Resources Account for immediate use in opera-
tions and transactions.
(ix) On a reduction of the amount of the investment by the Fund, a portion of
the reduction corresponding to the proportion of the assets transferred to
the Investment Account under Article V, Section 12(g) to the total of the
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assets transferred to this account shall be transferred to the Special Dis-
bursement Account if it has not been terminated, and the balance of the
reduction shall be transferred to the General Resources Account for imme-
diate use in operations and transactions.
SECTION 7. PUBLICATION OF REPORTS
(a) The Fund shall publish an annual report containing an audited statement of its
accounts, and shall issue, at intervals of three months or less, a summary state-
ment of its operations and transactions and its holdings of special drawing
rights, gold, and currencies of members.
(b) The Fund may publish such other reports as it deems desirable for carrying out
its purposes.
SECTION 8. COMMUNICATION OF VIEWS TO MEMBERS
The Fund shall at all times have the right to communicate its views informally to
any member on any matter arising under this Agreement. The Fund may, by a sev-
enty per cent majority of the total voting power, decide to publish a report made to
a member regarding its monetary or economic conditions and developments which
directly tend to produce a serious disequilibrium in the international balance of pay-
ments of members. If the member is not entitled to appoint an Executive Director,
it shall be entitled to representation in accordance with Section 3(j) of this Article.
The Fund shall not publish a report involving changes in the fundamental structure
of the economic organization of members.
Article XIII: Offices and Depositories
SECTION 1. LOCATION OF OFFICES
The principal office of the Fund shall be located in the territory of the member hav-
ing the largest quota, and agencies or branch offices may be established in the ter-
ritories of other members.
SECTION 2. DEPOSITORIES
(a) Each member shall designate its central bank as a depository for all the Fund’s
holdings of its currency, or if it has no central bank it shall designate such other
institution as may be acceptable to the Fund.
(b) The Fund may hold other assets, including gold, in the depositories designated
by the five members having the largest quotas and in such other designated
depositories as the Fund may select. Initially, at least one-half of the holdings
of the Fund shall be held in the depository designated by the member in whose
territories the Fund has its principal office and at least forty per cent shall be
held in the depositories designated by the remaining four members referred to
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above. However, all transfers of gold by the Fund shall be made with due regard
to the costs of transport and anticipated requirements of the Fund. In an emer-
gency the Executive Board may transfer all or any part of the Fund’s gold hold-
ings to any place where they can be adequately protected.
SECTION 3. GUARANTEE OF THE FUND’S ASSETS
Each member guarantees all assets of the Fund against loss resulting from failure or
default on the part of the depository designated by it.
Article XIV: Transitional Arrangements
SECTION 1. NOTIFICATION TO THE FUND
Each member shall notify the Fund whether it intends to avail itself of the transi-
tional arrangements in Section 2 of this Article, or whether it is prepared to accept
the obligations of Article VIII, Sections 2, 3, and 4. A member availing itself of the
transitional arrangements shall notify the Fund as soon thereafter as it is prepared to
accept these obligations.
SECTION 2. EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS
A member that has notified the Fund that it intends to avail itself of transitional
arrangements under this provision may, notwithstanding the provisions of any other
articles of this Agreement, maintain and adapt to changing circumstances the restric-
tions on payments and transfers for current international transactions that were in
effect on the date on which it became a member. Members shall, however, have con-
tinuous regard in their foreign exchange policies to the purposes of the Fund, and,
as soon as conditions permit, they shall take all possible measures to develop such
commercial and financial arrangements with other members as will facilitate inter-
national payments and the promotion of a stable system of exchange rates. In par-
ticular, members shall withdraw restrictions maintained under this Section as soon
as they are satisfied that they will be able, in the absence of such restrictions, to
settle their balance of payments in a manner which will not unduly encumber their
access to the general resources of the Fund.
SECTION 3. ACTION OF THE FUND RELATING TO RESTRICTIONS
The Fund shall make annual reports on the restrictions in force under Section 2 of
this Article. Any member retaining any restrictions inconsistent with Article VIII,
Sections 2, 3, or 4 shall consult the Fund annually as to their further retention. The
Fund may, if it deems such action necessary in exceptional circumstances, make
representations to any member that conditions are favorable for the withdrawal of
any particular restriction, or for the general abandonment of restrictions, inconsis-
tent with the provisions of any other articles of this Agreement. The member shall
be given a suitable time to reply to such representations. If the Fund finds that the
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member persists in maintaining restrictions which are inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the Fund, the member shall be subject to Article XXVI, Section 2(a).
Article XV: Special Drawing Rights
SECTION 1. AUTHORITY TO ALLOCATE SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS
(a) To meet the need, as and when it arises, for a supplement to existing reserve
assets, the Fund is authorized to allocate special drawing rights in accordance
with the provisions of Article XVIII to members that are participants in the Spe-
cial Drawing Rights Department.
(b) In addition, the Fund shall allocate special drawing rights to members that are
participants in the Special Drawing Rights Department in accordance with the
provisions of Schedule M.
SECTION 2. VALUATION OF THE SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHT
The method of valuation of the special drawing right shall be determined by the
Fund by a seventy per cent majority of the total voting power, provided, however,
that an eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting power shall be required for
a change in the principle of valuation or a fundamental change in the application of
the principle in effect.
Article XVI: General Department and Special Drawing Rights Department
SECTION 1. SEPARATION OF OPERATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS
All operations and transactions involving special drawing rights shall be conducted
through the Special Drawing Rights Department. All other operations and transac-
tions on the account of the Fund authorized by or under this Agreement shall be con-
ducted through the General Department. Operations and transactions pursuant to
Article XVII, Section 2 shall be conducted through the General Department as well
as the Special Drawing Rights Department.
SECTION 2. SEPARATION OF ASSETS AND PROPERTY
All assets and property of the Fund, except resources administered under Article V,
Section 2(b), shall be held in the General Department, provided that assets and prop-
erty acquired under Article XX, Section 2 and Articles XXIV and XXV and Sched-
ules H and I shall be held in the Special Drawing Rights Department. Any assets or
property held in one Department shall not be available to discharge or meet the
liabilities, obligations, or losses of the Fund incurred in the conduct of the opera-
tions and transactions of the other Department, except that the expenses of conduct-
ing the business of the Special Drawing Rights Department shall be paid by the
Fund from the General Department which shall be reimbursed in special drawing
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rights from time to time by assessments under Article XX, Section 4 made on the
basis of a reasonable estimate of such expenses.
SECTION 3. RECORDING AND INFORMATION
All changes in holdings of special drawing rights shall take effect only when
recorded by the Fund in the Special Drawing Rights Department. Participants shall
notify the Fund of the provisions of this Agreement under which special drawing
rights are used. The Fund may require participants to furnish it with such other
information as it deems necessary for its functions.
Article XVII: Participants and Other Holders of Special Drawing Rights
SECTION 1. PARTICIPANTS
Each member of the Fund that deposits with the Fund an instrument setting forth
that it undertakes all the obligations of a participant in the Special Drawing Rights
Department in accordance with its law and that it has taken all steps necessary to
enable it to carry out all of these obligations shall become a participant in the Spe-
cial Drawing Rights Department as of the date the instrument is deposited, except
that no member shall become a participant before the provisions of this Agreement
pertaining exclusively to the Special Drawing Rights Department have entered into
force and instruments have been deposited under this Section by members that have
at least seventy-five per cent of the total of quotas.
SECTION 2. FUND AS A HOLDER
The Fund may hold special drawing rights in the General Resources Account and
may accept and use them in operations and transactions conducted through the Gen-
eral Resources Account with participants in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement or with prescribed holders in accordance with the terms and conditions
prescribed under Section 3 of this Article.
SECTION 3. OTHER HOLDERS
The Fund may prescribe:
(i) as holders, non-members, members that are non-participants, institutions that
perform functions of a central bank for more than one member, and other offi-
cial entities;
(ii) the terms and conditions on which prescribed holders may be permitted to hold
special drawing rights and may accept and use them in operations and trans-
actions with participants and other prescribed holders; and
(iii) the terms and conditions on which participants and the Fund through the Gen-
eral Resources Account may enter into operations and transactions in special
drawing rights with prescribed holders.
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An eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting power shall be required for pre-
scriptions under (i) above. The terms and conditions prescribed by the Fund shall
be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement and the effective functioning of
the Special Drawing Rights Department.
Article XVIII: Allocation and Cancellation of Special Drawing Rights
SECTION 1. PRINCIPLES AND CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING ALLOCATION AND
CANCELLATION
(a) In all its decisions with respect to the allocation and cancellation of special
drawing rights the Fund shall seek to meet the long-term global need, as and
when it arises, to supplement existing reserve assets in such manner as will pro-
mote the attainment of its purposes and will avoid economic stagnation and
deflation as well as excess demand and inflation in the world.
(b) The first decision to allocate special drawing rights shall take into account, as
special considerations, a collective judgment that there is a global need to
supplement reserves, and the attainment of a better balance of payments equi-
librium, as well as the likelihood of a better working of the adjustment process
in the future.
SECTION 2. ALLOCATION AND CANCELLATION
(a) Decisions of the Fund to allocate or cancel special drawing rights shall be made
for basic periods which shall run consecutively and shall be five years in dura-
tion. The first basic period shall begin on the date of the first decision to allo-
cate special drawing rights or such later date as may be specified in that
decision. Any allocations or cancellations shall take place at yearly intervals.
(b) The rates at which allocations are to be made shall be expressed as per centages
of quotas on the date of each decision to allocate. The rates at which special
drawing rights are to be cancelled shall be expressed as per centages of net
cumulative allocations of special drawing rights on the date of each decision to
cancel. The per centages shall be the same for all participants.
(c) In its decision for any basic period the Fund may provide, notwithstanding (a)
and (b) above, that:
(i) the duration of the basic period shall be other than five years; or
(ii) the allocations or cancellations shall take place at other than yearly inter-
vals; or
(iii) the basis for allocations or cancellations shall be the quotas or net cumu-
lative allocations on dates other than the dates of decisions to allocate or
cancel.
(d) A member that becomes a participant after a basic period starts shall receive
allocations beginning with the next basic period in which allocations are made
after it becomes a participant unless the Fund decides that the new participant
shall start to receive allocations beginning with the next allocation after it
becomes a participant. If the Fund decides that a member that becomes a par-
ticipant during a basic period shall receive allocations during the remainder of
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that basic period and the participant was not a member on the dates established
under (b) or (c) above, the Fund shall determine the basis on which these allo-
cations to the participant shall be made.
(e) A participant shall receive allocations of special drawing rights made pursuant
to any decision to allocate unless:
(i) the Governor for the participant did not vote in favor of the decision; and
(ii) the participant has notified the Fund in writing prior to the first allocation
of special drawing rights under that decision that it does not wish special
drawing rights to be allocated to it under the decision. On the request of a
participant, the Fund may decide to terminate the effect of the notice with
respect to allocations of special drawing rights subsequent to the termina-
tion.
(f) If on the effective date of any cancellation the amount of special drawing rights
held by a participant is less than its share of the special drawing rights that are
to be cancelled, the participant shall eliminate its negative balance as promptly
as its gross reserve position permits and shall remain in consultation with the
Fund for this purpose. Special drawing rights acquired by the participant after
the effective date of the cancellation shall be applied against its negative bal-
ance and cancelled.
SECTION 3. UNEXPECTED MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
The Fund may change the rates or intervals of allocation or cancellation during the
rest of a basic period or change the length of a basic period or start a new basic
period, if at any time the Fund finds it desirable to do so because of unexpected
major developments.
SECTION 4. DECISIONS ON ALLOCATIONS AND CANCELLATIONS
(a) Decisions under Section 2(a), (b), and (c) or Section 3 of this Article shall be
made by the Board of Governors on the basis of proposals of the Managing
Director concurred in by the Executive Board.
(b) Before making any proposal, the Managing Director, after having satisfied him-
self that it will be consistent with the provisions of Section 1(a) of this Article,
shall conduct such consultations as will enable him to ascertain that there is
broad support among participants for the proposal. In addition, before making a
proposal for the first allocation, the Managing Director shall satisfy himself that
the provisions of Section 1(b) of this Article have been met and that there is
broad support among participants to begin allocations; he shall make a proposal
for the first allocation as soon after the establishment of the Special Drawing
Rights Department as he is so satisfied.
(c) The Managing Director shall make proposals:
(i) not later than six months before the end of each basic period;
(ii) if no decision has been taken with respect to allocation or cancellation for
a basic period, whenever he is satisfied that the provisions of (b) above
have been met;
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(iii) when, in accordance with Section 3 of this Article, he considers that it
would be desirable to change the rate or intervals of allocation or cancel-
lation or change the length of a basic period or start a new basic period; or
(iv) within six months of a request by the Board of Governors or the Executive
Board;
provided that, if under (i), (iii), or (iv) above the Managing Director ascertains that
there is no proposal which he considers to be consistent with the provisions of Sec-
tion 1 of this Article that has broad support among participants in accordance with
(b) above, he shall report to the Board of Governors and to the Executive Board.
(d) An eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting power shall be required for
decisions under Section 2(a), (b), and (c) or Section 3 of this Article except for
decisions under Section 3 with respect to a decrease in the rates of allocation.
Article XIX: Operations and Transactions in Special Drawing Rights
SECTION 1. USE OF SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS
Special drawing rights may be used in the operations and transactions authorized by
or under this Agreement.
SECTION 2. OPERATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS
(a) A participant shall be entitled to use its special drawing rights to obtain an
equivalent amount of currency from a participant designated under Section 5 of
this Article.
(b) A participant, in agreement with another participant, may use its special draw-
ing rights to obtain an equivalent amount of currency from the other partici-
pant.
(c) The Fund, by a seventy per cent majority of the total voting power, may pre-
scribe operations in which a participant is authorized to engage in agreement
with another participant on such terms and conditions as the Fund deems appro-
priate. The terms and conditions shall be consistent with the effective function-
ing of the Special Drawing Rights Department and the proper use of special
drawing rights in accordance with this Agreement.
(d) The Fund may make representations to a participant that enters into any opera-
tion or transaction under (b) or (c) above that in the judgment of the Fund may
be prejudicial to the process of designation according to the principles of Sec-
tion 5 of this Article or is otherwise inconsistent with Article XXII. A partici-
pant that persists in entering into such operations or transactions shall be subject
to Article XXIII, Section 2(b).
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SECTION 3. REQUIREMENT OF NEED
(a) In transactions under Section 2(a) of this Article, except as otherwise provided
in (c) below, a participant will be expected to use its special drawing rights only
if it has a need because of its balance of payments or its reserve position or
developments in its reserves, and not for the sole purpose of changing the com-
position of its reserves.
(b) The use of special drawing rights shall not be subject to challenge on the basis
of the expectation in (a) above, but the Fund may make representations to a par-
ticipant that fails to fulfill this expectation. A participant that persists in failing
to fulfill this expectation shall be subject to Article XXIII, Section 2(b).
(c) The Fund may waive the expectation in (a) above in any transactions in which
a participant uses special drawing rights to obtain an equivalent amount of cur-
rency from a participant designated under Section 5 of this Article that would
promote reconstitution by the other participant under Section 6(a) of this
Article; prevent or reduce a negative balance of the other participant; or offset
the effect of a failure by the other participant to fulfill the expectation in (a)
above.
SECTION 4. OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE CURRENCY
(a) A participant designated by the Fund under Section 5 of this Article shall pro-
vide on demand a freely usable currency to a participant using special drawing
rights under Section 2(a) of this Article. A participant’s obligation to provide
currency shall not extend beyond the point at which its holdings of special
drawing rights in excess of its net cumulative allocation are equal to twice its
net cumulative allocation or such higher limit as may be agreed between a par-
ticipant and the Fund.
(b) A participant may provide currency in excess of the obligatory limit or any
agreed higher limit.
SECTION 5. DESIGNATION OF PARTICIPANTS TO PROVIDE CURRENCY
(a) The Fund shall ensure that a participant will be able to use its special drawing
rights by designating participants to provide currency for specified amounts of
special drawing rights for the purposes of Sections 2(a) and 4 of this Article.
Designations shall be made in accordance with the following general principles
supplemented by such other principles as the Fund may adopt from time to time:
(i) A participant shall be subject to designation if its balance of payments and
gross reserve position is sufficiently strong, but this will not preclude the
possibility that a participant with a strong reserve position will be desig-
nated even though it has a moderate balance of payments deficit. Partici-
pants shall be designated in such manner as will promote over time a
balanced distribution of holdings of special drawing rights among them.
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(ii) Participants shall be subject to designation in order to promote reconstitu-
tion under Section 6(a) of this Article, to reduce negative balances in hold-
ings of special drawing rights, or to offset the effect of failures to fulfill the
expectation in Section 3(a) of this Article.
(iii) In designating participants, the Fund normally shall give priority to those
that need to acquire special drawing rights to meet the objectives of des-
ignation under (ii) above.
(b) In order to promote over time a balanced distribution of holdings of special
drawing rights under (a)(i) above, the Fund shall apply the rules for designation
in Schedule F or such rules as may be adopted under (c) below.
(c) The rules for designation may be reviewed at any time and new rules shall be
adopted if necessary. Unless new rules are adopted, the rules in force at the time
of the review shall continue to apply.
SECTION 6. RECONSTITUTION
(a) Participants that use their special drawing rights shall reconstitute their hold-
ings of them in accordance with the rules for reconstitution in Schedule G or
such rules as may be adopted under (b) below.
(b) The rules for reconstitution may be reviewed at any time and new rules shall be
adopted if necessary. Unless new rules are adopted or a decision is made to
abrogate rules for reconstitution, the rules in force at the time of review shall
continue to apply. A seventy per cent majority of the total voting power shall be
required for decisions to adopt, modify, or abrogate the rules for reconstitution.
SECTION 7. EXCHANGE RATES
(a) Except as otherwise provided in (b) below, the exchange rates for transactions
between participants under Section 2(a) and (b) of this Article shall be such that
participants using special drawing rights shall receive the same value whatever
currencies might be provided and whichever participants provide those curren-
cies, and the Fund shall adopt regulations to give effect to this principle.
(b) The Fund, by an eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting power, may
adopt policies under which in exceptional circumstances the Fund, by a seventy
per cent majority of the total voting power, may authorize participants entering
into transactions under Section 2(b) of this Article to agree on exchange rates
other than those applicable under (a) above.
(c) The Fund shall consult a participant on the procedure for determining rates of
exchange for its currency.
(d) For the purpose of this provision the term participant includes a terminating par-
ticipant.
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Article XX: Special Drawing Rights Department Interest and Charges
SECTION 1. INTEREST
Interest at the same rate for all holders shall be paid by the Fund to each holder on
the amount of its holdings of special drawing rights. The Fund shall pay the amount
due to each holder whether or not sufficient charges are received to meet the pay-
ment of interest.
SECTION 2. CHARGES
Charges at the same rate for all participants shall be paid to the Fund by each par-
ticipant on the amount of its net cumulative allocation of special drawing rights plus
any negative balance of the participant or unpaid charges.
SECTION 3. RATE OF INTEREST AND CHARGES
The Fund shall determine the rate of interest by a seventy per cent majority of the
total voting power. The rate of charges shall be equal to the rate of interest.
SECTION 4. ASSESSMENTS
When it is decided under Article XVI, Section 2 that reimbursement shall be made,
the Fund shall levy assessments for this purpose at the same rate for all participants
on their net cumulative allocations.
SECTION 5. PAYMENT OF INTEREST, CHARGES, AND ASSESSMENTS
Interest, charges, and assessments shall be paid in special drawing rights. A partici-
pant that needs special drawing rights to pay any charge or assessment shall be obli-
gated and entitled to obtain them, for currency acceptable to the Fund, in a
transaction with the Fund conducted through the General Resources Account. If suf-
ficient special drawing rights cannot be obtained in this way, the participant shall be
obligated and entitled to obtain them with a freely usable currency from a partici-
pant which the Fund shall specify. Special drawing rights acquired by a participant
after the date for payment shall be applied against its unpaid charges and cancelled.
Article XXI: Administration of the General Department and the Special
Drawing Rights Department
(a) The General Department and the Special Drawing Rights Department shall be
administered in accordance with the provisions of Article XII, subject to the fol-
lowing provisions:
(i) For meetings of or decisions by the Board of Governors on matters per-
taining exclusively to the Special Drawing Rights Department only
requests by, or the presence and the votes of, Governors appointed by
members that are participants shall be counted for the purpose of calling
Appendix 1. IMF Articles of Agreement
IMF – 139Intergovernmental Organizations – Suppl. 47 (2013)
meetings and determining whether a quorum exists or whether a decision
is made by the required majority.
(ii) For decisions by the Executive Board on matters pertaining exclusively to
the Special Drawing Rights Department only Executive Directors
appointed or elected by at least one member that is a participant shall be
entitled to vote. Each of these Executive Directors shall be entitled to cast
the number of votes allotted to the member which is a participant that
appointed him or to the members that are participants whose votes counted
towards his election. Only the presence of Executive Directors appointed
or elected by members that are participants and the votes allotted to mem-
bers that are participants shall be counted for the purpose of determining
whether a quorum exists or whether a decision is made by the required
majority. For the purposes of this provision, an agreement under Article
XII, Section 3(i)(ii) by a member that is a participant shall entitle an
appointed Executive Director to vote and cast the number of votes allotted
to the member.
(iii) Questions of the general administration of the Fund, including reimburse-
ment under Article XVI, Section 2, and any question whether a matter per-
tains to both Departments or exclusively to the Special Drawing Rights
Department shall be decided as if they pertained exclusively to the Gen-
eral Department. Decisions with respect to the method of valuation of the
special drawing right, the acceptance and holding of special drawing rights
in the General Resources Account of the General Department and the use
of them, and other decisions affecting the operations and transactions con-
ducted through both the General Resources Account of the General Depart-
ment and the Special Drawing Rights Department shall be made by the
majorities required for decisions on matters pertaining exclusively to each
Department. A decision on a matter pertaining to the Special Drawing
Rights Department shall so indicate.
(b) In addition to the privileges and immunities that are accorded under Article IX
of this Agreement, no tax of any kind shall be levied on special drawing rights
or on operations or transactions in special drawing rights.
(c) A question of interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement on matters per-
taining exclusively to the Special Drawing Rights Department shall be submit-
ted to the Executive Board pursuant to Article XXIX(a) only on the request of
a participant. In any case where the Executive Board has given a decision on a
question of interpretation pertaining exclusively to the Special Drawing Rights
Department only a participant may require that the question be referred to the
Board of Governors under Article XXIX(b). The Board of Governors shall
decide whether a Governor appointed by a member that is not a participant shall
be entitled to vote in the Committee on Interpretation on questions pertaining
exclusively to the Special Drawing Rights Department.
(d) Whenever a disagreement arises between the Fund and a participant that has ter-
minated its participation in the Special Drawing Rights Department or between
the Fund and any participant during the liquidation of the Special Drawing
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Rights Department with respect to any matter arising exclusively from partici-
pation in the Special Drawing Rights Department, the disagreement shall be
submitted to arbitration in accordance with the procedures in Article XXIX(c).
Article XXII: General Obligations of Participants
In addition to the obligations assumed with respect to special drawing rights under
other articles of this Agreement, each participant undertakes to collaborate with the
Fund and with other participants in order to facilitate the effective functioning of
the Special Drawing Rights Department and the proper use of special drawing rights
in accordance with this Agreement and with the objective of making the special
drawing right the principal reserve asset in the international monetary system.
Article XXIII: Suspension of Operations and Transactions in Special
Drawing Rights
SECTION 1. EMERGENCY PROVISIONS
In the event of an emergency or the development of unforeseen circumstances
threatening the activities of the Fund with respect to the Special Drawing Rights
Department, the Executive Board, by an eighty-five per cent majority of the total
voting power, may suspend for a period of not more than one year the operation of
any of the provisions relating to operations and transactions in special drawing
rights, and the provisions of Article XXVII, Section l(b), (c), and (d) shall then
apply.
SECTION 2. FAILURE TO FULFILL OBLIGATIONS
(a) If the Fund finds that a participant has failed to fulfill its obligations under
Article XIX, Section 4, the right of the participant to use its special drawing
rights shall be suspended unless the Fund otherwise decides.
(b) If the Fund finds that a participant has failed to fulfill any other obligation with
respect to special drawing rights, the Fund may suspend the right of the partici-
pant to use special drawing rights it acquires after the suspension.
(c) Regulations shall be adopted to ensure that before action is taken against any
participant under (a) or (b) above, the participant shall be informed immedi-
ately of the complaint against it and given an adequate opportunity for stating
its case, both orally and in writing. Whenever the participant is thus informed
of a complaint relating to (a) above, it shall not use special drawing rights pend-
ing the disposition of the complaint.
(d) Suspension under (a) or (b) above or limitation under (c) above shall not affect
a participant’s obligation to provide currency in accordance with Article XIX,
Section 4.
(e) The Fund may at any time terminate a suspension under (a) or (b) above, pro-
vided that a suspension imposed on a participant under (b) above for failure to
fulfill the obligations under Article XIX, Section 6(a) shall not be terminated
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until one hundred eighty days after the end of the first calendar quarter during
which the participant complies with the rules for reconstitution.
(f) The right of a participant to use its special drawing rights shall not be sus-
pended because it has become ineligible to use the Fund’s general resources
under Article V, Section 5, Article VI, Section 1, or Article XXVI, Section 2(a).
Article XXVI, Section 2 shall not apply because a participant has failed to ful-
fill any obligations with respect to special drawing rights.
Article XXIV: Termination of Participation
SECTION 1. RIGHT TO TERMINATE PARTICIPATION
(a) Any participant may terminate its participation in the Special Drawing Rights
Department at any time by transmitting a notice in writing to the Fund at its
principal office. Termination shall become effective on the date the notice is
received.
(b) A participant that withdraws from membership in the Fund shall be deemed to
have simultaneously terminated its participation in the Special Drawing Rights
Department.
SECTION 2. SETTLEMENT ON TERMINATION
(a) When a participant terminates its participation in the Special Drawing Rights
Department, all operations and transactions by the terminating participant in
special drawing rights shall cease except as otherwise permitted under an agree-
ment made pursuant to (c) below in order to facilitate a settlement or as pro-
vided in Sections 3, 5, and 6 of this Article or in Schedule H. Interest and
charges that accrued to the date of termination and assessments levied before
that date but not paid shall be paid in special drawing rights.
(b) The Fund shall be obligated to redeem all special drawing rights held by the ter-
minating participant, and the terminating participant shall be obligated to pay to
the Fund an amount equal to its net cumulative allocation and any other
amounts that may be due and payable because of its participation in the Special
Drawing Rights Department. These obligations shall be set off against each
other and the amount of special drawing rights held by the terminating partici-
pant that is used in the setoff to extinguish its obligation to the Fund shall be
cancelled.
(c) A settlement shall be made with reasonable despatch by agreement between the
terminating participant and the Fund with respect to any obligation of the ter-
minating participant or the Fund after the setoff in (b) above. If agreement on a
settlement is not reached promptly the provisions of Schedule H shall apply.
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SECTION 3. INTEREST AND CHARGES
After the date of termination the Fund shall pay interest on any outstanding balance
of special drawing rights held by a terminating participant and the terminating par-
ticipant shall pay charges on any outstanding obligation owed to the Fund at the
times and rates prescribed under Article XX. Payment shall be made in special
drawing rights. A terminating participant shall be entitled to obtain special drawing
rights with a freely usable currency to pay charges or assessments in a transaction
with a participant specified by the Fund or by agreement from any other holder, or
to dispose of special drawing rights received as interest in a transaction with any
participant designated under Article XIX, Section 5 or by agreement with any other
holder.
SECTION 4. SETTLEMENT OF OBLIGATION TO THE FUND
Currency received by the Fund from a terminating participant shall be used by the
Fund to redeem special drawing rights held by participants in proportion to the
amount by which each participant’s holdings of special drawing rights exceed its
net cumulative allocation at the time the currency is received by the Fund. Special
drawing rights so redeemed and special drawing rights obtained by a terminating
participant under the provisions of this Agreement to meet any installment due
under an agreement on settlement or under Schedule H and set off against that
installment shall be cancelled.
SECTION 5. SETTLEMENT OF OBLIGATION TO A TERMINATING PARTICIPANT
Whenever the Fund is required to redeem special drawing rights held by a termi-
nating participant, redemption shall be made with currency provided by participants
specified by the Fund. These participants shall be specified in accordance with the
principles in Article XIX, Section 5. Each specified participant shall provide at its
option the currency of the terminating participant or a freely usable currency to the
Fund and shall receive an equivalent amount of special drawing rights. However, a
terminating participant may use its special drawing rights to obtain its own cur-
rency, a freely usable currency, or any other asset from any holder, if the Fund so
permits.
SECTION 6. GENERAL RESOURCES ACCOUNT TRANSACTIONS
In order to facilitate settlement with a terminating participant, the Fund may decide
that a terminating participant shall:
(i) use any special drawing rights held by it after the setoff in Section 2(b) of this
Article, when they are to be redeemed, in a transaction with the Fund con-
ducted through the General Resources Account to obtain its own currency or
a freely usable currency at the option of the Fund; or
(ii) obtain special drawing rights in a transaction with the Fund conducted through
the General Resources Account for a currency acceptable to the Fund to meet
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any charges or installment due under an agreement or the provisions of Sched-
ule H.
Article XXV: Liquidation of the Special Drawing Rights Department
(a) The Special Drawing Rights Department may not be liquidated except by deci-
sion of the Board of Governors. In an emergency, if the Executive Board
decides that liquidation of the Special Drawing Rights Department may be nec-
essary, it may temporarily suspend allocations or cancellations and all opera-
tions and transactions in special drawing rights pending decision by the Board
of Governors. A decision by the Board of Governors to liquidate the Fund shall
be a decision to liquidate both the General Department and the Special Drawing
Rights Department.
(b) If the Board of Governors decides to liquidate the Special Drawing Rights
Department, all allocations or cancellations and all operations and transactions
in special drawing rights and the activities of the Fund with respect to the Spe-
cial Drawing Rights Department shall cease except those incidental to the
orderly discharge of the obligations of participants and of the Fund with respect
to special drawing rights, and all obligations of the Fund and of participants
under this Agreement with respect to special drawing rights shall cease except
those set out in this Article, Article XX, Article XXI(d), Article XXIV, Article
XXIX(c), and Schedule H, or any agreement reached under Article XXIV sub-
ject to paragraph 4 of Schedule H, and Schedule I.
(c) Upon liquidation of the Special Drawing Rights Department, interest and
charges that accrued to the date of liquidation and assessments levied before that
date but not paid shall be paid in special drawing rights. The Fund shall be obli-
gated to redeem all special drawing rights held by holders, and each participant
shall be obligated to pay the Fund an amount equal to its net cumulative allo-
cation of special drawing rights and such other amounts as may be due and pay-
able because of its participation in the Special Drawing Rights Department.
(d) Liquidation of the Special Drawing Rights Department shall be administered in
accordance with the provisions of Schedule I.
Article XXVI: Withdrawal from Membership
SECTION 1. RIGHT OF MEMBERS TO WITHDRAW
Any member may withdraw from the Fund at any time by transmitting a notice in
writing to the Fund at its principal office. Withdrawal shall become effective on the
date such notice is received.
SECTION 2. COMPULSORY WITHDRAWAL
(a) If a member fails to fulfill any of its obligations under this Agreement, the Fund
may declare the member ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund.
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Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to limit the provisions of Article V, Sec-
tion 5 or Article VI, Section 1.
(b) If, after the expiration of a reasonable period following a declaration of ineli-
gibility under (a) above, the member persists in its failure to fulfill any of its
obligations under this Agreement, the Fund may, by a seventy per cent majority
of the total voting power, suspend the voting rights of the member. During the
period of the suspension, the provisions of Schedule L shall apply. The Fund
may, by a seventy per cent majority of the total voting power, terminate the sus-
pension at any time.
(c) If, after the expiration of a reasonable period following a decision of suspen-
sion under (b) above, the member persists in its failure to fulfill any of its obli-
gations under this Agreement, that member may be required to withdraw from
membership in the Fund by a decision of the Board of Governors carried by a
majority of the Governors having eighty-five per cent of the total voting power.
(d) Regulations shall be adopted to ensure that before action is taken against any
member under (a), (b), or (c) above, the member shall be informed in reason-
able time of the complaint against it and given an adequate opportunity for stat-
ing its case, both orally and in writing.
SECTION 3. SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS WITH MEMBERS WITHDRAWING
When a member withdraws from the Fund, normal operations and transactions of
the Fund in its currency shall cease and settlement of all accounts between it and
the Fund shall be made with reasonable despatch by agreement between it and the
Fund. If agreement is not reached promptly, the provisions of Schedule J shall apply
to the settlement of accounts.
Article XXVII: Emergency Provisions
SECTION 1. TEMPORARY SUSPENSION
(a) In the event of an emergency or the development of unforeseen circumstances
threatening the activities of the Fund, the Executive Board, by an eighty-five per
cent majority of the total voting power, may suspend for a period of not more
than one year the operation of any of the following provisions:
(i) Article V, Sections 2, 3, 7, 8(a)(i) and (e);
(ii) Article VI, Section 2;
(iii) Article XI, Section 1;
(iv) Schedule C, paragraph 5.
(b) A suspension of the operation of a provision under (a) above may not be
extended beyond one year except by the Board of Governors which, by an
eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting power, may extend a suspension
for an additional period of not more than two years if it finds that the emer-
gency or unforeseen circumstances referred to in (a) above continue to exist.
(c) The Executive Board may, by a majority of the total voting power, terminate
such suspension at any time.
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(d) The Fund may adopt rules with respect to the subject matter of a provision dur-
ing the period in which its operation is suspended.
SECTION 2. LIQUIDATION OF THE FUND
(a) The Fund may not be liquidated except by decision of the Board of Governors.
In an emergency, if the Executive Board decides that liquidation of the Fund
may be necessary, it may temporarily suspend all operations and transactions,
pending decision by the Board of Governors.
(b) If the Board of Governors decides to liquidate the Fund, the Fund shall forth-
with cease to engage in any activities except those incidental to the orderly col-
lection and liquidation of its assets and the settlement of its liabilities, and all
obligations of members under this Agreement shall cease except those set out in
this Article, in Article XXIX(c), in Schedule J, paragraph 7, and in Schedule K.
(c) Liquidation shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of Sched-
ule K.
Article XXVIII: Amendments
(a) Any proposal to introduce modifications in this Agreement, whether emanating
from a member, a Governor, or the Executive Board, shall be communicated to
the chairman of the Board of Governors who shall bring the proposal before the
Board of Governors. If the proposed amendment is approved by the Board of
Governors, the Fund shall, by circular letter or telegram, ask all members
whether they accept the proposed amendment. When three-fifths of the mem-
bers, having eighty-five per cent of the total voting power, have accepted the
proposed amendment, the Fund shall certify the fact by a formal communica-
tion addressed to all members.
(b) Notwithstanding (a) above, acceptance by all members is required in the case
of any amendment modifying:
(i) the right to withdraw from the Fund (Article XXVI, Section 1);
(ii) the provision that no change in a member’s quota shall be made without
its consent (Article III, Section 2 (d)); and
(iii) the provision that no change may be made in the par value of a mem-
ber’s currency except on the proposal of that member (Schedule C,
paragraph 6).
(c) Amendments shall enter into force for all members three months after the date
of the formal communication unless a shorter period is specified in the circular
letter or telegram.
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Article XXIX: Interpretation
(a) Any question of interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement arising
between any member and the Fund or between any members of the Fund shall
be submitted to the Executive Board for its decision. If the question particularly
affects any member not entitled to appoint an Executive Director, it shall be
entitled to representation in accordance with Article XII, Section 3(j).
(b) In any case where the Executive Board has given a decision under (a) above,
any member may require, within three months from the date of the decision, that
the question be referred to the Board of Governors, whose decision shall be
final. Any question referred to the Board of Governors shall be considered by a
Committee on Interpretation of the Board of Governors. Each Committee mem-
ber shall have one vote. The Board of Governors shall establish the member-
ship, procedures, and voting majorities of the Committee. A decision of the
Committee shall be the decision of the Board of Governors unless the Board of
Governors, by an eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting power, decides
otherwise. Pending the result of the reference to the Board of Governors the
Fund may, so far as it deems necessary, act on the basis of the decision of the
Executive Board.
(c) Whenever a disagreement arises between the Fund and a member which has
withdrawn, or between the Fund and any member during liquidation of the
Fund, such disagreement shall be submitted to arbitration by a tribunal of three
arbitrators, one appointed by the Fund, another by the member or withdrawing
member, and an umpire who, unless the parties otherwise agree, shall be
appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice or such other
authority as may have been prescribed by regulation adopted by the Fund. The
umpire shall have full power to settle all questions of procedure in any case
where the parties are in disagreement with respect thereto.
Article XXX: Explanation of Terms
In interpreting the provisions of this Agreement the Fund and its members shall be
guided by the following provisions:
(a) The Fund’s holdings of a member’s currency in the General Resources Account
shall include any securities accepted by the Fund under Article III, Section 4.
(b) Stand-by arrangement means a decision of the Fund by which a member is
assured that it will be able to make purchases from the General Resources
Account in accordance with the terms of the decision during a specified period
and up to a specified amount.
(c) Reserve tranche purchase means a purchase by a member of special drawing
rights or the currency of another member in exchange for its own currency
which does not cause the Fund’s holdings of the member’s currency in the Gen-
eral Resources Account to exceed its quota, provided that for the purposes of
this definition the Fund may exclude purchases and holdings under:
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(i) policies on the use of its general resources for compensatory financing of
export fluctuations;
(ii) policies on the use of its general resources in connection with the financ-
ing of contributions to international buffer stocks of primary products; and
(iii) other policies on the use of its general resources in respect of which the
Fund decides, by an eighty-five per cent majority of the total voting power,
that an exclusion shall be made.
(d) Payments for current transactions means payments which are not for the pur-
pose of transferring capital, and includes, without limitation:
(1) all payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current business,
including services, and normal short-term banking and credit facilities;
(2) payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other invest-
ments;
(3) payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for depreciation
of direct investments; and
(4) moderate remittances for family living expenses.
The Fund may, after consultation with the members concerned, determine whether
certain specific transactions are to be considered current transactions or capital
transactions.
(e) Net cumulative allocation of special drawing rights means the total amount of
special drawing rights allocated to a participant less its share of special drawing
rights that have been cancelled under Article XVIII, Section 2(a).
(f) A freely usable currency means a member’s currency that the Fund determines
(i) is, in fact, widely used to make payments for international transactions, and
(ii) is widely traded in the principal exchange markets.
(g) Members that were members on August 31, 1975 shall be deemed to include a
member that accepted membership after that date pursuant to a resolution of the
Board of Governors adopted before that date.
(h) Transactions of the Fund means exchanges of monetary assets by the Fund for
other monetary assets. Operations of the Fund means other uses or receipts of
monetary assets by the Fund.
(i) Transactions in special drawing rights means exchanges of special drawing
rights for other monetary assets. Operations in special drawing rights means
other uses of special drawing rights.
Article XXXI: Final Provisions
SECTION 1. ENTRY INTO FORCE
This Agreement shall enter into force when it has been signed on behalf of govern-
ments having sixty-five per cent of the total of the quotas set forth in Schedule A
and when the instruments referred to in Section 2(a) of this Article have been depos-
ited on their behalf, but in no event shall this Agreement enter into force before
May 1, 1945.
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SECTION 2. SIGNATURE
(a) Each government on whose behalf this Agreement is signed shall deposit with
the Government of the United States of America an instrument setting forth that
it has accepted this Agreement in accordance with its law and has taken all steps
necessary to enable it to carry out all of its obligations under this Agreement.
(b) Each country shall become a member of the Fund as from the date of the deposit
on its behalf of the instrument referred to in (a) above, except that no country
shall become a member before this Agreement enters into force under Section
1 of this Article.
(c) The Government of the United States of America shall inform the governments
of all countries whose names are set forth in Schedule A, and the governments
of all countries whose membership is approved in accordance with Article II,
Section 2, of all signatures of this Agreement and of the deposit of all instru-
ments referred to in (a) above.
(d) At the time this Agreement is signed on its behalf, each government shall trans-
mit to the Government of the United States of America one one-hundredth of
one per cent of its total subscription in gold or United States dollars for the pur-
pose of meeting administrative expenses of the Fund. The Government of the
United States of America shall hold such funds in a special deposit account and
shall transmit them to the Board of Governors of the Fund when the initial meet-
ing has been called. If this Agreement has not come into force by December 31,
1945, the Government of the United States of America shall return such funds
to the governments that transmitted them.
(e) This Agreement shall remain open for signature at Washington on behalf of the
governments of the countries whose names are set forth in Schedule A until
December 31, 1945.
(f) After December 31, 1945, this Agreement shall be open for signature on behalf
of the government of any country whose membership has been approved in
accordance with Article II, Section 2.
(g) By their signature of this Agreement, all governments accept it both on their
own behalf and in respect of all their colonies, overseas territories, all territories
under their protection, suzerainty, or authority, and all territories in respect of
which they exercise a mandate.
(h) Subsection (d) above shall come into force with regard to each signatory gov-
ernment as from the date of its signature.
[The signature and depositary clause reproduced below followed the text of Article
XX in the original Articles of Agreement]
Done at Washington, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives
of the Government of the United States of America, which shall transmit certified
copies to all governments whose names are set forth in Schedule A and to all gov-
ernments whose membership is approved in accordance with Article II, Section 2.
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Schedules
Schedule A omitted
Schedule B: Transitional Provisions with Respect to Repurchase, Payment of
Additional Subscriptions, Gold, and Certain Operational Matters
1. Repurchase obligations that have accrued pursuant to Article V, Section 7(b)
before the date of the second amendment of this Agreement and that remain
undischarged at that date shall be discharged not later than the date or dates at
which the obligations had to be discharged in accordance with the provisions of
this Agreement before the second amendment.
2. A member shall discharge with special drawing rights any obligation to pay gold
to the Fund in repurchase or as a subscription that is outstanding at the date of
the second amendment of this Agreement, but the Fund may prescribe that these
payments may be made in whole or in part in the currencies of other members
specified by the Fund. A non-participant shall discharge an obligation that must
be paid in special drawing rights pursuant to this provision with the currencies
of other members specified by the Fund.
3. For the purposes of 2 above 0.888 671 gram of fine gold shall be equivalent to
one special drawing right, and the amount of currency payable under 2 above
shall be determined on that basis and on the basis of the value of the currency
in terms of the special drawing right at the date of discharge.
4. A member’s currency held by the Fund in excess of seventy-five per cent of the
member’s quota at the date of the second amendment of this Agreement and not
subject to repurchase under 1 above shall be repurchased in accordance with the
following rules:
(i) Holdings that resulted from a purchase shall be repurchased in accordance
with the policy on the use of the Fund’s general resources under which the
purchase was made.
(ii) Other holdings shall be repurchased not later than four years after the date
of the second amendment of this Agreement.
5. Repurchases under 1 above that are not subject to 2 above, repurchases under 4
above, and any specification of currencies under 2 above shall be in accordance
with Article V, Section 7(i).
6. All rules and regulations, rates, procedures, and decisions in effect at the date of
the second amendment of this Agreement shall remain in effect until they are
changed in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
7. To the extent that arrangements equivalent in effect to (a) and (b) below have
not been completed before the date of the second amendment of this Agree-
ment, the Fund shall
(a) sell up to 25 million ounces of fine gold held by it on August 31, 1975 to
those members that were members on that date and that agree to buy it, in
proportion to their quotas on that date. The sale to a member under this sub-
paragraph (a) shall be made in exchange for its currency and at a price
equivalent at the time of sale to one special drawing right per 0.888 671
gram of fine gold, and
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(b) sell up to 25 million ounces of fine gold held by it on August 31, 1975 for
the benefit of developing members that were members on that date, pro-
vided, however, that the part of any profits or surplus value of the gold that
corresponds to the proportion of such a member’s quota on August 31, 1975
to the total of the quotas of all members on that date shall be transferred
directly to each such member. The requirements under Article V, Section
12(c) that the Fund consult a member, obtain a member’s concurrence, or
exchange a member’s currency for the currencies of other members in cer-
tain circumstances shall apply with respect to currency received by the Fund
as a result of sales of gold under this provision, other than sales to a mem-
ber in return for its own currency, and placed in the General Resources
Account.
Upon the sale of gold under this paragraph 7, an amount of the proceeds in the cur-
rencies received equivalent at the time of sale to one special drawing right per 0.888
671 gram of fine gold shall be placed in the General Resources Account and other
assets held by the Fund under arrangements pursuant to (b) above shall be held
separately from the general resources of the Fund. Assets that remain subject to dis-
position by the Fund upon termination of arrangements pursuant to (b) above shall
be transferred to the Special Disbursement Account.
Schedule C: Par Values
1. The Fund shall notify members that par values may be established for the pur-
poses of this Agreement, in accordance with Article IV, Sections 1, 3, 4, and 5
and this Schedule, in terms of the special drawing right, or in terms of such
other common denominator as is prescribed by the Fund. The common denomi-
nator shall not be gold or a currency.
2. A member that intends to establish a par value for its currency shall propose a
par value to the Fund within a reasonable time after notice is given under 1
above.
3. Any member that does not intend to establish a par value for its currency under
1 above shall consult with the Fund and ensure that its exchange arrangements
are consistent with the purposes of the Fund and are adequate to fulfill its obli-
gations under Article IV, Section 1.
4. The Fund shall concur in or object to a proposed par value within a reasonable
period after receipt of the proposal. A proposed par value shall not take effect
for the purposes of this Agreement if the Fund objects to it, and the member
shall be subject to 3 above. The Fund shall not object because of the domestic
social or political policies of the member proposing the par value.
5. Each member that has a par value for its currency undertakes to apply appro-
priate measures consistent with this Agreement in order to ensure that the maxi-
mum and the minimum rates for spot exchange transactions taking place within
its territories between its currency and the currencies of other members main-
taining par values shall not differ from parity by more than four and one-half
per cent or by such other margin or margins as the Fund may adopt by an eighty-
five per cent majority of the total voting power.
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6. A member shall not propose a change in the par value of its currency except to
correct, or prevent the emergence of, a fundamental disequilibrium. A change
may be made only on the proposal of the member and only after consultation
with the Fund.
7. When a change is proposed, the Fund shall concur in or object to the proposed
par value within a reasonable period after receipt of the proposal. The Fund
shall concur if it is satisfied that the change is necessary to correct, or prevent
the emergence of, a fundamental disequilibrium. The Fund shall not object
because of the domestic social or political policies of the member proposing the
change. A proposed change in par value shall not take effect for the purposes of
this Agreement if the Fund objects to it. If a member changes the par value of
its currency despite the objection of the Fund, the member shall be subject to
Article XXVI, Section 2. Maintenance of an unrealistic par value by a member
shall be discouraged by the Fund.
8. The par value of a member’s currency established under this Agreement shall
cease to exist for the purposes of this Agreement if the member informs the
Fund that it intends to terminate the par value. The Fund may object to the ter-
mination of a par value by a decision taken by an eighty-five per cent majority
of the total voting power. If a member terminates a par value for its currency
despite the objection of the Fund, the member shall be subject to Article XXVI,
Section 2. A par value established under this Agreement shall cease to exist for
the purposes of this Agreement if the member terminates the par value despite
the objection of the Fund, or if the Fund finds that the member does not main-
tain rates for a substantial volume of exchange transactions in accordance with
5 above, provided that the Fund may not make such finding unless it has con-
sulted the member and given it sixty days notice of the Fund’s intention to con-
sider whether to make a finding.
9. If the par value of the currency of a member has ceased to exist under 8 above,
the member shall consult with the Fund and ensure that its exchange arrange-
ments are consistent with the purposes of the Fund and are adequate to fulfill its
obligations under Article IV, Section 1.
10. A member for whose currency the par value has ceased to exist under 8 above
may, at any time, propose a new par value for its currency.
11. Notwithstanding 6 above, the Fund, by a seventy per cent majority of the total
voting power, may make uniform proportionate changes in all par values if the
special drawing right is the common denominator and the changes will not
affect the value of the special drawing right. The par value of a member’s cur-
rency shall, however, not be changed under this provision if, within seven days
after the Fund’s action, the member informs the Fund that it does not wish the
par value of its currency to be changed by such action.
Schedule D: Council
1.
(a) Each member that appoints an Executive Director and each group of
members that has the number of votes allotted to them cast by an elected
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Executive Director shall appoint to the Council one Councillor, who shall
be a Governor, Minister in the government of a member, or person of com-
parable rank, and may appoint not more than seven Associates. The Board
of Governors may change, by an eighty-five per cent majority of the total
voting power, the number of Associates who may be appointed. A Council-
lor or Associate shall serve until a new appointment is made or until the next
regular election of Executive Directors, whichever shall occur sooner.
(b) Executive Directors, or in their absence their Alternates, and Associates
shall be entitled to attend meetings of the Council, unless the Council
decides to hold a restricted session. Each member and each group of mem-
bers that appoints a Councillor shall appoint an Alternate who shall be
entitled to attend a meeting of the Council when the Councillor is not
present, and shall have full power to act for the Councillor.
2.
(a) The Council shall supervise the management and adaptation of the interna-
tional monetary system, including the continuing operation of the adjust-
ment process and developments in global liquidity, and in this connection
shall review developments in the transfer of real resources to developing
countries.
(b) The Council shall consider proposals pursuant to Article XXVIII(a) to
amend the Articles of Agreement.
3.
(a) The Board of Governors may delegate to the Council authority to exercise
any powers of the Board of Governors except the powers conferred directly
by this Agreement on the Board of Governors.
(b) Each Councillor shall be entitled to cast the number of votes allotted under
Article XII, Section 5 to the member or group of members appointing him.
A Councillor appointed by a group of members may cast separately the
votes allotted to each member in the group. If the number of votes allotted
to a member cannot be cast by an Executive Director, the member may
make arrangements with a Councillor for casting the number of votes allot-
ted to the member.
(c) The Council shall not take any action pursuant to powers delegated by the
Board of Governors that is inconsistent with any action taken by the Board
of Governors and the Executive Board shall not take any action pursuant to
powers delegated by the Board of Governors that is inconsistent with any
action taken by either the Board of Governors or the Council.
4. The Council shall select a Councillor as chairman, shall adopt regulations as
may be necessary or appropriate to perform its functions, and shall determine
any aspect of its procedure. The Council shall hold such meetings as may be
provided for by the Council or called by the Executive Board.
5.
(a) The Council shall have powers corresponding to those of the Executive
Board under the following provisions: Article XII, Section 2(c), (f), (g), and
(j); Article XVIII, Section 4(a) and Section 4(c)(iv); Article XXIII, Section
1; and Article XXVII, Section l(a).
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(b) For decisions by the Council on matters pertaining exclusively to the Spe-
cial Drawing Rights Department only Councillors appointed by a member
that is a participant or a group of members at least one member of which is
a participant shall be entitled to vote. Each of these Councillors shall be
entitled to cast the number of votes allotted to the member which is a par-
ticipant that appointed him or to the members that are participants in the
group of members that appointed him, and may cast the votes allotted to a
participant with which arrangements have been made pursuant to the last
sentence of 3(b) above.
(c) The Council may by regulation establish a procedure whereby the Execu-
tive Board may obtain a vote of the Councillors on a specific question with-
out a meeting of the Council when in the judgment of the Executive Board
an action must be taken by the Council which should not be postponed until
the next meeting of the Council and which does not warrant the calling of
a special meeting.
(d) Article IX, Section 8 shall apply to Councillors, their Alternates, and Asso-
ciates, and to any other person entitled to attend a meeting of the Council.
(e) For the purposes of (b) and 3(b) above, an agreement under Article XII, Sec-
tion 3(i)(ii) by a member, or by a member that is a participant, shall entitle
a Councillor to vote and cast the number of votes allotted to the member.
(f) When an Executive Director is entitled to cast the number of votes allotted
to a member pursuant to Article XII, Section 3(i)(v), the Councillor
appointed by the group whose members elected such Executive Director
shall be entitled to vote and cast the number of votes allotted to such mem-
ber. The member shall be deemed to have participated in the appointment
of the Councillor entitled to vote and cast the number of votes allotted to
the member.
6. The first sentence of Article XII, Section 2(a) shall be deemed to include a ref-
erence to the Council.
Schedule E: Election of Executive Directors
1. The election of the elective Executive Directors shall be by ballot of the Gov-
ernors eligible to vote.
2. In balloting for the Executive Directors to be elected, each of the Governors eli-
gible to vote shall cast for one person all of the votes to which he is entitled
under Article XII, Section 5(a). The fifteen persons receiving the greatest num-
ber of votes shall be Executive Directors, provided that no person who received
less than four per cent of the total number of votes that can be cast (eligible
votes) shall be considered elected.
3. When fifteen persons are not elected in the first ballot, a second ballot shall be
held in which there shall vote only (a) those Governors who voted in the first
ballot for a person not elected, and (b) those Governors whose votes for a per-
son elected are deemed under 4 below to have raised the votes cast for that per-
son above nine per cent of the eligible votes. If in the second ballot there are
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more candidates than the number of Executive Directors to be elected, the per-
son who received the lowest number of votes in the first ballot shall be ineli-
gible for election.
4. In determining whether the votes cast by a Governor are to be deemed to have
raised the total of any person above nine per cent of the eligible votes the nine
per cent shall be deemed to include, first, the votes of the Governor casting the
largest number of votes for such person, then the votes of the Governor casting
the next largest number, and so on until nine per cent is reached.
5. Any Governor part of whose votes must be counted in order to raise the total of
any person above four per cent shall be considered as casting all of his votes for
such person even if the total votes for such person thereby exceed nine per cent.
6. If, after the second ballot, fifteen persons have not been elected, further ballots
shall be held on the same principles until fifteen persons have been elected, pro-
vided that after fourteen persons are elected, the fifteenth may be elected by a
simple majority of the remaining votes and shall be deemed to have been
elected by all such votes.
Schedule F: Designation
During the first basic period the rules for designation shall be as follows:
(a) Participants subject to designation under Article XIX, Section 5(a)(i) shall be
designated for such amounts as will promote over time equality in the ratios of
the participants’ holdings of special drawing rights in excess of their net cumu-
lative allocations to their official holdings of gold and foreign exchange.
(b) The formula to give effect to (a) above shall be such that participants subject to
designation shall be designated:
(i) in proportion to their official holdings of gold and foreign exchange when
the ratios described in (a) above are equal; and
(ii) in such manner as gradually to reduce the difference between the ratios
described in (a) above that are low and the ratios that are high.
Schedule G: Reconstitution
1. During the first basic period the rules for reconstitution shall be as follows:
(a)
(i) A participant shall so use and reconstitute its holdings of special draw-
ing rights that, five years after the first allocation and at the end of each
calendar quarter thereafter, the average of its total daily holdings of spe-
cial drawing rights over the most recent five-year period will be not less
than thirty per cent of the average of its daily net cumulative allocation
of special drawing rights over the same period.
(ii) Two years after the first allocation and at the end of each calendar
month thereafter the Fund shall make calculations for each participant
so as to ascertain whether and to what extent the participant would need
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to acquire special drawing rights between the date of the calculation and
the end of any five-year period in order to comply with the requirement
in (a)(i) above. The Fund shall adopt regulations with respect to the
bases on which these calculations shall be made and with respect to the
timing of the designation of participants under Article XIX, Section
5(a)(ii), in order to assist them to comply with the requirement in (a)(i)
above.
(iii)The Fund shall give special notice to a participant when the calcula-
tions under (a)(ii) above indicate that it is unlikely that the participant
will be able to comply with the requirement in (a)(i) above unless it
ceases to use special drawing rights for the rest of the period for which
the calculation was made under (a)(ii) above.
(iv) A participant that needs to acquire special drawing rights to fulfill this
obligation shall be obligated and entitled to obtain them, for currency
acceptable to the Fund, in a transaction with the Fund conducted
through the General Resources Account. If sufficient special drawing
rights to fulfill this obligation cannot be obtained in this way, the par-
ticipant shall be obligated and entitled to obtain them with a freely
usable currency from a participant which the Fund shall specify.
(b) Participants shall also pay due regard to the desirability of pursuing over
time a balanced relationship between their holdings of special drawing
rights and their other reserves.
2. If a participant fails to comply with the rules for reconstitution, the Fund shall
determine whether or not the circumstances justify suspension under Article
XXIII, Section 2(b).
Schedule H: Termination of Participation
1. If the obligation remaining after the setoff under Article XXIV, Section 2(b) is
to the terminating participant and agreement on settlement between the Fund
and the terminating participant is not reached within six months of the date of
termination, the Fund shall redeem this balance of special drawing rights in
equal half-yearly installments within a maximum of five years of the date of ter-
mination. The Fund shall redeem this balance as it may determine, either (a) by
the payment to the terminating participant of the amounts provided by the
remaining participants to the Fund in accordance with Article XXIV, Section 5,
or (b) by permitting the terminating participant to use its special drawing rights
to obtain its own currency or a freely usable currency from a participant speci-
fied by the Fund, the General Resources Account, or any other holder.
2. If the obligation remaining after the setoff under Article XXIV, Section 2(b) is
to the Fund and agreement on settlement is not reached within six months of
the date of termination, the terminating participant shall discharge this obliga-
tion in equal half-yearly installments within three years of the date of termina-
tion or within such longer period as may be fixed by the Fund. The terminating
participant shall discharge this obligation, as the Fund may determine, either (a)
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by the payment to the Fund of a freely usable currency, or (b) by obtaining spe-
cial drawing rights, in accordance with Article XXIV, Section 6, from the Gen-
eral Resources Account or in agreement with a participant specified by the Fund
or from any other holder, and the setoff of these special drawing rights against
the installment due.
3. Installments under either 1 or 2 above shall fall due six months after the date of
termination and at intervals of six months thereafter.
4. In the event of the Special Drawing Rights Department going into liquidation
under Article XXV within six months of the date a participant terminates its par-
ticipation, the settlement between the Fund and that government shall be made
in accordance with Article XXV and Schedule I.
Schedule I: Administration of Liquidation of the Special Drawing Rights
Department
1. In the event of liquidation of the Special Drawing Rights Department, partici-
pants shall discharge their obligations to the Fund in ten half-yearly install-
ments, or in such longer period as the Fund may decide is needed, in a freely
usable currency and the currencies of participants holding special drawing rights
to be redeemed in any installment to the extent of such redemption, as deter-
mined by the Fund. The first half-yearly payment shall be made six months after
the decision to liquidate the Special Drawing Rights Department.
2. If it is decided to liquidate the Fund within six months of the date of the deci-
sion to liquidate the Special Drawing Rights Department, the liquidation of the
Special Drawing Rights Department shall not proceed until special drawing
rights held in the General Resources Account have been distributed in accor-
dance with the following rule:
After the distributions made under 2(a) and (b) of Schedule K, the Fund shall
apportion its special drawing rights held in the General Resources Account
among all members that are participants in proportion to the amounts due to
each participant after the distribution under 2(b). To determine the amount due
to each member for the purpose of apportioning the remainder of its holdings of
each currency under 2(d) of Schedule K, the Fund shall deduct the distribution
of special drawing rights made under this rule.
3. With the amounts received under 1 above, the Fund shall redeem special draw-
ing rights held by holders in the following manner and order:
(a) Special drawing rights held by governments that have terminated their par-
ticipation more than six months before the date the Board of Governors
decides to liquidate the Special Drawing Rights Department shall be
redeemed in accordance with the terms of any agreement under Article
XXIV or Schedule H.
(b) Special drawing rights held by holders that are not participants shall be
redeemed before those held by participants, and shall be redeemed in pro-
portion to the amount held by each holder.
(c) The Fund shall determine the proportion of special drawing rights held by
each participant in relation to its net cumulative allocation. The Fund shall
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first redeem special drawing rights from the participants with the highest
proportion until this proportion is reduced to that of the second highest pro-
portion; the Fund shall then redeem the special drawing rights held by these
participants in accordance with their net cumulative allocations until the
proportions are reduced to that of the third highest proportion; and this pro-
cess shall be continued until the amount available for redemption is
exhausted.
4. Any amount that a participant will be entitled to receive in redemption under 3
above shall be set off against any amount to be paid under 1 above.
5. During liquidation the Fund shall pay interest on the amount of special drawing
rights held by holders, and each participant shall pay charges on the net cumu-
lative allocation of special drawing rights to it less the amount of any payments
made in accordance with 1 above. The rates of interest and charges and the time
of payment shall be determined by the Fund. Payments of interest and charges
shall be made in special drawing rights to the extent possible. A participant that
does not hold sufficient special drawing rights to meet any charges shall make
the payment with a currency specified by the Fund. Special drawing rights
received as charges in amounts needed for administrative expenses shall not be
used for the payment of interest, but shall be transferred to the Fund and shall
be redeemed first and with the currencies used by the Fund to meet its
expenses.
6. While a participant is in default with respect to any payment required by 1 or 5
above, no amounts shall be paid to it in accordance with 3 or 5 above.
7. If after the final payments have been made to participants each participant not
in default does not hold special drawing rights in the same proportion to its net
cumulative allocation, those participants holding a lower proportion shall pur-
chase from those holding a higher proportion such amounts in accordance with
arrangements made by the Fund as will make the proportion of their holdings
of special drawing rights the same. Each participant in default shall pay to the
Fund its own currency in an amount equal to its default. The Fund shall appor-
tion this currency and residual claims among participants in proportion to the
amount of special drawing rights held by each and these special drawing rights
shall be cancelled. The Fund shall then close the books of the Special Drawing
Rights Department and all of the Fund’s liabilities arising from the allocations
of special drawing rights and the administration of the Special Drawing Rights
Department shall cease.
8. Each participant whose currency is distributed to other participants under this
Schedule guarantees the unrestricted use of such currency at all times for the
purchase of goods or for payments of sums due to it or to persons in its terri-
tories. Each participant so obligated agrees to compensate other participants for
any loss resulting from the difference between the value at which the Fund dis-
tributed its currency under this Schedule and the value realized by such partici-
pants on disposal of its currency.
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Schedule J: Settlement of Accounts with Members Withdrawing
1. The settlement of accounts with respect to the General Resources Account
shall be made according to 1 to 6 of this Schedule. The Fund shall be obli-
gated to pay to a member withdrawing an amount equal to its quota, plus any
other amounts due to it from the Fund, less any amounts due to the Fund,
including charges accruing after the date of its withdrawal; but no payment
shall be made until six months after the date of withdrawal. Payments shall
be made in the currency of the withdrawing member, and for this purpose the
Fund may transfer to the General Resources Account holdings of the mem-
ber’s currency in the Special Disbursement Account or in the Investment
Account in exchange for an equivalent amount of the currencies of other
members in the General Resources Account selected by the Fund with their
concurrence.
2. If the Fund’s holdings of the currency of the withdrawing member are not suf-
ficient to pay the net amount due from the Fund, the balance shall be paid in
a freely usable currency, or in such other manner as may be agreed. If the
Fund and the withdrawing member do not reach agreement within six months
of the date of withdrawal, the currency in question held by the Fund shall be
paid forthwith to the withdrawing member. Any balance due shall be paid in
ten half-yearly installments during the ensuing five years. Each such install-
ment shall be paid, at the option of the Fund, either in the currency of the
withdrawing member acquired after its withdrawal or in a freely usable cur-
rency.
3. If the Fund fails to meet any installment which is due in accordance with the
preceding paragraphs, the withdrawing member shall be entitled to require the
Fund to pay the installment in any currency held by the Fund with the
exception of any currency which has been declared scarce under Article VII,
Section 3.
4. If the Fund’s holdings of the currency of a withdrawing member exceed the
amount due to it, and if agreement on the method of settling accounts is not
reached within six months of the date of withdrawal, the former member shall
be obligated to redeem such excess currency in a freely usable currency.
Redemption shall be made at the rates at which the Fund would sell such cur-
rencies at the time of withdrawal from the Fund. The withdrawing member
shall complete redemption within five years of the date of withdrawal, or
within such longer period as may be fixed by the Fund, but shall not be
required to redeem in any half-yearly period more than one-tenth of the
Fund’s excess holdings of its currency at the date of withdrawal plus further
acquisitions of the currency during such half-yearly period. If the withdraw-
ing member does not fulfill this obligation, the Fund may in an orderly man-
ner liquidate in any market the amount of currency which should have been
redeemed.
5. Any member desiring to obtain the currency of a member which has with-
drawn shall acquire it by purchase from the Fund, to the extent that such
member has access to the general resources of the Fund and that such cur-
rency is available under 4 above.
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6. The withdrawing member guarantees the unrestricted use at all times of the
currency disposed of under 4 and 5 above for the purchase of goods or for
payment of sums due to it or to persons within its territories. It shall compen-
sate the Fund for any loss resulting from the difference between the value of
its currency in terms of the special drawing right on the date of withdrawal
and the value realized in terms of the special drawing right by the Fund on
disposal under 4 and 5 above.
7. If the withdrawing member is indebted to the Fund as the result of transac-
tions conducted through the Special Disbursement Account under Article V,
Section 12(f)(ii), the indebtedness shall be discharged in accordance with the
terms of the indebtedness.
8. If the Fund holds the withdrawing member’s currency in the Special Dis-
bursement Account or in the Investment Account, the Fund may in an orderly
manner exchange in any market for the currencies of members the amount of
the currency of the withdrawing member remaining in each account after use
under 1 above, and the proceeds of the exchange of the amount in each
account shall be kept in that account. Paragraph 5 above and the first sen-
tence of 6 above shall apply to the withdrawing member’s currency.
9. If the Fund holds obligations of the withdrawing member in the Special Dis-
bursement Account pursuant to Article V, Section 12(h), or in the Investment
Account, the Fund may hold them until the date of maturity or dispose of
them sooner. Paragraph 8 above shall apply to the proceeds of such disinvest-
ment.
10. In the event of the Fund going into liquidation under Article XXVII, Section
2 within six months of the date on which the member withdraws, the accounts
between the Fund and that government shall be settled in accordance with
Article XXVII, Section 2 and Schedule K.
Schedule K: Administration of Liquidation
1. In the event of liquidation the liabilities of the Fund other than the repayment
of subscriptions shall have priority in the distribution of the assets of the
Fund. In meeting each such liability the Fund shall use its assets in the fol-
lowing order:
(a) the currency in which the liability is payable;
(b) gold;
(c) all other currencies in proportion, so far as may be practicable, to the quo-
tas of the members.
2. After the discharge of the Fund’s liabilities in accordance with 1 above, the
balance of the Fund’s assets shall be distributed and apportioned as follows:
(a)
(i) The Fund shall calculate the value of gold held on August 31, 1975
that it continues to hold on the date of the decision to liquidate. The
calculation shall be made in accordance with 9 below and also on the
basis of one special drawing right per 0.888 671 gram of fine gold on
the date of liquidation. Gold equivalent to the excess of the former
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value over the latter shall be distributed to those members that were
members on August 31, 1975 in proportion to their quotas on that
date.
(ii) The Fund shall distribute any assets held in the Special Disbursement
Account on the date of the decision to liquidate to those members that
were members on August 31, 1975 in proportion to their quotas on
that date. Each type of asset shall be distributed proportionately to
members.
(b) The Fund shall distribute its remaining holdings of gold among the mem-
bers whose currencies are held by the Fund in amounts less than their
quotas in the proportions, but not in excess of, the amounts by which their
quotas exceed the Fund’s holdings of their currencies.
(c) The Fund shall distribute to each member one-half the Fund’s holdings
of its currency but such distribution shall not exceed fifty per cent of its
quota.
(d) The Fund shall apportion the remainder of its holdings of gold and each
currency
(i) among all members in proportion to, but not in excess of, the amounts
due to each member after the distributions under (b) and (c) above,
provided that distribution under 2(a) above shall not be taken into
account for determining the amounts due, and
(ii) any excess holdings of gold and currency among all the members in
proportion to their quotas.
3. Each member shall redeem the holdings of its currency apportioned to other
members under 2(d) above, and shall agree with the Fund within three months
after a decision to liquidate upon an orderly procedure for such redemption.
4. If a member has not reached agreement with the Fund within the three-month
period referred to in 3 above, the Fund shall use the currencies of other mem-
bers apportioned to that member under 2(d) above to redeem the currency of
that member apportioned to other members. Each currency apportioned to a
member which has not reached agreement shall be used, so far as possible, to
redeem its currency apportioned to the members which have made agreements
with the Fund under 3 above.
5. If a member has reached agreement with the Fund in accordance with 3 above,
the Fund shall use the currencies of other members apportioned to that member
under 2(d) above to redeem the currency of that member apportioned to other
members which have made agreements with the Fund under 3 above. Each
amount so redeemed shall be redeemed in the currency of the member to which
it was apportioned.
6. After carrying out the steps in the preceding paragraphs, the Fund shall pay to
each member the remaining currencies held for its account.
7. Each member whose currency has been distributed to other members under 6
above shall redeem such currency in the currency of the member requesting
redemption, or in such other manner as may be agreed between them. If the
members involved do not otherwise agree, the member obligated to redeem
shall complete redemption within five years of the date of distribution, but shall
not be required to redeem in any half-yearly period more than one-tenth of the
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amount distributed to each other member. If the member does not fulfill this
obligation, the amount of currency which should have been redeemed may be
liquidated in an orderly manner in any market.
8. Each member whose currency has been distributed to other members under 6
above guarantees the unrestricted use of such currency at all times for the pur-
chase of goods or for payment of sums due to it or to persons in its territories.
Each member so obligated agrees to compensate other members for any loss
resulting from the difference between the value of its currency in terms of the
special drawing right on the date of the decision to liquidate the Fund and the
value in terms of the special drawing right realized by such members on dis-
posal of its currency.
9. The Fund shall determine the value of gold under this Schedule on the basis of
prices in the market.
10. For the purposes of this Schedule, quotas shall be deemed to have been
increased to the full extent to which they could have been increased in accor-
dance with Article III, Section 2(b) of this Agreement.
Schedule L: Suspension of Voting Rights
In the case of a suspension of voting rights of a member under Article XXVI, Sec-
tion 2(b), the following provisions shall apply:
1. The member shall not:
(a) participate in the adoption of a proposed amendment of this Agreement, or
be counted in the total number of members for that purpose, except in the
case of an amendment requiring acceptance by all members under Article
XXVIII(b) or pertaining exclusively to the Special Drawing Rights Depart-
ment;
(b) appoint a Governor or Alternate Governor, appoint or participate in the
appointment of a Councillor or Alternate Councillor, or appoint, elect, or
participate in the election of an Executive Director.
2. The number of votes allotted to the member shall not be cast in any organ of
the Fund. They shall not be included in the calculation of the total voting power,
except for purposes of: (a) the acceptance of a proposed amendment pertaining
exclusively to the Special Drawing Rights Department and (b) the calculation
of basic votes pursuant to Article XII, Section 5(a)(i).
3.
(a) The Governor and Alternate Governor appointed by the member shall cease
to hold office.
(b) The Councillor and Alternate Councillor appointed by the member, or in
whose appointment the member has participated, shall cease to hold office,
provided that, if such Councillor was entitled to cast the number of votes
allotted to other members whose voting rights have not been suspended,
another Councillor and Alternate Councillor shall be appointed by such
other members under Schedule D, and, pending such appointment, the
Councillor and Alternate Councillor shall continue to hold office, but for a
maximum of thirty days from the date of suspension.
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(c) The Executive Director appointed or elected by the member, or in whose
election the member has participated, shall cease to hold office, unless such
Executive Director was entitled to cast the number of votes allotted to other
members whose voting rights have not been suspended. In the latter case:
(i) if more than ninety days remain before the next regular election of
Executive Directors, another Executive Director shall be elected for the
remainder of the term by such other members by a majority of the votes
cast; pending such election, the Executive Director shall continue to
hold office, but for a maximum of thirty days from the date of suspen-
sion;
(ii) if not more than ninety days remain before the next regular election of
Executive Directors, the Executive Director shall continue to hold office
for the remainder of the term.
4. The member shall be entitled to send a representative to attend any meeting of
the Board of Governors, the Council, or the Executive Board, but not any meet-
ing of their committees, when a request made by, or a matter particularly affect-
ing, the member is under consideration.
Schedule M: Special One-Time Allocation of Special Drawing Rights
1. Subject to 4 below, each member that, as of September 19, 1997, is a partici-
pant in the Special Drawing Rights Department shall, on the 30th day following
the effective date of the fourth amendment of this Agreement, receive an allo-
cation of special drawing rights in an amount that will result in its net cumu-
lative allocation of special drawing rights being equal to 29.315788813 per cent
of its quota as of September 19, 1997, provided that, for participants whose quo-
tas have not been adjusted as proposed in Resolution No. 45-2 of the Board of
Governors, calculations shall be made on the basis of the quotas proposed in
that resolution.
2.
(a) Subject to 4 below, each country that becomes a participant in the Special
Drawing Rights Department after September 19, 1997 but within three
months of the date of its membership in the Fund shall receive an allocation
of special drawing rights in an amount calculated in accordance with (b) and
(c) below on the 30th day following the later of: (i) the date on which the
new member becomes a participant in the Special Drawing Rights Depart-
ment, or (ii) the effective date of the fourth amendment of this Agreement.
(b) For the purposes of (a) above, each participant shall receive an amount of
special drawing rights that will result in such participant’s net cumulative
allocation being equal to 29.315788813 per cent of its quota as of the date
on which the member becomes a participant in the Special Drawing Rights
Department, as adjusted:
(i) first, by multiplying 29.315788813 per cent by the ratio of the total of
quotas, as calculated under 1 above, of the participants described in (c)
below to the total of quotas of such participants as of the date on which
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the member became a participant in the Special Drawing Rights Depart-
ment, and
(ii) second, by multiplying the product of (i) above by the ratio of the total
of the sum of the net cumulative allocations of special drawing rights
received under Article XVIII of the participants described in (c) below
as of the date on which the member became a participant in the Special
Drawing Rights Department and the allocations received by such par-
ticipants under 1 above to the total of the sum of the net cumulative allo-
cations of special drawing rights received under Article XVIII of such
participants as of September 19, 1997 and the allocations received by
such participants under 1 above.
(c) For the purposes of the adjustments to be made under (b) above, the par-
ticipants in the Special Drawing Rights Department shall be members that
are participants as of September 19, 1997 and (i) continue to be participants
in the Special Drawing Rights Department as of the date on which the mem-
ber became a participant in the Special Drawing Rights Department, and (ii)
have received all allocations made by the Fund after September 19, 1997.
3.
(a) Subject to 4 below, if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/
Montenegro) succeeds to the membership in the Fund and the participation
in the Special Drawing Rights Department of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in accordance with the terms and conditions of
Executive Board Decision No. 10237-(92/150), adopted December 14,
1992, it shall receive an allocation of special drawing rights in an amount
calculated in accordance with (b) below on the 30th day following the later
of: (i) the date on which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/
Montenegro) succeeds to membership in the Fund and participation in the
Special Drawing Rights Department in accordance with the terms and con-
ditions of Executive Board Decision No. 10237-(92/150), or (ii) the effec-
tive date of the fourth amendment of this Agreement.
(b) For the purposes of (a) above, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/
Montenegro) shall receive an amount of special drawing rights that will
result in its net cumulative allocation being equal to 29.315788813 per cent
of the quota proposed to it under paragraph 3(c) of Executive Board Deci-
sion No. 10237-(92/150), as adjusted in accordance with 2(b)(ii) and (c)
above as of the date on which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/
Montenegro) qualifies for an allocation under (a) above.
4. The Fund shall not allocate special drawing rights under this Schedule to those
participants that have notified the Fund in writing prior to the date of the allo-
cation of their desire not to receive the allocation.
5.
(a) If, at the time an allocation is made to a participant under 1, 2, or 3 above,
the participant has overdue obligations to the Fund, the special drawing
rights so allocated shall be deposited and held in an escrow account within
the Special Drawing Rights Department and shall be released to the partici-
pant upon discharge of all its overdue obligations to the Fund.
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(b) Special drawing rights being held in an escrow account shall not be avail-
able for any use and shall not be included in any calculations of allocations
or holdings of special drawing rights for the purposes of the Articles, except
for calculations under this Schedule. If special drawing rights allocated to a
participant are held in an escrow account when the participant terminates its
participation in the Special Drawing Rights Department or when it is
decided to liquidate the Special Drawing Rights Department, such special
drawing rights shall be canceled.
(c) For purposes of this paragraph, overdue obligations to the Fund consist of
overdue repurchases and charges in the General Resources Account, over-
due principal and interest on loans in the Special Disbursement Account,
overdue charges and assessments in the Special Drawing Rights Depart-
ment, and overdue liabilities to the Fund as trustee.
(d) Except for the provisions of this paragraph, the principle of separation
between the General Department and the Special Drawing Rights Depart-
ment and the unconditional character of special drawing rights as reserve
assets shall be maintained.
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Appendix 2. Bilateral and Multilateral
Surveillance Executive Board
Decision – July 18, 2012
Preamble
Since the adoption in 2007 of the Decision entitled “Bilateral Surveillance over
Members’ Policies” (the “2007 Decision”), there have been significant develop-
ments in the global economy that have highlighted the extent of trade and financial
interconnections and integration and the potential benefits and risks of spillovers
across national borders. In light of these developments and in recognition of the
increasingly important international dimensions of surveillance and of cross-
country spillovers, the Fund is of the view that better integrating bilateral and mul-
tilateral surveillance, including through the adoption of an integrated surveillance
decision covering both responsibilities, would play an important role in providing
guidance to both the Fund and its members regarding their mutual responsibilities
under Article IV. The Fund emphasizes that the guidance being provided to mem-
bers in this Decision relates to the performance of their existing obligations under
Article IV; no new obligations are created for members by this Decision. Moreover,
the Fund recognizes that members have legitimate policy objectives, including
domestic social and political policy objectives, that are beyond the scope of Article
IV and, accordingly, beyond the scope of this Decision, although when adopting
policies to achieve these objectives, members need to ensure that such policies are
consistent with their obligations under Article IV. They are also encouraged to be
mindful of the impact of such policies on the international monetary system.
This Decision does not, and cannot be construed or used to, expand or broaden the
scope—or change the nature—of members’ obligations under the Articles of Agree-
ment, directly or indirectly, including the obligations set out in Articles IV, VI and
VIII. Part I of this Decision is designed to give guidance to the Fund in its conduct
of bilateral and multilateral surveillance. The principles for the guidance of mem-
bers set forth in Part II of this Decision regarding their exchange rate and domestic
economic and financial policies respect the domestic social and political policies of
members and will be applied in a manner that pays due regard to the circumstances
of members, and the need for evenhandedness in the practice of surveillance. More-
over, the Principle for the guidance of members’ domestic economic and financial
policies recognizes that the obligations of members governing such policies under
Article IV Section 1 are of a best efforts nature. Finally, looking forward, flexibility
will be maintained to allow for the continued evolution of surveillance.
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1. This Decision provides guidance to the Fund in:
(a) its general oversight over members’ exchange rate and domestic policies pur-
suant to Article IV, Sections 3 (a) and its firm surveillance over the exchange
rate policies of members pursuant to Article IV, Sections 3 (b), (hereinafter
referred to as “bilateral surveillance”); and;
(b) the exercise of its responsibility to oversee the international monetary system in
order to ensure its effective operation pursuant to Article IV, Section 3 (a) (here-
inafter referred to as “multilateral” surveillance).
This Decision also provides guidance to members in the conduct of their domestic
economic and financial policies and their exchange rate policies.
2. Part I of this Decision sets out the scope and modalities of bilateral and multi-
lateral surveillance. Part II establishes principles for the guidance of members in the
conduct of their exchange rate policies and their domestic economic and financial
policies for the purposes of ensuring compliance with their obligations under Article
IV, Section 1; it also identifies certain developments which, in the Fund’s assess-
ment of a member’s observance of the principles, would require thorough review
and might indicate the need for discussion with the member. Beyond members’ obli-
gations under Article IV, Section 1, Part II also encourages members to consider the
effects of their policies on the effective operation of the international monetary sys-
tem. Part III sets out procedures for surveillance. Part IV makes provision for a
review of this decision.
3. Fund surveillance over members’ policies and over the international monetary
system shall be adapted to the needs of the international monetary and financial sys-
tem as they develop. The principles and procedures set out in this Decision, which
apply to all members irrespective of their exchange arrangements and balance of
payments positions, are not necessarily comprehensive and are subject to reconsid-
eration by the Fund in the light of experience.
PART I - PRINCIPLES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF THE FUND IN ITS
SURVEILLANCE
A. The Scope of Surveillance
4. Article IV, Section 3 requires the Fund to conduct both bilateral and multilateral
surveillance. While these responsibilities are legally distinct, it is recognized that
bilateral and multilateral surveillance are mutually supportive and reinforcing and,
accordingly, need to be operationally integrated.
(i) Bilateral Surveillance
5. The scope of bilateral surveillance is determined by members’ obligations under
Article IV, Section 1. Members undertake under Article IV, Section 1 to collaborate
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with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to
promote a stable system of exchange rates (hereinafter “systemic stability”). Sys-
temic stability is most effectively achieved by each member adopting policies that
promote its own balance of payments stability and domestic stability—that is, poli-
cies that are consistent with members’ obligations under Article IV, Section 1 and,
in particular, the specific obligations set forth in Article IV, Section 1, (i) through
(iv). “Balance of payments stability” refers to a balance of payments position that
does not, and is not likely to, give rise to disruptive exchange rate movements.
Except as provided in paragraph 8 below, balance of payments stability is assessed
at the level of each member.
6. In its bilateral surveillance, the Fund will focus on those policies of members that
can significantly influence present or prospective balance of payments and domestic
stability. The Fund will assess whether exchange rate policies are promoting bal-
ance of payments stability and whether domestic economic and financial policies
are promoting domestic stability and advise the member on policy adjustments nec-
essary for these purposes. Accordingly, exchange rate policies will always be the
subject of the Fund’s bilateral surveillance with respect to each member, as will
monetary, fiscal, and financial sector policies (both their macroeconomic aspects
and macroeconomically relevant structural aspects). Other policies will be exam-
ined in the context of surveillance only to the extent that they significantly influ-
ence present or prospective balance of payments or domestic stability.
7. In the conduct of their domestic economic and financial policies, members are
considered by the Fund to be promoting balance of payments stability when they
are promoting domestic stability—that is, when they (i) endeavor to direct their
domestic economic and financial policies toward the objective of fostering orderly
economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due regard to their circum-
stances, and (ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic
and financial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic
disruptions. It is recognized that there may be circumstances where a member’s
domestic instability may give rise to systemic instability even in the absence of bal-
ance of payments instability. The Fund in its surveillance will assess whether a
member’s domestic policies are directed toward the promotion of domestic stabil-
ity. While the Fund will always examine whether a member’s domestic policies are
directed toward keeping the member’s economy operating broadly at capacity, the
Fund will examine whether domestic policies are directed toward fostering a high
rate of potential growth only in those cases where such high potential growth sig-
nificantly influences prospects for domestic, and thereby balance of payments, sta-
bility. However, the Fund will not require a member that is complying with Article
IV, Sections 1(i) and (ii) to change its domestic policies in the interests of balance
of payments stability.
8. This Decision applies to members of currency unions, subject to the following
considerations. Members of currency unions remain subject to all of their obliga-
tions under Article IV, Section 1 and, accordingly, each member is accountable for
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those policies that are conducted by union-level institutions on its behalf. In its sur-
veillance over the policies of members of a currency union, the Fund will assess
whether relevant policies implemented at the level of the currency union (including
exchange rate and monetary policies) and at the level of members are promoting the
balance of payments and domestic stability of the union and will advise on policy
adjustments necessary for this purpose. In particular, the Fund will assess whether
the exchange rate policies of the union are promoting its balance of payments sta-
bility, and whether domestic policies implemented at the level of the union are pro-
moting the domestic, and thereby balance of payments, stability of the union.
Because, in a currency union, exchange rate policies are implemented at the level
of the union, the principles for the guidance of members’ exchange rate policies and
the associated indicators set out in paragraphs 21 and 22 of this Decision only apply
at the level of the currency union. With respect to the conduct of domestic policies
implemented at the level of individual members, the Fund will assess whether a
member of a currency union is promoting its own domestic stability and will con-
sider the member to be promoting the balance of payments and domestic stability
of the union when it is promoting its own domestic stability. In view of the impor-
tance of individual members’ balances of payments for the domestic stability of the
member and the balance of payments and domestic stability of the union, the Fund’s
assessment of the policies of a member of a currency union will always include an
evaluation of developments in the member’s own balance of payments.
(ii) Multilateral Surveillance
9. The scope of multilateral surveillance is determined by the obligation of the Fund
under Article IV Section 3 (a) to oversee the international monetary system in order
to ensure its effective operation. In the context of multilateral surveillance, the Fund
may not and will not require a member to change its policies in the interests of the
effective operation of the international monetary system. It may, however, discuss
the impact of members’ policies on the effective operation of the international mon-
etary system and may suggest alternative policies that, while promoting the mem-
ber’s own stability, better promote the effective operation of the international
monetary system.
10. The international monetary system includes, in particular: (a) the rules govern-
ing exchange arrangements between countries and the rates at which foreign
exchange is purchased and sold; (b) the rules governing the making of payments and
transfers for current international transactions between countries; (c) the arrange-
ments respecting the regulation of international capital movements; and (d) the
arrangements under which international reserves are held, including official arrange-
ments through which countries have access to liquidity through purchases from the
Fund or under official currency swap arrangements.
11. The international monetary system is considered to be operating effectively
when the areas it governs do not exhibit symptoms of malfunction such as, for
example, persistent significant current account imbalances, an unstable system of
exchange rates including foreign exchange rate misalignment, volatile capital flows,
Appendix 2. Integrated Surveillance Decision 2012
IMF – 169Intergovernmental Organizations – Suppl. 47 (2013)
the excessive build up or depletion of reserves, or imbalances arising from exces-
sive or insufficient global liquidity. It is recognized that, typically, the international
monetary system may only operate effectively in an environment of global eco-
nomic and financial stability, and that its effective operation contributes to such sta-
bility. Both global economic and financial stability and the effective operation of the
international monetary system may be affected by, among other factors, members’
own balance of payments and domestic stability, economic and financial intercon-
nections among members’ economies and potential spillovers from members’ eco-
nomic and financial policies through balance of payments and other channels.
12. Therefore, in its multilateral surveillance, the Fund will focus on issues that may
affect the effective operation of the international monetary system, including (a) glo-
bal economic and financial developments and the outlook for the global economy,
including risks to global economic and financial stability, and (b) the spillovers aris-
ing from policies of individual members that may significantly influence the effec-
tive operation of the international monetary system, for example by undermining
global economic and financial stability. The policies of members that may be rel-
evant for this purpose include exchange rate, monetary, fiscal, and financial sector
policies and policies respecting capital flows.
B. The Modalities of Surveillance
13. The Fund’s assessment of an individual member’s policies and its advice to a
member in the context of surveillance will be conducted in a manner that is con-
sistent with the following modalities. Except where they are expressly limited in
their application to bilateral surveillance, these modalities shall apply to policy dis-
cussions between the Fund and individual members whether they take place in the
context of bilateral or multilateral surveillance.
14. Continuous dialogue and persuasion are key pillars of effective surveillance. The
Fund, in its surveillance over the policies of individual members, will clearly and
candidly assess relevant economic developments, prospects, risks, and policies of
the member in question, and advise on these. Such assessments, advice and discus-
sion of alternative policies are intended to assist that member in making policy
choices, and to enable other members to discuss these policy choices with that mem-
ber. The Fund will foster an environment of frank and open dialogue and mutual
trust with each member and will be evenhanded across members, affording similar
treatment to members in similar relevant circumstances.
15. The Fund’s assessment of a member’s policies and its advice on these policies
will pay due regard to the circumstances of the member. This assessment and advice
will be formulated within the framework of a comprehensive analysis of the general
economic situation and economic policy strategy of the member, and will pay due
regard to the member’s implementation capacity. Moreover, in advising members
on the manner in which they may promote their balance of payments and domestic
stability and the effective operation of the international monetary system, the Fund
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shall, to the extent permitted under Article IV, take into account the member’s other
objectives and shall respect its domestic social and political policies.
16. The Fund’s assessment of a member’s policies and its advice to the member will
be informed by, and be consistent with, a multilateral framework that incorporates
relevant aspects of the global and regional economic and financial environment,
including exchange rates, international capital market conditions, and key linkages
among members. In the context of bilateral surveillance, the Fund’s assessment and
advice will take into account the impact of a member’s policies on other members
to the extent that the member’s policies undermine the promotion of its own bal-
ance of payments or domestic stability.
17. The Fund’s assessment of a member’s policies and its advice to a member will,
to the extent possible, be placed in the context of an examination of the member’s
medium-term objectives and the planned conduct of policies, including possible
responses to the most relevant contingencies.
18. The Fund’s assessment of a member’s policies will always include an evalua-
tion of the developments in the member’s balance of payments, including the size
and sustainability of capital flows, against the background of its reserves, the size
and composition of its other external assets and its external liabilities, and its oppor-
tunities for access to international capital markets.
PART II - PRINCIPLES FOR THE GUIDANCE OF MEMBERS’
POLICIES
19. It is recognized that a member’s overall mix of economic and financial policies,
including both exchange rate and domestic policies, contributes to the members’
balance of payments stability and domestic stability and may impact the stability of
the international monetary system. Set out below are (i) principles that are adopted
for the purposes of bilateral surveillance and that provide guidance to members in
the conduct of their exchange rate policies and their domestic economic and finan-
cial policies; and (ii) guidance that is adopted for the purpose of multilateral sur-
veillance and that provides encouragement to members in the conduct of economic
and financial policies with a view to ensuring the effective operation of the inter-
national monetary system.
(i) Bilateral Surveillance
20. Principles A through D below are adopted pursuant to Article IV, Section 3 (b)
and are intended to provide guidance to members in the conduct of their exchange
rate policies in accordance with their obligations under Article IV, Section 1. Prin-
ciple E is adopted pursuant to Article IV, Section 1 and is intended to provide guid-
ance to members in the conduct of their domestic economic and financial policies.
The Fund recognizes that members have legitimate policy objectives, including
domestic social and political policy objectives that are beyond the scope of Article
IV and accordingly beyond the scope of this Decision. The Principles set out in
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paragraph 21 of this Decision respect the domestic social and political policies of
members. The Fund will apply these Principles evenhandedly and pay due regard to
the circumstances of members. Members are presumed to be implementing policies
that are consistent with the Principles. When, in the context of surveillance, a ques-
tion arises as to whether a particular member is implementing policies consistent
with the Principles, the Fund will give the member the benefit of any reasonable
doubt, including with respect to an assessment of fundamental exchange rate mis-
alignment. In circumstances where the Fund has determined that a member is imple-
menting policies that are not consistent with these Principles and is informing the
member as to what policy adjustments should be made to address this situation, the
Fund will take into consideration the disruptive impact that excessively rapid adjust-
ment would have on the member’s economy.
21. Principle A sets forth the obligation contained in Article IV, Section 1(iii); fur-
ther guidance on its meaning is provided in the Annex to this Decision. Principles
B through E constitute recommendations rather than obligations of members. A
determination by the Fund that a member is not following one of these recommen-
dations would not create a presumption that that member is in breach of its obli-
gations under Article IV, Section 1.
A. A member shall avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary
system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an
unfair competitive advantage over other members.
B. A member should intervene in the exchange market if necessary to counter dis-
orderly conditions, which may be characterized inter alia by disruptive short-term
movements in the exchange rate of its currency.
C. Members should take into account in their intervention policies the interests of
other members, including those of the countries in whose currencies they intervene.
D. A member should avoid exchange rate policies that result in balance of payments
instability.
E. A member should seek to avoid domestic economic and financial policies that
give rise to domestic instability.
22. In its surveillance of the observance by members of the Principles set forth
above, the Fund shall consider the following developments as among those which
would require thorough review and might indicate the need for discussion with a
member:
(i) protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in the exchange market;
(ii) official or quasi-official borrowing that either is unsustainable or brings
unduly high liquidity risks, or excessive and prolonged official or quasi-
official accumulation of foreign assets, for balance of payments purposes;
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(iii) (a) the introduction, substantial intensification, or prolonged maintenance, for
balance of payments purposes, of restrictions on, or incentives for, current
transactions or payments, or (b) the introduction or substantial modification
for balance of payments purposes of restrictions on, or incentives for, the
inflow or outflow of capital;
(iv) the pursuit, for balance of payments purposes, of monetary and other finan-
cial policies that provide abnormal encouragement or discouragement to capi-
tal flows;
(v) fundamental exchange rate misalignment;
(vi) large and prolonged current account deficits or surpluses; and
(vii) large external sector vulnerabilities, including liquidity risks, arising from pri-
vate capital flows.
(ii) Multilateral Surveillance
23. Beyond members’ obligations under Article IV Section 1, and recognizing that
a member’s policies may have a significant impact on other members and on global
economic and financial stability, members are encouraged to implement exchange
rate and domestic economic and financial policies that, in themselves or in combi-
nation with the policies of other members, are conducive to the effective operation
of the international monetary system.
PART III - PROCEDURES FOR SURVEILLANCE
24. In conducting surveillance, the Fund will make use of various procedures and
will adapt these to changing circumstances. As described below, Article IV consul-
tations with members serve as vehicles for both bilateral and multilateral surveil-
lance, except for ad hoc consultations referred to in paragraph 29 which are a
vehicle for bilateral surveillance. Other procedures serve as vehicles for multilateral
surveillance.
25. Each country that becomes a member of the Fund after the adoption of this deci-
sion shall, within thirty days of the date of its membership, notify the Fund in appro-
priate detail of the exchange arrangements it intends to apply in fulfillment of its
obligations under Article IV, Section 1. Each member, regardless of its date of mem-
bership, shall notify the Fund promptly of any changes in its exchange arrange-
ments.
A. Article IV Consultations
26. Members shall consult with the Fund regularly under Article IV to enable the
Fund to (i) assess members’ compliance with their obligations under Article IV, Sec-
tion 1 and, in particular, to exercise firm surveillance over the conduct of their
exchange rate policies, and (ii) discuss with members the impact of their policies on
the operation of the international monetary system. In principle, the consultations
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under Article IV shall comprehend the regular consultations under Articles VIII and
XIV, and shall take place annually. They shall include consideration of the obser-
vance by members of the principles and guidance set forth in paragraphs 21 and 23
of this Decision as well as of a member’s obligations under Article IV, Section 1. In
addition, they shall include a discussion of the spillover effects of a member’s
exchange rate and domestic economic and financial policies that may significantly
influence the effective operation of the international monetary system, for example,
by undermining global economic and financial stability.
27. It is expected that no later than sixty-five days after the termination of discus-
sions between the member and the staff, the Executive Board will reach conclu-
sions and thereby complete the consultation under Article IV, except in the case of
consultations with members eligible for financing under the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Trust established by Decision No. 8759- (87/176), ESAF, as amended,
where it is expected that the Executive Board will reach conclusions no later than
three months from the termination of discussions between the member and the staff.
B. Bilateral Surveillance – Ad hoc Article IV Consultations
28. The Managing Director shall maintain close contact with members in connec-
tion with their exchange arrangements and their policies under Article IV, Section
1, and will be prepared to discuss on the initiative of a member important changes
that it contemplates in its exchange arrangements or its policies.
29. (a) Whenever the Managing Director considers that important economic or
financial developments are likely to affect a member’s exchange rate policies or the
behavior of the exchange rate of its currency, the Managing Director shall, in the
context of the Fund’s exercise of firm surveillance over members’ exchange rate
policies, initiate informally and confidentially a discussion with the member. After
such discussion the Managing Director may report to the Executive Board or infor-
mally advise the Executive Directors and, if the Executive Board considers it appro-
priate, an ad hoc Article IV consultation between the member and the Fund shall be
conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in subparagraph (b) below.
(b) A staff report will be circulated to the Executive Directors under cover of a note
from the Secretary specifying a tentative date for Executive Board discussion which
will be at least 15 days later than the date upon which the report is circulated. The
Secretary’s note will also set out a draft decision taking note of the staff report and
completing the ad hoc consultation without discussion or approval of the views con-
tained in the report; the decision will be adopted upon the expiration of the two-
week period following the circulation of the staff report to the Executive Directors
unless, within such period, there is a request from an Executive Director or decision
of the Managing Director to place the report on the agenda of the Executive Board.
If the staff report is placed on the agenda, the Executive Board will discuss the
report and will reach conclusions which will be reflected in a summing up.
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(c) Unless otherwise decided by the Executive Board, the conduct of an ad hoc con-
sultation with a member will not affect the consultation cycle applicable to the
member or the deadline for completion of the next consultation with the member.
C. Other Multilateral Surveillance Activities
(i) Periodic Reports on the International Monetary System
30. The Fund will assess all issues relevant for the effective operation of the inter-
national monetary system, as described in paragraph 11 of this Decision. These
assessments may take the form of periodic or ad hoc reports produced by staff for
discussion by the Executive Board. In particular, broad developments in exchange
rates will be reviewed periodically by the Fund, inter alia in discussions of the inter-
national adjustment process within the framework of the World Economic Outlook.
The Fund will continue to conduct consultations in preparing for these discussions.
In order to inform the Fund’s oversight of the operation of the international mon-
etary system, the Managing Director may collaborate with other international bod-
ies in conducting assessments of relevant issues.
(ii) Multilateral Consultations
31. Whenever the Managing Director considers that an issue has arisen in a policy
area or a member country that may significantly influence the effective operation of
the international monetary system, and that requires collaboration among members
that is not already effectively taking place in another forum in which the Fund is a
party, the Managing Director shall informally and confidentially discuss the issue
with the relevant members. When the Managing Director forms the view that a mul-
tilateral consultation is necessary, the Managing Director may recommend such a
consultation to the Executive Board, which may decide that a multilateral consul-
tation will be held. Members shall consult with the Fund in a manner that is con-
sistent with the decision of the Executive Board.
32. A multilateral consultation will consist of discussions between Fund staff and
management and officials of relevant member countries, including, in the case of a
currency union, with officials of relevant union-level institutions. The Fund will
facilitate discussions among participating members and encourage them to agree on
policy adjustments that will promote the effective operation of the international
monetary system. In these discussions, the Fund will provide analysis and propose
policy options that participating members may adopt, and may advise on the effect
of different combinations of policy adjustments. During the course of these discus-
sions, the Executive Board will be briefed by the Managing Director.
33. After the conclusion of these discussions, the Managing Director will report to
the Executive Board on the discussions, any agreed policy adjustments and their
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impact on the participating members and the operation of the international mon-
etary system. The Executive Board will conclude the multilateral consultation with
the formal consideration of this report.
PART IV - REVIEW
34. It is expected that the Fund will review this Decision and its general implemen-
tation at intervals of three years, and at such other times as consideration of such
matters may be placed on the agenda of the Executive Board.
ANNEX
Article IV. Section 1(iii) and Principle A
1. Article IV, Section 1 (iii) of the Fund’s Articles provides that members shall
“avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order
to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competi-
tive advantage over other members.” The language of this provision is repeated in
Principle A contained in Part II of this Decision. The text set forth below is designed
to provide further guidance regarding the meaning of this provision.
2. A member would only be acting inconsistently with Article IV, Section 1(iii) if
the Fund determined both that: (a) the member was manipulating its exchange rate
or the international monetary system and (b) such manipulation was being carried
out for one of the two purposes specifically identified in Article IV, Section 1(iii).
(a) “Manipulation” of the exchange rate is only carried out through policies that are
targeted at—and actually affect—the level of an exchange rate. Moreover, manipu-
lation may cause the exchange rate to move or may prevent such movement.
(b) A member that is manipulating its exchange rate would only be acting incon-
sistently with Article IV, Section 1(iii) if the Fund were to determine that such
manipulation was being undertaken “in order to prevent effective balance of pay-
ments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members.”
In that regard, a member will only be considered to be manipulating exchange rates
in order to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members if the Fund
determines both that: (A) the member is engaged in these policies for the purpose
of securing fundamental exchange rate misalignment in the form of an undervalued
exchange rate and (B) the purpose of securing such misalignment is to increase net
exports.
3. It is the responsibility of the Fund to make an objective assessment of whether a
member is observing its obligations under Article IV, Section 1 (iii), based on all
available evidence, including consultation with the member concerned. Any repre-
sentation made by the member regarding the purpose of its policies will be given
the benefit of any reasonable doubt.
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Appendix 3. IMF Guidelines on
Conditionality (September
25, 2002)
A. Principles
1. Basis and purpose of conditionality. Conditions on the use of Fund resources
are governed by the Fund’s Articles of Agreement and implementing decisions of
the Executive Board. Conditionality – that is, program-related conditions – is
intended to ensure that Fund resources are provided to members to assist them in
resolving their balance of payments problems in a manner that is consistent with the
Fund’s Articles and that establishes adequate safeguards for the temporary use of
the Fund’s resources.
2. Early warning and prevention. Conditionality is one element in a broad strat-
egy for helping members strengthen their economic and financial policies. Through
formal and informal consultations, multilateral surveillance including the World
Economic Outlook and discussions of capital market developments, advice to mem-
bers on the voluntary adoption of appropriate standards and codes, and the provi-
sion of technical assistance, the Fund encourages members to adopt sound economic
and financial policies as a precaution against the emergence of balance of payments
difficulties, or to take corrective measures at an early stage of the development of
difficulties.
3. Ownership and capacity to implement programs. National ownership of
sound economic and financial policies and an adequate administrative capacity are
crucial for successful implementation of Fund-supported programs. In responding
to members’ requests to use Fund resources and in setting program-related condi-
tions, the Fund will be guided by the principle that the member has primary respon-
sibility for the selection, design, and implementation of its economic and financial
policies. The Fund will encourage members to seek to broaden and deepen the base
of support for sound policies in order to enhance the likelihood of successful imple-
mentation.
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4. Circumstances of members. In helping members to devise economic and
financial programs, the Fund will pay due regard to the domestic social and politi-
cal objectives, the economic priorities, and the circumstances of members, includ-
ing the causes of their balance of payments problems and their administrative
capacity to implement reforms. Conditionality and program design will also reflect
the member’s circumstances and the provisions of the facility under which the
Fund’s financing is being provided. The causes of balance of payments difficulties
and the emphasis to be given to various program goals may differ among members,
and the appropriate financing, the specification and sequencing of policy adjust-
ments, and the time required to correct the problem will reflect those and other dif-
ferences in circumstances. The member’s past performance in implementing
economic and financial policies will be taken into account as one factor affecting
conditionality, with due consideration to changes in circumstances that would indi-
cate a break with past performance.
5. Approval of access to Fund resources. The Fund will ensure consistency in
the application of policies relating to the use of its resources with a view to main-
taining the uniform treatment of members. A member’s request to use Fund
resources will be approved only if the Fund is satisfied that the member’s program
is consistent with the Fund’s provisions and policies and that it will be carried out,
and in particular that the member is sufficiently committed to implement the pro-
gram. The Managing Director will be guided by these principles in making recom-
mendations to the Executive Board with respect to the approval of the use of Fund
resources by members.
6. Focus on program goals. Fund-supported programs should be directed pri-
marily toward the following macroeconomic goals
(a) solving the member’s balance of payments problem without recourse to mea-
sures destructive of national or international prosperity; and
(b) achieving medium-term external viability while fostering sustainable economic
growth.
7. Scope of conditions. Program-related conditions governing the provision of
Fund resources will be applied parsimoniously and will be consistent with the fol-
lowing principles:
(a) Conditions will be established only on the basis of those variables or measures
that are reasonably within the member’s direct or indirect control and that are,
generally, either (i) of critical importance for achieving the goals of the mem-
ber’s program or for monitoring the implementation of the program, or (ii) nec-
essary for the implementation of specific provisions of the Articles or policies
adopted under them. In general, all variables or measures that meet these cri-
teria will be established as conditions.
(b) Conditions will normally consist of macroeconomic variables and structural
measures that are within the Fund’s core areas of responsibility. Variables and
measures that are outside the Fund’s core areas of responsibility may also be
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established as conditions but may require more detailed explanation of their
critical importance. The Fund’s core areas of responsibility in this context com-
prise: macroeconomic stabilization; monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate poli-
cies, including the underlying institutional arrangements and closely related
structural measures; and financial system issues related to the functioning of
both domestic and international financial markets.
(c) Program-related conditions may contemplate the member meeting particular
targets or objectives (outcomes-based conditionality), or taking (or refraining
from taking) particular actions (actions-based conditionality). The formulation
of individual conditions will be based, in particular, upon the circumstances of
the member.
8. Responsibility of the Fund for conditionality. The Fund is fully responsible for
the establishment and monitoring of all conditions attached to the use of its
resources. There will be no cross-conditionality, under which the use of the Fund’s
resources would be directly subjected to the rules or decisions of other organiza-
tions. When establishing and monitoring conditions based on variables and mea-
sures that are not within its core areas of responsibility, the Fund will, to the fullest
extent possible, draw on the advice of other multilateral institutions, particularly the
World Bank. The application of a ‘lead agency’ framework, such as between the
Fund and the Bank, will be implemented flexibly to take account of the circum-
stances of members and the overlapping interests of the two institutions with respect
to some aspects of members’ policies. The Fund’s policy advice, program design,
and conditionality will, insofar as possible, be consistent and integrated with those
of other international institutions within a coherent country-led framework. The
roles of each institution, including any relevant conditionality, will be stated clearly
in Fund-related program documents.
B. Modalities
9. Nature of Fund arrangements. A Fund arrangement is a decision of the
Executive Board by which a member is assured that it will be able to make pur-
chases or receive disbursements from the Fund in accordance with the terms of the
decision during a specified period and up to a specified amount. Fund arrangements
are not international agreements and therefore language having a contractual con-
notation will be avoided in arrangements and in program documents. Appropriate
consultation clauses will be incorporated in all arrangements.
10. Members’ program documents. The authorities’ policy intentions will be
described in documents such as a Letter of Intent (LOI), or a Memorandum on Eco-
nomic and financial Policies (MEFP) that may be accompanied by a Technical
Memorandum of Understanding (TMU). These documents will be prepared by the
authorities, with the cooperation and assistance of the Fund staff, and will be sub-
mitted to the Managing Director for circulation to the Executive Board. The docu-
ments should reflect the authorities’ policy goals and strategies. In addition to
conditions specified in these documents, members requesting the use of Fund
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resources may in exceptional cases communicate confidential policy understand-
ings to the Fund in a side letter addressed to the Managing Director and disclosed
to the Executive Board. In all their program documents, the authorities should
clearly distinguish between the conditions on which the Fund’s financial support
depends and other elements of the program. Detailed policy matrices covering the
broader agenda should be avoided in program documents such as LOIs and MEFPs
unless they are considered necessary by the authorities to express their policy inten-
tions.
11. Monitoring of performance. The implementation of the member’s under-
standings with the Fund may be monitored, in particular, on the basis of prior
actions, performance criteria, program and other reviews, and other variables and
measures established as structural benchmarks or indicative targets.
(a) Prior actions. A member may be expected to adopt measures prior to the Fund’s
approval of an arrangement, completion of a review, or the granting of a waiver
with respect to a performance criterion when it is critical for the successful
implementation of the program that such actions be taken to underpin the
upfront implementation of important measures. In reaching understandings on
prior actions, the Fund will also take into account the strain that excessive reli-
ance upon such actions can place on members’ implementation capacity. The
Managing Director will keep Executive Directors informed in an appropriate
manner of the progress of discussions with the member.
(b) Performance criteria. A performance criterion is a variable or measure whose
observance or implementation is established as a formal condition for the mak-
ing of purchases or disbursements under a Fund arrangement. Performance cri-
teria will apply to clearly-specified variables or measures that can be objectively
monitored by the staff and are so critical for the achievement of the program
goals or monitoring implementation that purchases or disbursements under the
arrangement should be interrupted in cases of nonobservance. The number and
content of performance criteria may vary because of the diversity of circum-
stances and institutional arrangements of members.
(c) Reviews. Reviews are conducted by the Executive Board.
(i) Program reviews. Program reviews provide a framework for an assess-
ment of whether the program is broadly on track and whether modifica-
tions are necessary. A program review will be completed only if the
Executive Board is satisfied, based on the member’s past performance and
policy understandings for the future, that the program remains on track to
achieve its objectives. In making this assessment, the Executive Board will
take into consideration, in particular, the member’s observance of perfor-
mance criteria, indicative targets, and structural benchmarks, and the need
to safeguard Fund resources. The elements of a member’s program that
will be taken into account for the completion of a review will be specified
as fully and transparently as possible in the arrangement. Arrangements
will provide for reviews to take place at a frequency appropriate to the
member’s circumstances. Reviews are expected to be held every six
months, but substantial uncertainties concerning major economic trends or
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policy implementation may warrant more frequent monitoring. In cases of
major delays in the completion of a review, the Managing Director will
inform Executive Directors in an appropriate manner.
(ii) Financing assurances reviews. Where the Fund is providing financial
assistance to a member that has outstanding sovereign external payments
arrears to private creditors or that, by virtue of the imposition of exchange
controls, has outstanding non-sovereign external payments arrears, the
Executive Board will conduct a financing assurances review to determine
whether adequate safeguards remain in place for the further use of the
Fund’s resources in the member’s circumstances and whether the mem-
ber’s adjustment efforts are undermined by developments in creditor-
debtor relations. More specifically, every purchase or disbursement made
available after the approval of the arrangement will, while such arrears
remain outstanding, be made subject to the completion of a financing
assurances review. Financing assurances reviews may also be established
where the member has outstanding arrears to official creditors.
(d) Other variables and measures. In monitoring the implementation of a mem-
ber’s program, the Fund may also examine variables and measures established
as indicative targets and structural benchmarks. The same principles governing
the scope of conditions set out in paragraph 7 apply to these variables and mea-
sures as well as to other program-related conditions.
(i) Indicative targets. Variables may be established as indicative targets for the
part of an arrangement for which they cannot be established as perfor-
mance criteria because of substantial uncertainty about economic trends.
As uncertainty is reduced, these targets will normally be established as per-
formance criteria, with appropriate modifications as necessary. Indicative
targets may also be established in addition to performance criteria as quan-
titative indicators to assess the member’s progress in meeting the objec-
tives of a program in the context of a program review.
(ii) Structural benchmarks. A measure may be established as a structural
benchmark where it cannot be specified in terms that may be objectively
monitored or where its non-implementation would not, by itself, warrant
an interruption of purchases or disbursements under an arrangement. Struc-
tural benchmarks are intended to serve as clear markers in the assessment
of progress in the implementation of critical structural reforms in the con-
text of a program review.
12. Waivers. The Fund will grant a waiver for nonobservance of a performance cri-
terion only if satisfied that, notwithstanding the nonobservance, the program will be
successfully implemented, either because of the minor or temporary nature of the
nonobservance or because of corrective actions taken by the authorities. The Fund
will grant a waiver of the applicability of a performance criterion only if satisfied
that, notwithstanding the unavailability of the information necessary to assess obser-
vance, the program will be successfully implemented and there is no clear evidence
that the performance criterion will not be met.
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13. Floating tranches. Conditions will normally apply to specified dates or continu-
ously. However, when the Fund judges that the member will need to implement a
particular structural measure or meet a particular performance target during the pro-
gram period but
not necessarily by a specific date, and when flexibility in timing would promote
national ownership, the arrangement may provide for the purchase or disbursement
of Fund resources to be made available whenever the measure is implemented or
the target observed. These
floating tranches are expected to apply primarily to structural performance criteria
that are included because of their importance for medium-term external sustainabil-
ity and growth.
C. Evaluation and Review
14. Program evaluation. The staff will prepare an analysis and assessment of the
performance under programs supported by use of the Fund’s resources in connec-
tion with Article IV consultations and as appropriate in connection with further
requests for use of the Fund’s resources.
15. Periodic review. The Fund will review the application of this Decision at
intervals of two years and at such other times as consideration of it is placed on the
agenda of the Executive Board. These reviews will evaluate the consistency of con-
ditionality with these guidelines, the appropriateness and implementation of pro-
grams, and the effectiveness of policy instruments.
16. Decision No. 270-(53/95), adopted December 23, 1953, Stand-by Arrange-
ments as amended, Decision No. 6056-(79/38), adopted March 2, 1979, Guidelines
on Conditionality, and Decision No. C-3220-(01/24), adopted March 9, 2001, Con-
cluding Remarks by the Chairman – Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs,
are repealed.
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